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India’s Rapid Digital Expansion

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Over the past decade, India has experienced a rapid digitalisation process. The rise of digital financial services,  affordable internet costs, and the penetration of smartphones have transformed the way people communicate, transact and do business online.

Online payment systems, including Unified Payments Interface (UPI), have enabled real-time transactions between banks and financial systems. As much as these systems have enhanced access to finance and efficiency, they have also created new opportunities for cybercriminals.

Cybercrime has evolved alongside the shift of financial and social interactions to digital platforms. The fraud attacks on online payments, online banking, and personal information have become common and increasingly costly.

To analyse the scale and trend of cybercrime in India, this analysis will use the datasets released by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) and financial fraud data released by the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
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The Rise of Cybercrime in India
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The Rise of Cybercrime in India
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Source: National Crime Records Bureau – Crime in India Reports

The data released by the NCRB documents cybercrime incidents registered by the police at the national level under the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) and criminal provisions covering offences such as cheating, impersonation, and digital fraud. In the past, the offences were listed in the provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Following criminal law reforms in India, on 1 July 2024, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which replaced the IPC, came into force. Section 419 (cheating by impersonation), IPC, would be related to BNS Section 319 and Section 420 (cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property), which would be related to BNS Section 318(4). Similarly, crimes involving forgery and use of forged documents or electronic documents, which were previously contained in the IPC Sections 465-471, are dealt with in BNS Sections 335-340.

The data published by the NCRB represent the number of crimes that reached the point of the First Information Report (FIR) registration, meaning they reflect only cybercrime cases that were formally presented to the law enforcement system to investigate, rather than all complaints reported. The data shows that cybercrime cases increased from 27,248 in 2018 to 86,420 in 2023, a 3.17-fold increase in 5 years.

Two structural shifts are visible: the post-pandemic jump and subsequent acceleration.

However, these figures likely underestimate the true scale of cybercrime because many incidents are reported only through online complaint portals and may not result in FIR registration.
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The Financial Scale of Digital Fraud

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The Financial Scale of Digital Fraud

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Source: Ministry of Home Affairs via,  Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), and National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP)

This dataset tracks financial fraud complaints reported through the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP) and the estimated financial losses associated with those complaints.

The financial losses reported between 2021 and 2024 increased by 41 times over four years, compared to 2021, from 551 crore to 22,848 crore. At the same time, the number of complaints rose from 262,846 to over 1.9 million, an increase of ~623%, indicating both rising victimisation and greater public awareness of reporting mechanisms.

The contrast between these two trends is striking:
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While complaints increased by around 7 times, financial losses increased by over 40 times. 

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Distribution of Cyber-Fraud Complaints and Financial Losses by Fraud Type
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Source: Ministry of Home Affairs via Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre and National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal; analysis based on reporting in Business Standard using government cyber-fraud data.
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This divergence implies an uneven relationship between the number of incidents and the financial damage that they inflict. Most cyber fraud incidents involve relatively small transaction values; however, a smaller group of fraud categories result in disproportionate numbers of financial losses.
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Distribution of Financial Losses Across Major Cyber-Fraud Categories in India

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Source: Ministry of Home Affairs via,  Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), and National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP) figures reported by The Indian Express
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As reported by The Indian Express, based on the data compiled by the I4C, investment-related scams alone account for roughly 77% of reported cyber-fraud losses, followed by smaller shares from “digital arrest” scams (8%), credit card fraud (7%), sextortion (4%), e-commerce fraud (3%), and malware or app-based fraud (1%). This distribution means that even though scams with lower values, like phishing, OTP fraud, and small payment fraud, produce a high proportion of complaints, few categories of fraud produce most of the financial losses.

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Analysis

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1. Cybercrime is expanding faster than most traditional crimes: The fact that cybercrime cases have tripled in five years shows that cyber offences are presently becoming a significant element of Indian crime. Unlike conventional crimes that require physical proximity, cybercrime can be conducted remotely and at scale, enabling perpetrators to target large numbers of victims simultaneously.

2. Financial losses are concentrated in a small set of fraud categories: As cases of cybercrimes have been on the increase, the monetary losses of digital fraud cases have been increasing at a higher rate. The fact that the number of reported financial losses has increased 40 times in 4 years indicates that cybercrime has a very high economic impact.

3. Complaint volumes and financial damage follow different patterns: When comparing complaints and financial losses, it is evident that cyber fraud losses are unevenly distributed across types of incidents. Most of the prevalent scams reported, including phishing or OTP fraud, involve relatively small transaction values but yield a high portion of complaints. Conversely, fewer categories of fraud, especially investment-based schemes, contribute a significantly higher percentage of total financial losses.

4. Digital financial infrastructure has expanded the attack surface: India’s rapid adoption of digital payment systems, mobile banking and digital  financial systems has dramatically increased the number of potential victims of cybercriminals. The scale of online transactions creates new vulnerabilities that organised cybercrime networks take advantage of.

5. Reporting improvements reveal previously hidden crime: The expansion of national reporting systems has enhanced the transparency in the trends of cybercrime. The increase in the number of complaints recorded is partially due to improved reporting systems and not necessarily to the increased criminal activity, meaning that previous data might have understated the magnitude of cyber fraud.

Recommendations
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1. Move from reactive policing to proactive cyber-risk monitoring: The conventional models of policing focus on investigation of crimes that have already taken place. With such a magnitude and pace of cyber fraud, India should have systems that are designed to detect and prevent the fraud at its early stages, such as real-time observation of suspicious patterns in transactions by financial institutions.

2. Strengthen financial intelligence sharing across institutions: There are a lot of instances of cyber fraud that use more than one bank, payment system, and telecommunication provider. To detect new networks of fraud sooner, it can be suggested to establish more information-sharing measures between the financial institution and law enforcement agencies.

3. Target organised cyber fraud networks rather than individual incidents: Many digital scams operate through organised networks that coordinate phishing, mule accounts, and fake payment channels. The solution in regard to this involves dismantling these networks through investigative procedures instead of treating incidents on a case-by-case basis.

4. Improve recovery mechanisms for stolen funds: The recovery of the funds lost is one of the most difficult issues in cases of cyber fraud. Expanding systems such as the Citizen Financial Cyber Fraud Reporting and Management System (CFCFRMS) can improve the speed at which fraudulent transactions are frozen or reversed.

5. Strengthen digital financial literacy: A significant percentage of cyber frauds are based on social engineering methods that take advantage of user behaviour as opposed to technical weaknesses. Victimisation can be greatly reduced through specific public awareness efforts on typical scam schemes.

Conclusion
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India’s experience illustrates a broader global trend: as economies digitise, crime increasingly follows the flow of digital money. While cybercrime incidents are rising steadily, the much faster growth in financial losses suggests that cybercriminals are becoming more organised, technologically sophisticated, and economically motivated.

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References:
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• https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indians-lost-rs-53000-crore-fraud-cheating-cases-six-years-maharashtra-2025-10452185/ 
• https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2226441&reg=3&lang=2 -
• https://www.ncrb.gov.in/crime-in-india.html 
• https://i4c.mha.gov.in/index.aspx 
• https://i4c.mha.gov.in/index.aspx 

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In the vast, interconnected cosmos of the internet, where knowledge and connectivity are celebrated as the twin suns of enlightenment, there lurk shadows of a more sinister nature. Here, in these darker corners, the innocence of childhood is not only exploited but also scarred, indelibly and forever. The production, distribution, and consumption of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) have surged to alarming levels globally, casting a long, ominous shadow over the digital landscape. 

In response to this pressing issue, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has unfurled a comprehensive four-part advisory, a beacon of hope aimed at combating CSAM and safeguarding the rights of children in this digital age. This advisory dated 27/10/23 is not merely a reaction to the rising tide of CSAM, but a testament to the imperative need for constant vigilance in the realm of cyber peace.

The statistics paint a sobering picture. In 2021, more than 1,500 instances of publishing, storing, and transmitting CSAM were reported, shedding a harsh light on the scale of the problem. Even more alarming is the upward trend in cases reported in subsequent years. By 2023, a staggering 450,207 cases of CSAM had already been reported, marking a significant increase from the 204,056 and 163,633 cases reported in 2022 and 2021, respectively.

The Key Aspects of Advisory

The NHRC's advisory commences with a fundamental recommendation - a redefinition of terminology. It suggests replacing the term 'Child Pornography' with 'Child Sexual Abuse Material' (CSAM). This shift in language is not merely semantic; it underscores the gravity of the issue, emphasizing that this is not about pornography but child abuse. 

Moreover, the advisory calls for the definition of 'sexually explicit' under Section 67B of the IT Act, 2000. This step is crucial for ensuring the prompt identification and removal of online CSAM. By giving a clear definition, law enforcement can act swiftly in removing such content from the internet.

The digital world knows no borders, and CSAM can easily cross jurisdictional lines. NHRC recognizes this challenge and proposes that laws be harmonized across jurisdictions through bilateral agreements. Moreover, it recommends pushing for the adoption of a UN draft Convention on 'Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes' at the General Assembly.

One of the critical aspects of the advisory is the strengthening of law enforcement. NHRC advocates for the creation of Specialized State Police Units in every state and union territory to handle CSAM-related cases. The central government is expected to provide support, including grants, to set up and equip these units. 

The NHRC further recommends establishing a Specialized Central Police Unit under the government of India's jurisdiction. This unit will focus on identifying and apprehending CSAM offenders and maintaining a repository of such content. Its role is not limited to law enforcement; it is expected to cooperate with investigative agencies, analyze patterns, and initiate the process for content takedown. This coordinated approach is designed to combat the problem effectively, both on the dark web and open web.

The role of internet intermediaries and social media platforms in controlling CSAM is undeniable. The NHRC advisory emphasizes that intermediaries must deploy technology, such as content moderation algorithms, to proactively detect and remove CSAM from their platforms. This places the onus on the platforms to be proactive in policing their content and ensuring the safety of their users. 

New Developments 

Platforms using end-to-end encryption services may be required to create additional protocols for monitoring the circulation of CSAM. Failure to do so may invite the withdrawal of the 'safe harbor' clause under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000. This measure ensures that platforms using encryption technology are not inadvertently providing safe havens for those engaged in illegal activities. 

NHRC's advisory extends beyond legal and law enforcement measures; it emphasizes the importance of awareness and sensitization at various levels. Schools, colleges, and institutions are called upon to educate students, parents, and teachers about the modus operandi of online child sexual abusers, the vulnerabilities of children on the internet, and the early signs of online child abuse. 

To further enhance awareness, a cyber curriculum is proposed to be integrated into the education system. This curriculum will not only boost digital literacy but also educate students about relevant child care legislation, policies, and the legal consequences of violating them. 

NHRC recognizes that survivors of CSAM need more than legal measures and prevention strategies. Survivors are recommended to receive support services and opportunities for rehabilitation through various means. Partnerships with civil society and other stakeholders play a vital role in this aspect. Moreover, psycho-social care centers are proposed to be established in every district to facilitate need-based support services and organization of stigma eradication programs. 

NHRC's advisory is a resounding call to action, acknowledging the critical importance of protecting children from the perils of CSAM. By addressing legal gaps, strengthening law enforcement, regulating online platforms, and promoting awareness and support, the NHRC aims to create a safer digital environment for children. 

Conclusion 

In a world where the internet plays an increasingly central role in our lives, these recommendations are not just proactive but imperative. They underscore the collective responsibility of governments, law enforcement agencies, intermediaries, and society as a whole in safeguarding the rights and well-being of children in the digital age. 

NHRC's advisory is a pivotal guide to a more secure and child-friendly digital world. By addressing the rising tide of CSAM and emphasizing the need for constant vigilance, NHRC reaffirms the critical role of organizations, governments, and individuals in ensuring cyber peace and child protection in the digital age. The active contribution from premier cyber resilience firms like Cyber Peace Foundation, amplifies the collective action forging a secure digital space, highlighting the pivotal role played by think tanks in ensuring cyber peace and resilience. 

References:

• https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nhrc-issues-advisory-regarding-child-sexual-abuse-material-on-internet-101698473197792.html
• https://ssrana.in/articles/nhrcs-advisory-proliferation-of-child-sexual-abuse-material-csam/
• https://theprint.in/india/specialised-central-police-unit-use-of-technology-to-proactively-detect-csam-nhrc-advisory/1822223/

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"India’s digital public infrastructure promises inclusion and efficiency. But when essential services depend on handing over data, children become legible to the state long before anyone listens to them."

India’s digital transformation deserves much of the praise it gets. Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) has taken public services to people at a scale few countries have managed. Still, one question gets less attention than it should: what happens when the state’s wish for a neatly administered citizen starts to override the rights of a child?

Aditi Pillai takes this up in From Principle(al) to Practice: The Child as a Datafied Digital Citizen in India’s Digital Public Infrastructure. She doesn’t argue against digital infrastructure. Her point is that its claim to serve the public can’t be separated from the power it holds over the people enrolled in it. The most obvious example is children. When they are persons with rights today, they run the risk of being reduced to administrative categories, data points and future projections. A child’s citizenship is suspended until adulthood. These days, identity, privacy and agency are important but digital governance frequently views childhood as something that needs to be tracked, controlled and maximised. 

Protection without participation

Pillai’s sharpest idea is what she calls “double paternalism.” She uses 49-story completion responses from parents who completed brief hypothetical situations regarding enrolling a child in a computerised system, as well as expert interviews. Her focus is on how parental and institutional power reinforce one another and prevent kids from making decisions about their own online life. 

Consider the Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry (APAAR), which provides a permanent academic identification for every student. Consolidating records may well help administrators. The harder questions are whether enrolment is truly voluntary, whether refusing carries a penalty, and whether a family can question how data is collected and linked without risking the child’s schooling.

The answers weren’t encouraging. Many parents either accepted enrolment despite their reservations or viewed it as a requirement that wasn’t worth challenging. Out of the 48, only four exhibited aggressive resistance and just one admitted that the adolescent in the scenario might have a voice. It is not appropriate to interpret this little qualitative study as a statistical representation of Indian parents. Nevertheless, it implies that there was never a choice and that obedience may be mistaken for informed agreement. 

That is the double edge. The state compels, or strongly nudges, parents to enrol their children. Parents then decide on the child’s behalf without involving them. Both layers claim to protect the child’s interests, and the child’s own voice is missing from both.

When convenience becomes compulsion

It is easy to treat digital systems as neutral tools. They aren’t. Every system embodies decisions about what is collected, which records are linked, who can see them, and what happens to someone who can’t or won’t comply.

Pillai points to what can follow when educational records are tied to identity systems. Persistent data trails can expose children to long-term profiling. Rigid identification rules can shut out those whose lives don’t fit the institutional template: children without reliable documents, those who have left abusive homes, those who can’t provide valid biometrics.

There is an irony here. A system built to make citizens more visible to the state can make its most vulnerable citizens less visible as people. When a child can’t meet the system’s requirements, the result is often exclusion, not accommodation.

All of this does not imply that India should abandon digital infrastructure.The true debate is whether people’s freedom of choice, privacy and equitable access should be sacrificed for efficiency.  A system can’t call itself inclusive if participation is compulsory in practice and the exceptions are badly designed.

Parents can’t carry this alone

Pillai also names “potentiality risk,” the worry that data gathered in childhood will quietly shape future opportunities, reputation or identity. A school record can outlast the circumstances that produced it. A bad year, once logged, may follow a student if institutions come to read them through a permanent digital profile.

Parents are left in an impossible spot. They are expected to guard their children against risks they may not fully understand and have little power to control. Responsibility slides from the institutions that build and run these systems to the families who must live with them. That is a weak form of accountability. Parental consent can’t justify every kind of data processing involving a child, and parents shouldn’t have to bargain one by one with schools or authorities when the alternative is losing an essential service.

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, treats children as a distinct category of data principals and requires verifiable parental consent, subject to its provisions and rules. That is a start. The deeper question remains: does a child-focused data regime only regulate what adults decide about children, or does it also leave room for children’s own evolving views and abilities? Protection without participation can turn into control by another name.

From data subjects to digital citizens

Pillai’s strategy is built on two interconnected concepts: a rights-based perspective of data justice rooted in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and participatory digital citizenship.

In actuality, this entails consulting kids before systems are developed rather than after. Parents need clear information and practical options to raise concerns about enrolment. Accessible grievance procedures, real alternatives when necessary and safeguards against exclusion are all necessary for institutions. Collection and linking of data should be proportionate to a legitimate purpose with clear accountability for how it is used later. Above all, the child’s best interests should be a standard that actually governs decisions, not a phrase invoked to excuse administrative convenience.

India’s digital ambitions and children’s rights don’t have to collide. A public system is best judged by how it treats the people least able to challenge it. The real test of a digital state is not how many people it can enrol or connect, but whether they keep their dignity and agency once inside. Children should not end up as records to be maintained or risks to be managed. They are citizens now, and their rights matter now.

References

1. Aditi Pillai, ‘From Principle(al) to Practice: The Child as a Datafied Digital Citizen in India’s Digital Public Infrastructure’ (2026) 22(2) Indian Journal of Law and Technology, Article 3. DOI: 10.55496/NFYV5618.
2. Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, s 9.
3. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.
4. Government of India, ‘G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration’ (2023).

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