#FactCheck-Fake Frontline Cover Claiming ‘Vijay Wave’ Goes Viral During Tamil Nadu Polls
Executive Summary
As Tamil Nadu voted in the 2026 Assembly elections, with 84.69 percent polling recorded on April 23, a purported cover page of Frontline magazine began circulating on social media. The viral image featured a massive rally crowd of South Indian actor and Tamilaga Vetri Kazhagam (TVK) chief Joseph Vijay, claiming that a “Vijay Wave” had emerged in the state. The alleged cover also stated that Tamil Nadu was witnessing a new political force after five decades, one that had challenged the dominance of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK).
However, research by the CyberPeace Research Wing found that the viral cover page is fake. Frontline magazine has not published any such edition, and its latest issue is related to health.
Claim:
X user “Dr. Ravishankar Sadasivam” shared the viral image on April 22, 2026, claiming the “wave is real” and suggesting that Vijay could emerge as a top contender in a three-cornered contest. The post further claimed that after MGR, Vijay was drawing the largest spontaneous crowds in Tamil Nadu politics.

Fact Check:
To verify the claim, relevant keyword searches were conducted online. During the research, a clarification post from Frontline magazine’s official X account, shared on April 22, 2026, was found. In the post, the publication clearly stated that the viral cover page was fake and had not been published by the magazine. It further said that the fabricated cover was being circulated online by supporters of TVK.

A review of the official Frontline website also found no edition carrying such a cover page.

Additionally, the viral image was analyzed using the AI detection tool Hive Moderation, which rated it as 92 percent likely to be AI-generated.

Conclusion:
The claim that Frontline magazine published a cover story on a “Vijay Wave” during the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections is false. The viral cover page is fake and is being circulated online to mislead people.
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Introduction
In today’s cybersecurity landscape, ransomware has emerged as one of the most significant and rapidly growing cyber threats. What began as attacks carried out by individual hackers has evolved into a highly organised criminal enterprise, with groups operating through structured business models and global networks. The emergence of The Gentlemen ransomware group reflects this transformation, demonstrating how modern threat actors can quickly expand their operations and target organisations across multiple sectors. Their rise highlights the increasing sophistication of ransomware campaigns and the growing challenges faced by organisations in defending against them. The attribution of the group's administrator to an identified individual in Izhevsk, Russia, provides a valuable lens through which to examine three interconnected developments: the maturation of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business models, the inherent operational security (OPSEC) weaknesses that emerge over the course of cybercriminal careers, and the geopolitical environments that enable such actors to operate with relative impunity. Together, these dynamics illustrate the industrialisation of modern cybercrime.
The Industrialisation of Ransomware-as-a-Service
The remarkable rapid rise of The Gentlemen is impossible without discussing the maturation of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). RaaS systems utilize network intrusion experts as affiliates who conduct networks intrusions and secure access in exchange for a cut of the total ransoms paid, while a core group builds and maintains the ransomware framework itself. Although Reveton, one of the earliest Raas providers, can be credited with bringing early iterations of RaaS to fruition in 2012, the potential scale was truly evident in the mid-2020s. By 2025 it was estimated that there were over 100 active ransomware gangs operating; this proliferation is the direct result of the franchise-like system, which has lowered the barriers to entry for cybercrime.
The marketplace surrounding RaaS is intensely competitive, and this is clearly exemplified in the business structure of The Gentlemen: while many of the top ransomware groups provide an 80/20 profit share (with the majority of the profit going to the affiliates), The Gentlemen has an exceptionally profitable 90/10 split (affiliates keep 90% of the profit share) for affiliates, likely to draw experienced operators away from their rivals given recent decreases in victim willingness to pay and corresponding increases in the incentives RaaS platforms are required to offer.
The operational efficiency of the group is representative of a successful enterprise. They attack vulnerable internet-facing VPNs and firewalls and generally complete the network encryption within a matter of hours, leaving defenders with very little time to respond, as confirmed by Check Point Software, a renowned cybersecurity vendor.
Additionally, PRODAFT reports that the administrator of The Gentlemen, known by the alias Zeta88 (previously known as Hastalamuerte), directly provides affiliates with SSL VPN credentials, often obtained through brutal force attacks or their own private leaked databases, indicating an unusually high level of vertical integration for RaaS groups.
AI as a Force Multiplier in Ransomware Development
A particularly significant aspect of the Hastalamuerte case is PRODAFT's finding that the administrator employs artificial intelligence to develop and maintain ransomware, support associated tooling, and assist post-exploitation operations. This reflects a broader trend observed across the 2025–2026 threat landscape, where AI has increasingly lowered the capability threshold for participation in organised cybercrime. Researchers have documented its role in automating stages of intrusion, accelerating malware development cycles, and simplifying the maintenance of malicious infrastructure. These capabilities have been leveraged by both nation-state actors and criminal enterprises.
The trajectory of Hastalamuerte is especially illustrative. Cybersecurity Forum posts during 2019-2020 depict a hacker who is fairly novice at fundamental penetration testing procedures. A subsequent emergence as the operator of a top-tier ransomware-as-a-service operation indicates that AI-assisted development may be responsible for dramatically reducing the skill level and time necessary to create a successful criminal enterprise in cyberspace. The evolution of these tools should make the route from novice forum user to accomplished ransomware operator more attainable for a wider array of perpetrators in the future.
The OPSEC Paradox: How Cybercriminals Leave a Trail
The attribution of Hastalamuerte's identity by researchers from Intel 471, Flashpoint, and Constella Intelligence demonstrates the effectiveness of modern open-source and commercial intelligence methodologies. A forum registration traceable to an IP address from Izhevsk, Russia linked a Protonmail address, which linked to an Apple account, a GitHub profile, a Telegram handle, a Russian phone number, and finally to a 36 year old marketing professional named Alexander Andreevich Yapaev who was also living in Izhevsk. Investigators did not use an advanced capability in their attribution, but rather a simple OPSEC mistake of consistently reusing credentials. Every username and email address and every phone number creates a linkage between disparate data points, eventually building into a real-world persona.
It has also come out in the forum discussion that while training for a penetration testing course in 2020, Hastalamuerte displayed the kind of inexperience that a novice would display in traceable, recorded fashion to intelligence databases. It's an example of a broader rule about attribution; attacker mistakes provide the most value. With Russians the lack of apparent consequences may contribute to a lack of need to maintain tight OPSEC from the start.
The Russian Safe Haven: Conditional Impunity and Its Limits
Yapaev's base in Izhevsk is emblematic of the geostrategic situation that has allowed Russian cybercriminality to prosper. Security researchers routinely label Russia's policy as one of "controlled impunity," where the cybercriminality directed at foreign entities is ignored or implicitly condoned, while that directed at Russian interests will prompt a law enforcement response. This constitutes what has been called a "managed market" rather than an "unconditional sanctuary," where many of the named defendants could and likely will continue their illegal enterprise with little fear of reprisal, provided that they do not threaten the interests of the Russian state and do not attempt to move their operations outside of Russian control.
Yet this protection is neither absolute nor permanent. In May 2024, the transnational Operation Endgame campaign highlighted the growing global appetite for damaging the cybercrime ecosystem rooted in Russia. Russian authorities did indeed pursue and seize some assets and operators, but arrests seem largely confined to the lower-rung facilitators of these attacks (hosting providers and payment services), and it seems higher-end ransomware operators continue to evade scrutiny. Selective enforcement thus further bolsters the perception that protection is accorded according to strategic value, not legal standards. For operators such as Hastalamuerte, who possess no publicly documented intelligence connections, growing attribution capabilities, and sustained international pressure may gradually erode the security traditionally associated with operating from within Russia.
Attribution as a Deterrence Instrument
The public identification of Alexander Andreevich Yapaev as Hastalamuerte/Zeta88 shows the continued struggle with the utility of attribution in situations where immediate prosecution is not feasible. Its utility is far more extensive than simply an ability to make an arrest. Functionally, public naming forces a perpetrator into an open evidentiary space and can lead to alterations in their operational habits and effectiveness. Strategically, attribution provides future leverage for sanctions, indictments, financial restrictions, or extradition if the target can leave their safe haven country. The logic behind US rewards programs (paying up to $10 million for the capture and conviction of ransomware operators) relies on this principle. The analytical insight provided by the case cannot be understated either. Hastalamuerte's trajectory from a relative amateur forum participant on Nulled and Raidforums in 2019 to leading a significant ransomware operation by 2026 offers an invaluable look into the career progression of a cyber criminal. It confirms one of the lessons learned through deterrence and attribution: pseudonymity is not everlasting, and many years of OPSEC failures can be pieced together to establish a real-world identity.
Conclusion
The Gentlemen incident is emblematic of the three broad themes that currently characterise cyber warfare: ransomware-as-a-service through innovative competition, common OPSEC failures that enable attribution, and a new, conditional regime of protection for Russian cybercriminals. The obvious defense lesson: increasing attack surfaces require stronger identity, behavioural monitoring, and intelligence capacities. The policy lesson: effective attribution is still an essential tool for comprehension, deterrence, and disruption in an increasingly industrialised environment of criminals supporting each other's operations in ransomware-as-a-service.
References
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/06/who-runs-the-ransomware-group-the-gentlemen/
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/
- https://www.vectra.ai/topics/ransomware-as-a-service
- https://www.trmlabs.com/es/resources/blog/new-disruption-opportunities-in-the-evolving-ransomware-ecosystem

Executive Summary
A video clip of Indian Army Chief Upendra Dwivedi is being widely shared across social media platforms with the claim that he criticised the Indian government's policy towards Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. In the viral clip, the Army Chief is allegedly heard saying that India is doing nothing except sending money to the Taliban government due to the Centre’s failed policies.
However, CyberPeace Research Wing research found the claim to be false. The viral video is a deepfake. In the original footage, General Upendra Dwivedi was speaking about Operation Sindoor and the preparedness of the Indian Armed Forces for a possible “Operation Sindoor 2.0.” He made no remarks regarding the Taliban or the government’s Afghanistan policy.
Claim
An X user named “XaQil” shared the viral video on May 31, 2026, with the caption:“Due to failed policies of the Central Government, India is doing nothing except sending Money to Taliban government. How can money alone do everything?” — Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi.

Fact Check
In the viral video, General Dwivedi is purportedly heard making remarks about India’s Afghanistan policy, the Taliban, Pakistan, Iran, and India’s diplomatic position. To verify the claim, we searched for the original source of the video. A reverse image search of key frames led us to the authentic footage posted by news agency ANI on its official X account on May 30, 2026.

In the original video, General Dwivedi was responding to a question about Operation Sindoor. He stated that the operation was still ongoing, hostilities had only paused temporarily, and that the Indian Armed Forces were fully prepared if “Operation Sindoor 2.0” became necessary.
He also spoke about enhancing coordination among the three services and maintaining operational readiness.”
No part of his statement mentioned the Taliban, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, or criticism of the Central Government.
Further corroboration came from media reports covering the same event. According to a report published by Navbharat Times on May 30, 2026, General Dwivedi made the remarks during the passing-out parade of the 150th course of the National Defence Academy (NDA), where he attended as the chief guest. He reiterated that the armed forces were fully prepared for “Operation Sindoor 2.0” if required.

Since the content of the viral clip did not match the original statement, we examined it using InVID’s MeVer Deepfake Detector. The tool flagged signs of AI manipulation and indicated that the video had likely been altered.

Conclusion
Cyber Peace Foundation found that the viral video purportedly showing Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi criticising the Indian government’s policy towards the Taliban is a deepfake. The Army Chief made no such remarks. The original video was recorded during an NDA event, where he spoke about Operation Sindoor and the preparedness of the Indian Armed Forces for a possible future operation. The viral clip has been manipulated using AI to spread a false narrative.

Executive Summary:
A video showing poor runway visibility from inside an aircraft cockpit is being widely shared on social media, linking it to an alleged aircraft accident involving Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar in Baramati on January 28, 2025. Users claim that the footage captured the final moments before the crash, suggesting that the runway visibility disappeared just seconds before landing. However, research conducted by the CyberPeace found the viral claim to be misleading. The research revealed that the video has no connection to any aircraft accident involving Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar. In reality, the video dates back to 2013 and shows a pilot attempting to land an aircraft amid heavy rain. During the approach, the runway briefly disappears from the pilot’s view, prompting the pilot to abort the landing and execute a go-around. The aircraft later lands safely after weather conditions improve.
Claim
An Instagram user shared the viral video on January 29, 2026, claiming:“Baramati plane crash: video of the aircraft accident surfaces. Runway disappears just three seconds before landing.” (The link to the post, its archived version, and screenshots are provided below.)

Fact Check
To verify the claim, we extracted keyframes from the viral video and conducted a reverse image search using Google Lens. The search led us to the same video uploaded on a YouTube channel named douglesso, which was published on June 12, 2013. (Footage link and screenshot available below.)

Further research led us to a report published by the American media website CNET, which featured the same visual. According to the report, the video shows a Boeing Business Jet attempting to land during heavy rainfall. The aircraft was conducting a CAT I Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach when a sudden downpour drastically reduced visibility at decision height. As the runway briefly disappeared from view, the pilots aborted the landing and carried out a go-around. The aircraft later landed safely once weather conditions improved. (The link to the CNET report and its screenshot are provided below.)
- https://www.cnet.com/culture/this-is-what-happens-when-a-plane-is-landing-and-the-runway-disappears/

Conclusion
Our research confirms that the video circulating on social media is unrelated to any recent aircraft accident involving Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar. The clip is an old video from 2013, which is now being shared with a false and misleading claim.