#FactCheck: AI-Generated Video Falsely Shows Captain Smith Machhar’s Image Displayed on Burj Khalifa

Introduction

For years, Indian companies could get away with vague privacy promises. That window closed on 13 November 2025, when the government notified the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, giving teeth to the broad principles Parliament had passed back in 2023 under the DPDP Act. The Rules turned soft commitments into specific, auditable duties, and a lot of organisations are only now realising how much that actually changes.

Start with Section 8(4). It requires every Data Fiduciary to put "appropriate technical and organisational measures" in place. Most readers skim past "organisational" and focus on the technical half, but that's a mistake, because the word is doing real work. It's asking for defined roles, written policies, staff training, and someone actually watching whether any of it holds up over time, not just firewalls and encryption keys. Section 8(5) goes further, demanding reasonable security safeguards against breaches, and Rule 6 spells out exactly what that phrase means in practice: encrypt data at rest and in transit, restrict access on a need to know basis, require multi factor authentication, log and monitor activity, run regular vulnerability checks, bind your data processors contractually to the same standard, and keep relevant logs for at least a year.

Then there's Rule 7, and this is where the clock starts running. Once a Data Fiduciary becomes aware of a breach, the Data Protection Board must be told without delay, and a full report has to follow within 72 hours covering what happened, when, why, what's being done about it, and confirmation that affected individuals were notified. Unlike GDPR, there's no minimum severity threshold here. A breach affecting ten people triggers the same obligation as one affecting ten million. And CERT-In's existing six hour reporting window under its 2022 Directions still applies separately, which means a serious incident can trigger two overlapping regulatory clocks running side by side.

Put all of this together and a pattern emerges. The law assumes an organisation already knows what it's protecting, has actually protected it, kept usable records the whole way through, and can explain clearly what happened the moment something breaks. That coordination job belongs to Governance, Risk and Compliance, or GRC for short. GRC decides who's accountable, which risks actually matter, which controls address them, and how anyone checks whether compliance is real rather than assumed. Skip that structure and security work tends to splinter into a pile of disconnected tasks nobody truly owns.

GRC gives a legal duty somewhere to live. Forensic readiness is what lets an organisation prove, months or years later, that the duty was actually being met.

The Role of Governance, Risk and Compliance

On paper, most cybersecurity programmes look fine. There's an incident response plan somewhere, access control rules exist, logging is "in place," and someone has a title that says they're responsible for security. None of that gets tested until something actually breaks. A phishing compromise, a ransomware infection, a leaked database, a hijacked admin account, whatever the trigger, the questions that follow are always the same, and they're not comfortable ones. What happened, exactly, and when did it start? Which systems, which data, were actually touched? Were the controls the organisation claims to run genuinely functioning at that moment, or just described in a slide deck somewhere? And can anyone produce records solid enough to answer those questions with confidence rather than a shrug?

This is the exact seam where GRC and digital forensics meet. GRC lays out what's expected, who's responsible, and what evidence a control should be generating in the background. Digital forensics is the craft of taking whatever technical traces actually exist and turning them into an account of events that will hold up to scrutiny. Passing an audit was never really the point. Being able to stand in front of a regulator, mid incident, and show that the processes described on paper were real, active, and generating trustworthy evidence, that's the actual bar.

Why Compliance Alone Falls Short

Compliance, in the narrow sense, just means meeting whatever legal, contractual, or internal requirement applies. But a policy sitting in a document repository proves nothing about what actually happens on a Tuesday afternoon when someone requests admin access. A written incident response plan says nothing about whether the team can actually execute it under real pressure, at 2am, with a ransomware note on every screen. A logging policy is close to worthless if the logs it promises were switched off somewhere along the way, or overwritten, or scattered across systems that were never synchronised to the same clock.

NIST's Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 essentially built this concern into its core structure, placing "Govern" alongside Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover as one of five equal functions rather than background paperwork sitting off to the side. India's own regulatory posture pushes in the same direction. CERT-In's 2022 Directions require certain incidents to be reported within six hours of discovery, and its guidance for government entities leans heavily on documented incident handling and disciplined evidence practices. The underlying message from both is identical: figure out, before anything goes wrong, whether the evidence you'll eventually need is actually going to exist when someone asks for it.

Where GRC and Forensics Actually Connect

A good GRC programme spells out what's supposed to happen. Forensic readiness is what lets you later prove what actually did.

Access control is a useful example here. On the GRC side, an organisation might require least privilege access, multi factor authentication, periodic reviews of who holds privileged accounts, and prompt removal of access once someone leaves or changes roles. On the forensic side, none of that means anything without the underlying records that let investigators actually test it, authentication logs, MFA usage history, privilege change records, and account activity trails. The table below lines up a few common GRC controls against the specific evidence needed to show they were genuinely operating.

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A Practical Scenario: After a Ransomware Incident

Picture a mid-sized company waking up to find half its file servers encrypted. There's an incident response plan somewhere in the shared drive, technically, but nobody's actually run through it in over a year. The security team isolates the obviously compromised endpoint and starts escalating. Now the forensic side of the house has to reconstruct what happened, working backward through endpoint telemetry, authentication logs, firewall events, email traffic, and file activity, hunting for the original point of entry, how the attacker escalated privileges, how they moved sideways through the network, what data they actually touched, and finally how the ransomware got deployed.

This is where the quality of everything collected beforehand suddenly matters a great deal. If server clocks were never properly synchronised, the timeline investigators build might not line up cleanly enough to trust. If logs only ever lived locally on individual machines rather than being pulled centrally, some of them are probably gone by now. If nobody ever bothered logging administrator actions, there are going to be real, unexplained gaps in the story. And if whatever evidence does exist wasn't collected the right way, its integrity can be challenged later, sometimes fatally, in a legal or regulatory proceeding. CERT-In actually ran a programme on exactly this in July 2026, "Inside the Breach," covering system artefacts, investigative technique, and chain of custody requirements, precisely because this is where real investigations tend to succeed or quietly fall apart.

Building a Forensic Ready GRC Programme

For an organisation starting more or less from scratch, forensic readiness doesn't need to be bolted on as some separate initiative. It can be built straight into the GRC programme that already exists. Start by identifying the systems, applications, cloud services, and privileged accounts that actually matter. Map the real risks and regulatory requirements onto the controls meant to address them. Then get specific about what evidence each control should be generating, and how that evidence gets protected and kept over time. Time synchronisation, centralised logging, tightly controlled access to security records, and clear ownership of preservation, escalation, and investigation all need to exist well before an incident, not be improvised during one. And none of it means much until it's actually been tested, through tabletop exercises and simulated incidents rather than assumed to work because it's written down somewhere. NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3 frames incident response as one continuous loop of preparation, detection, response, recovery, and improvement, rather than a series of separate boxes to check.

There's one question worth asking of every important control an organisation runs: could you actually prove this was working at the moment an incident happened? If the honest answer is no, what you have is a compliance process on paper, and a forensic readiness gap sitting quietly underneath it.

Conclusion

Cyber readiness was never really about how many policies sit in a binder or how many boxes get ticked in an audit. It shows up, or doesn't, in the hours right after something breaks, when an organisation has to move fast, preserve evidence that can actually stand up to scrutiny, explain clearly what happened, and prove that governance and technical controls were genuinely working together rather than just coexisting on paper. GRC sets the direction, the accountability, the risk priorities, and the compliance expectations. Digital forensics does the work of preserving and interpreting the technical evidence once something actually happens. Forensic readiness sits in between the two, making sure they're actually talking to each other long before an incident forces the conversation. The practical task for most organisations comes down to something simple to say, if not always simple to build: design controls that hold up under real incident response, not just an auditor's checklist. The strongest compliance posture was never the one with the thickest binder. It's the one that can back every document up with evidence, on the day it actually matters.

References

1. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, Sections 8(4), 8(5), 8(6). https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Digital%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202023.pdf
2. Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, Rules 6 and 7, notified 13 November 2025. https://www.meity.gov.in
3. National Institute of Standards and Technology, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, CSWP 29, 2024. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/29/the-nist-cybersecurity-framework-csf-20/final
4. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Directions under Section 70B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, dated 28 April 2022. https://www.cert-in.org.in/Directions70B.jsp
5. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Guidelines on Information Security Practices for Government Entities. https://www.cert-in.org.in/Downloader?fileName=CIPS-2026-0014.pdf&pageid=5&type=2
6. National Institute of Standards and Technology, SP 800-86: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, 2006. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/86/final
7. International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 27037:2012, Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence. CERT-In, "Inside the Breach: Advanced Cyber Forensics & Incident Investigation," 31 July 2026. https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PRSTNVIEW03&reCode=CIWS-2026-3569
8. National Institute of Standards and Technology, SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management, 2025. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r3/final
9. Matters.ai, "DPDP Breach Notification: 72-Hour Rule & ₹200 Cr Penalty." https://www.matters.ai/article/dpdp-breach-notification MediaNama, "Data Breach Reporting Timeline of DPDP Rules 2025 Explained." https://www.medianama.com/2025/11/223-data-breach-reporting-timeline-of-dpdp-rules-2025-explained/

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Executive Summary:

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A dramatic image circulating online, showing a Boeing 787 of Air India  engulfed in flames after crashing into a building in Ahmedabad, is not a genuine photograph from the incident. Our research has confirmed it was created using artificial intelligence.

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Claim:

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Social media posts and forwarded messages allege that the image shows the actual crash of Air India Flight AI‑171 near Ahmedabad airport on June 12, 2025.

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Fact Check:

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In our research to validate the authenticity of the viral image, we conducted a reverse image search and analyzed it using AI-detection tools like Hive Moderation. The image showed clear signs of manipulation, distorted details, and inconsistent lighting. Hive Moderation flagged it as “Likely AI-generated”, confirming it was synthetically created and not a real photograph.

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In contrast, verified visuals and information about the Air India Flight AI-171 crash have been published by credible news agencies like The Indian Express and  Hindustan Times, confirmed by the aviation authorities. Authentic reports include on-ground video footage and official statements, none of which feature the viral image. This confirms that the circulating photo is unrelated to the actual incident.

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Conclusion:

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The viral photograph is a fabrication, created by AI, not a real depiction of the Ahmedabad crash. It does not represent factual visuals from the tragedy. It’s essential to rely on verified images from credible news agencies and official investigation reports when discussing such sensitive events.

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• Claim: An Air India Boeing aircraft crashed into a building near Ahmedabad airport
• Claimed On:  Social Media
• Fact Check: False and Misleading 

Executive Summary

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A video is being widely circulated on social media by Pakistani users as propaganda against the Indian Army. In the video, a man can be seen being beaten by a group of women in the middle of a road. Based on the viral video, it is being claimed that in Phuket, Thailand, Lieutenant General Rajiv Kiran Sahni, DG EME of the Indian Army, was thrashed by "ladyboys" after he allegedly harassed them and refused to pay the full amount.

Research by the CyberPeace Research Wing  found the viral claim to be misleading and baseless. The viral video has no connection with Lieutenant General Rajiv Kiran Sahni (DG EME) of the Indian Army. According to credible media reports obtained during the research, this incident took place in Pattaya, Thailand, in December 2025, where a dispute over payment allegedly broke out between an Indian tourist named Raj Jasuja and some transgender women (ladyboys). Subsequently, the tourist was assaulted.

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Claim:

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A Pakistani website shared the viral video claiming that Indian Army Lieutenant General Rajiv Kiran Sahni (DG EME) was publicly thrashed in Phuket, Thailand, by ladyboys after he harassed them and refused to pay the full amount.

‍https://dnd.com.pk/indian-lt-gen-rajiv-kumar-sahni-dg-eme-was-thrashed-publicly-in-phuket-after-he-touched-a-ladyboy-without-permission/329732/

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Meanwhile, on the social site X (formerly Twitter), a user shared the viral video and wrote, “Indian Army Lt Gen Rajiv Kiran Sahni, DG EME, thrashed by Thai ladyboys in Phuket after harassing them and refusing to pay full amount. They think they can bully and oppress people everywhere like Christians in Manipur, but Thailand showed them the reality.”

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https://x.com/uthmanrumi2025/status/2061554209036898369

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Fact Check:

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To investigate the claim made with the viral video, we conducted a reverse search of the video's keyframes. During this process, we found a report by The Times of India. The report, published on January 4, 2026, stated that “According to 'The Thaiger', an Indian tourist was hospitalized in Pattaya, Thailand. It is alleged that a group of transgender women attacked him following a dispute over payment for escort services. The incident occurred on December 27, when rescue workers from the Sawang Boriboon Foundation received a call around 5:30 AM regarding an injured foreign tourist near the beachside entrance of Walking Street. According to the rescue workers who found the victim, he was identified as 52-year-old Indian national Raj Jasuja. Injury marks were clearly visible on his face and the back of his head. He was given first aid before being taken to the hospital for further treatment. A 19-year-old Thai witness, Pongpol Boonchid, told police and rescue workers that the fight began when Raj was seen arguing with a transgender sex worker near the entry gate of Walking Street. The row escalated as both began chasing and hitting each other. According to the witness, the transgender woman then called several of her friends, who arrived and collectively attacked the Indian tourist. It is believed the fight started over money, as the tourist reportedly did not pay the full amount agreed upon for the services. Raj has not made any public statement regarding the incident.”

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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/indian-national-raj-jasuja-thrashed-by-transwomen-in-thailand-after-allegedly-refusing-to-pay-for-escort-service/articleshow/126327519.cms

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Furthermore, another report by The Indian Express, published on January 5, 2026, stated regarding the incident: “A group of transgender women allegedly beat up an Indian tourist in Pattaya, Thailand, according to a local media report. The dispute reportedly arose over non-payment of fees for sex services. In a viral video from December 27, three transgender women are seen hitting the 52-year-old man with slippers. The situation worsened when the man refused to pay the requested amount and tried to leave the spot in a car. The transgender women accused the man of not paying. Subsequently, he was allegedly kicked and punched, after which emergency responders intervened. According to a report by 'The Thaiger', the man suffered injuries to his face and the back of his head. He was given first aid on the spot and later taken to Pattamaku Hospital for further treatment. A Thai eyewitness told rescue workers that he saw the man arguing with a transgender sex worker near the entrance of the famous 'Walking Street' area. The witness stated that the argument turned into a physical altercation, with both parties reportedly chasing and hitting each other, after which others joined in, turning it into a group attack. According to the report, the witness further claimed the dispute occurred because the Indian tourist allegedly did not pay the full amount fixed for sexual services. Thai police said they would ask the man to file a formal complaint once he fully recovers.”

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https://indianexpress.com/article/trending/trending-globally/indian-man-beaten-by-transgender-women-in-pattaya-viral-video-10455877/

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Conclusion:

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Our research found the viral claim to be misleading and baseless. The viral video has no connection with Lieutenant General Rajiv Kiran Sahni (DG EME) of the Indian Army. According to credible media reports, the incident occurred in Pattaya, Thailand, where in December 2025, an Indian tourist named Raj Jasuja had a dispute over payment with some transgender women (ladyboys), leading to the assault.

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