#FactCheck- Viral video of fighter jet striking dam falsely linked to alleged Israeli attack on Iran; actually AI-generated content
Executive Summary
Amid escalating tensions between Iran and Israel, a video showing a fighter jet launching a missile at a massive dam, followed by its collapse and widespread flooding, is being widely shared on social media. Users are claiming that the video depicts a recent Israeli airstrike on a petrochemical plant located along Iran’s Karun River. CyberPeace Research Wing research found that the viral claim is false. The video is not related to any real-world incident and has been generated using artificial intelligence (AI).
Claim:
An Instagram user shared the viral video with a caption claiming that Israel carried out an airstrike on a petrochemical complex along Iran’s Karun River. The post further suggested that the facility is a key industrial site and that the attack caused widespread panic in the region. Post link:
https://www.instagram.com/reels/DZhNuiRx_v1/
https://www.instagram.com/reels/DZhNuiRx_v1/

Fact Check:
A reverse image search of keyframes from the video led to its appearance on a Facebook page named Warfare NextGen. The page clearly described the footage as “dramatic content,” indicating that it is not a real incident.
https://www.facebook.com/reel/1027249019882257

A closer analysis of the visuals also revealed several inconsistencies that raise doubts about its authenticity. To further verify the video, it was analyzed using the AI detection tool Hive Moderation, which indicated a 99.4% probability that the content is AI-generated.

Additionally, a separate analysis using SIGHTENGINE also classified the video as approximately 99% AI-generated.

Conclusion:
The research confirms that the viral video is not a real incident. It has been created using artificial intelligence and is being falsely shared as a depiction of an Israeli strike on a petrochemical plant along Iran’s Karun River.
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Introduction
The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) changed course just 48 hours after the directive dated December 1, 2025, sparked controversy. On December 3, 2025, the department publicly reversed its directive to smartphone manufacturers to pre-install the Sanchar Saathi app starting in March of the following year. The withdrawal marked the ending of a tumultuous, quick-paced event that highlighted how dynamic digital policy can be in a democracy.
The DoT explained its move in calculated terms. The government said that the first mandate was no longer necessary due to an abrupt increase in voluntary app downloads brought on by the public furore. The agency stated , “The mandate to install the app was meant to accelerate the process because the number of users has been growing rapidly.”
The app in question is not new. When it was first introduced in 2023, it was intended to be a public safety where people could report suspicious calls, identify numbers registered in their name, block stolen devices using their IMEI, confirm the authenticity of their handset, and report fraudulent international calls that were disguised as Indian numbers. The platform has quietly expanded over the past two years with features like utilities to check mobile connections, as well as Chakshu for reporting fraud. When used freely, it has helped numerous people in navigating the increasingly complex web of online scams.
Balancing Protection and Personal Freedom
In India, there isn’t much precedent for requiring all phones to have a certain government backed app installed. While operators supported TRAI’s DND app in 2018 and emergency numbers were integrated during the pandemic, they did not go into the territory of compulsory pre-installation.
Legal experts have time and again pointed out that although the government can control telecommunications for security reasons, any mandatory action pertaining to personal devices may be subject to constitutional review under the right to privacy, as stated in the Puttaswamy ruling. Not because the app is flawed in and of itself, but rather because every transition from voluntary adoption to mandatory compliance necessitates a higher standard of necessity, proportionality, and protections.
The Pulse of the Policy
The DoT’s stated rationale was clear: fake, duplicated or spoofed IMEIs represent a major cyber-security threat. India currently faces some of the world’s highest levels of SIM misuse, digital impersonation, online extortion, and device cloning crimes. Even a small fraction of compromised devices can do great harm in a nation with over a billion active mobile users.
The DoT’s AI and Digital Intelligence Unit, a small seven-person team in charge of SIM security, fighting illicit telecom setups, and collaborating with financial regulators on quickly changing fraud patterns, issued the Sanchar Saathi directive as part of a larger set of security-focused measures. One order required platforms such as WhatsApp to make sure that web sessions were terminated after six hours and that accounts only functioned when the registered SIM card was present in the device.
When taken as a whole, these orders indicate a clear strategic goal, the government is working to close systemic gaps that organised crime, particularly identity theft and device-level fraud, exploits. However, they also highlight the complex relationship between public opinion and security requirements. The government’s quick reversal in the Sanchar Saathi case demonstrated a crucial realization: digital safety mechanisms can only be effective when people feel educated, valued, and in charge.
CyberPeace Perspective & The Middle Path
CyberPeace stated that whenever a digital tool comes into contact with identity, data, or mobile access, public concern is inevitable. However, it is also emphasised that Sanchar Saathi is not a surveillance tool, instead can empower citizens.
Even with the rolled back mandate, it is reaffirmed that cornerstones of digital trust are accountability, openness, audits, and unambiguous permissions. India can maintain both safety and rights through responsible implementation, ethical design, and open communication.
References
- https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/what-is-the-sanchar-saathi-app-why-is-the-government-mandating-its-pre-installation/article70350322.ece
- https://theprint.in/opinion/sharp-edge/sanchar-saathi-app-modi-govt/2797917/
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2198110®=3&lang=2
- https://sancharsaathi.gov.in/SancharSaathiDocuments/ImportantDocuments/DoT%20issues%20directions%20for%20pre-installation%20of%20Sanchar%20Saathi%20App%20in%20mobile%20handsets%20to%20verify%20the%20genuineness%20of%20mobile%20handsets.pdf
- https://cyberpeace.org/resources/blogs/sanchar-saathi-portal-a-solution-for-mobile-phone-theft-and-data-protection
- https://cyberpeace.org/resources/blogs/chakshu-and-dip-shielding-citizens-from-online-frauds
- https://cyberpeace.org/resources/blogs/financial-risk-indicator-launched-by-dot-to-strengthen-cybersecurity

A video purportedly showing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat making remarks about the “saffronisation” of the Indian Army has been widely circulated on social media. The clip claims that Bhagwat called for the removal of non-Hindus from the armed forces and linked the issue to future political leadership changes in the country.
Claim
However, a verification by the Cyber Peace Foundation has established that the video is misleading and has been digitally manipulated.
In the video, Bhagwat is allegedly heard saying that unless more than 50 percent of non-Hindus are removed from the Indian Army by 2028, Prime Minister Narendra Modi would be replaced by Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. The clip further attributes another statement to him, suggesting that he would resign if the Prime Minister were to demand Nitish Kumar’s resignation.
By the time of publication, the video had been viewed over 7,000 times.( lINK, ARCHIVE Link, Screenshot

Fact Check:
The reverse image search also directed the Desk to a video uploaded on CNN-News18’s official YouTube channel on December 21, 2025. The footage was found to be a longer version of the viral clip and was recorded at the RSS centenary event held in Kolkata on the same date. A comparison of both videos confirmed that the background visuals, stage setup and camera angles were identical.
However, a careful review of the original CNN-News18 video revealed that Mohan Bhagwat did not make any of the statements attributed to him in the viral clip.
In his original address, Bhagwat spoke about unity and referred to concerns over increasing atrocities against Hindus in Bangladesh. He made no reference to the Indian Army, nor did he comment on its composition or alleged saffronisation. Here is the link to the original video, along with a screenshot: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnsAUGfBQBk&t=1s

In the next phase of the investigation, the audio track from the viral video was extracted and analysed using the AI audio detection tool Aurigin. The tool’s assessment indicated that the voice heard in the clip was artificially generated, confirming that the audio did not originate from the original speech.

Conclusion
The claim that RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat called for the saffronisation of the Indian Army is false. PTI Fact Check found that the viral video was digitally manipulated, using genuine footage from an RSS centenary event but pairing it with an AI-generated audio track. The altered video was shared online to mislead viewers by falsely attributing statements Bhagwat never made.
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Introduction
The automobile business is fast expanding, with vehicles becoming sophisticated, interconnected gadgets equipped with cutting-edge digital technology. This integration improves convenience, safety, and efficiency while also exposing automobiles to a new set of cyber risks. Electric vehicles (EVs) are equipped with sophisticated computer systems that manage various functions, such as acceleration, braking, and steering. If these systems are compromised, it could result in hazardous situations, including the remote control of the vehicle or unauthorized access to sensitive data. The automotive sector is evolving with the rise of connected car stakeholders, exposing new vulnerabilities for hackers to exploit.
Why Automotive Cybersecurity is required
Cybersecurity threats to automotives result from hardware, software and overall systems redundancy. Additional concerns include general privacy clauses that justify collecting and transferring data to “third-party vendors”, without explicitly disclosing who such third parties are and the manner of processing personal data. For example, infotainment platform data may show popular music and the user’s preferences, which may be used by the music industry to improve marketing strategies. Similarly, it is lesser known that any data relating to behavioural tracking data, such as driving patterns etc., are also logged by the original equipment manufacturer.
Hacking is not limited to attackers gaining control of an electronic automobile; it includes malicious actors hacking charging stations to manipulate the systems. In Russia, EV charging stations were hacked in Moscow to display pro-Ukraine and anti-Putin messages such as “Glory to Ukraine” and “Death to the enemy” in the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war. Other examples include instances from the Isle of Wight, where hackers controlled the EV monitor to show inappropriate content and display high voltage fault codes to EV owners, preventing them from charging their vehicles with empty batteries.
UN Economic Commission for Europe releases Regulation 155 for Automobiles
UN Economic Commission for Europe Regulation 155 lays down uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to cybersecurity and cybersecurity management systems (CSMS). This was originally a part of the Commission.s Work Paper (W.P.) 29 that aimed to harmonise vehicular regulations for vehicles and vehicle equipment. Regulation 155 has a two-prong objective; first, to ensure cybersecurity at the organisational level and second, to ensure adequate designs of the vehicle architecture. A critical aspect in this context is the implementation of a certified CSMS by all companies that bring vehicles to market. Notably, this requirement alters the perspective of manufacturers; their responsibilities no longer conclude with the start of production (SOP). Instead, manufacturers are now required to continuously monitor and assess the safety systems throughout the entire life cycle of a vehicle, including making any necessary improvements.
This Regulation reflects the highly dynamic nature of software development and assurance. Moreover, the management system is designed to ensure compliance with safety requirements across the entire supply chain. This is a significant challenge, considering that suppliers currently account for over 70 per cent of the software volume.
The Regulation, which is binding in nature for 64 member countries, came into force in 2021. UNECE countries were required to be compliant with the Regulations by July 2022 for all new vehicles and by July 2024, the Regulation was set to apply to all vehicles. It is believed that the Regulation will become a de facto global standard, since vehicles authorised in a particular country may not be brought into the global market or the market of any UNECE member country based on any other authorisation. In such a scenario, OEMs of non-member countries may be required to give a “self-declaration”, declaring the equipment’s conformity with cybersecurity standards.
Conclusion
To compete and ensure trust, global car makers must deliver a robust cybersecurity framework that meets evolving regulations. The UNECE regulations in this regard are driving this direction by requiring automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to integrate vehicle cybersecurity throughout the entire value chain. The ‘security by design' approach aims to build a connected car that is trusted by all. Automotive cybersecurity involves measures and technologies to protect connected vehicles and their onboard systems from growing digital threats.
References:
- “Electric vehicle cyber security risks and best practices (2023)”, Cyber Talk, 1 August 2023. https://www.cybertalk.org/2023/08/01/electric-vehicle-cyber-security-risks-and-best-practices-2023/#:~:text=EVs%20are%20equipped%20with%20complex,unauthorized%20access%20to%20sensitive%20data.
- Gordon, Aaron, “Russian Electric Vehicle Chargers Hacked, Tell Users “PUTIN IS A D*******D”, Vice, 28 February 2022. https://www.vice.com/en/article/russian-electric-vehicle-chargers-hacked-tell-users-putin-is-a-dickhead/
- “Isle of Wight: Council’s electric vehicle chargers hacked to show porn site”, BBC, 6 April 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-hampshire-61006816
- Sandler, Manuel, “UN Regulation No. 155: What You Need to Know about UN R155”, Cyres Consulting, 1 June 2022. https://www.cyres-consulting.com/un-regulation-no-155-requirements-what-you-need-to-know/?srsltid=AfmBOopV1pH1mg6M2Nn439N1-EyiU-gPwH2L4vq5tmP0Y2vUpQR-yfP7#A_short_overview_Background_knowledge_on_UN_Regulation_No_155
- https://unece.org/wp29-introduction?__cf_chl_tk=ZYt.Sq4MrXvTwSiYURi_essxUCGCysfPq7eSCg1oXLA-1724839918-0.0.1.1-13972