#FactCheck -Viral Post Falsely Attributes Communal NEET Remark to Kangana Ranaut; Fact Check Debunks Claim

Introduction

The most recent cable outages in the Red Sea, which caused traffic to slow down throughout the Middle East, South Asia, and even India, Pakistan and several parts of the UAE, like Etilasat and Du networks, also experienced comparable internet outages, serve as a reminder that the physical backbone of the internet is both routine and extremely important. Cloud platforms reroute traffic, e-commerce stalls, financial transactions stutter, and governments face the fragility of something they long believed to be seamless when systems like SMW4 and IMEWE malfunction close to Jeddah. Concerns over the susceptibility of undersea information highways have been raised by the incident. Given the ongoing conflict in the Red Sea region, where Yemen’s Houthi rebels have been waging a campaign against commercial shipping in retaliation for the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza.  The effects are seen immediately. The argument over whether global connection is genuinely robust or just operating on borrowed time was reignited by these recent failures, which compelled key providers to reroute flows. 

A geopolitical signal is what looks like a “technical glitch.” Accidents in contested waters are rarely simply accidents, and the inability to quickly assign blame highlights how brittle this ostensibly flawless digital world is. 

The Paradox of Essential yet Exposed Infrastructure

This is not an isolated accident. Undersea cables, which carry more than 97% of all internet traffic worldwide, connect continents at the speed of light, and support the cloud infrastructures that contemporary societies rely on, are the brains of the digital economy., as cautioned by NATO’s Cooperative  Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. In a sense, they are our unseen electrical grid; without them, connectivity breaks down. However, they continue to be incredibly fragile in spite of their significance. Anchors and fishing gear frequently damage cables, which are no thicker than a garden hose, and they break more than a hundred times annually on average. Most faults can be swiftly fixed or relocated, but when several cuts happen in strategic areas, like the 2022 Tonga eruption or the current Red Sea crisis, nations and economies are exposed to being isolated for days. 

The geopolitical risks are far more urgent. Subsea cables traverse disputed waters, land in hostile regimes, and cross oceans without regard for political boundaries. This makes them appealing for espionage, where state actors can tap or alter flows covertly, as well as sabotage, when service is interrupted to prevent access. Deliberate cable strikes have been likened by NATO specialists to the destruction of bridges or highways: if you choke the arteries, you choke the economy. Ironically, the most susceptible locations are not far below the surface but rather where cables emerge. These landing sites, which handle billions of dollars’ worth of trade, can have less security than a conventional bank office.

The New Theatre of Geopolitics 

Legal frameworks exist, but they are patchwork. Intentional damage is illegal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and previous agreements, but attribution is still infamously challenging. Covert sabotage and intelligence operations are examples of legal grey areas in hybrid warfare scenarios. Even during times of peace, national governments that rely on their continuous operation but find it difficult to extend sovereignty into international waters, private telecom consortia, and content giants like Google and Amazon that now finance their own cables share the burden of protection.

Cables convey influence in addition to data. Strategic leverage belongs to whoever can secure them, tap them or cut them during a fight. Even though landing stations are the entry points for billions of dollars’ worth of international trade, they frequently offer less security than a commercial bank branch. 

India at the Crossroads of Digital Geopolitics 

India’s reliance on underwater cables presents both advantages and disadvantages. India presents a classic single-point-of-failure danger, with more than 95% of its international data traffic being routed through a 6-km coastal stretch close to Versova, Mumbai. Red Sea disruptions have previously demonstrated how swiftly chokepoints located far from India’s coast may impede its digital arteries, placing a burden on government functions, defence communications, and financial flows. However, this same vulnerability also makes India a crucial player in the global discussion around digital sovereignty. It is not only an infrastructure exercise; it is also a strategic and constitutional necessity to be able to diversify landing places, expedite clearances, and develop indigenous repair capability.

India’s geographic location also presents opportunities. India’s location along East-West cable lines makes it an ideal location for robust connectivity as the Indo-Pacific region becomes the defining region of geopolitics in the twenty-first century. India may change from being a passive recipient of connectivity to a shaper of its governance by investing in distributed cable architecture and strengthening partnerships through initiatives like Quad and IPEF. Its aspirations for global influence must be balanced with its home regulatory lethargy. By doing this, India can secure not only bandwidth but also sovereignty itself by converting subsea cables from hidden liabilities into tools of economic might and geopolitical leverage. 

CyberPeace Insights 

If cables are considered essential infrastructure, then their safety demands the same level of attention that we give to ports, airports, and electrical grids. Stronger landing station defences, redundancy in route, and sincere public-private collaborations are now a necessity rather than an option.

The Red Sea incident is a call to action rather than a singular disruption. The robustness of underwater cables will determine whether the internet is a sustainable resource or a brittle luxury susceptible to the next outage as reliance on the cloud grows and 5G spreads. 

References

• https://forumias.com/blog/answered-assess-the-strategic-significance-of-undersea-cable-networks-for-indias-digital-economy-and-national-security-discuss-the-vulnerabilities-of-this-infrastructure-and-suggest-measures-to-e/ 
• https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-sea-cable-cuts-disrupt-internet-across-asia-middle-east-2025-09-07/ 
• https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/what-can-we-learn-from-africas-multiple-submarine-cable-outages 

‍

Introduction

Targeting airlines and airports, airline hoax threats are fabricated alarms which intend to disrupt normal day-to-day activities and create panic among the public. Security of public settings is of utmost importance, making them a vulnerable target. The consequences of such threats include the financial loss incurred by parties concerned, increased security protocols to be followed immediately after and in preparation, flight delays and diversions, emergency landings and passenger inconvenience and emotional distress. The motivation behind such threats is malicious intent of varying degrees, breaching national security, integrity and safety. However, apart from the government, airline and social media authorities which already have certain measures in place to tackle such issues, the public, through responsible consumption and verified sharing has an equal role in preventing the spread of misinformation and panic regarding the same.

Hoax Airline Threats

The recent spate of bomb hoax threats to Indian airlines has witnessed false reports about threats to (over) 500 flights since 14/10/2024, the majority being traced to posts on social media handles which are either anonymous or unverified. Some recent incidents include a hoax threat on Air India's flights from Delhi to Mumbai via Indore which was posted on X, 30/10/2024 and a flight from Nepal (Kathmandu) to Delhi on November 2nd, 2024.

As per reports by the Indian Express, steps are being taken to address such incidents by tweaking the assessment criteria for threats (regarding bombs) and authorities such as the Bomb Threat Assessment Committees (BTAC) are being selective in categorising them as specific and non-specific. Some other consideration factors include whether a VIP is onboard and whether the threat has been posted from an anonymous account with a similar history. 

CyberPeace Recommendations

1. For Public 

• Question sensational information: The public should scrutinise the information they’re consuming not only to keep themselves safe but also to be responsible to other citizens. Exercise caution before sharing alarming messages, posts and pieces of information
• Recognising credible sources: Rely only on trustworthy, verified sources when sharing information, especially when it comes to topics as serious as airline safety.
• Avoiding Reactionary Sharing: Sharing in a state of panic can contribute to the chaos created upon receiving unverified news, hence,  it is suggested to refrain from reactionary sharing.

2. For the Authorities & Agencies

• After a series of hoax bomb threats, the Government of India has issued an advisory to social media platforms calling for them to make efforts for the removal of such malicious content. Adherence to obligations such as the prompt removal of harmful content or disabling access to such unlawful information has been specified under the IT Rules, 2021. They are also obligated under the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 to report certain offences on their platform. The Ministry of Civil Aviation’s action plan consists of plans regarding hoax bomb threats being labelled as a cognisable offence, and attracting a no-flyers list as a penalty, among other things.

These plans also include steps such as :  

• Introduction of other corrective measures that are to be taken against bad actors (similar to having a non-flyers list).
• Introduction of a reporting mechanism which is specific to such threats.
• Focus on promoting awareness, digital literacy and critical thinking, fact-checking resources as well as encouraging the public to report such hoaxes

Conclusion

Preventing the spread of airline threat hoaxes is a collective responsibility which involves public engagement and ownership to strengthen safety measures and build upon the trust in the overall safety ecosystem (here; airline agencies, government authorities and the public). As the government and agencies take measures to prevent such instances, the public should continue to share information only from and on verified and trusted portals. It is encouraged that the public must remain vigilant and responsible while consuming and sharing information. 

References

• https://indianexpress.com/article/business/flight-bomb-threats-assessment-criteria-serious-9646397/
• https://www.wionews.com/world/indian-airline-flight-bound-for-new-delhi-from-nepal-receives-hoax-bomb-threat-amid-rise-in-similar-incidents-772795
• https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Oct/26/centre-cautions-social-media-platforms-to-tackle-misinformation-after-hoax-bomb-threat-to-multiple-airlines
• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/amid-rising-hoax-bomb-threats-to-indian-airlines-centre-issues-advisory-to-social-media-companies/articleshow/114624187.cms 

‍

‍Brief Overview of the EU AI Act

The EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, was officially published in the EU Official Journal on 12 July 2024. This landmark legislation on Artificial Intelligence (AI) will come into force just 20 days after publication, setting harmonized rules across the EU. It amends key regulations and directives to ensure a robust framework for AI technologies.  The AI Act, a set of EU rules governing AI, has been in development for two years and now, the EU AI Act enters into force across all 27 EU Member States on 1 August 2024, with certain future deadlines tied up and the enforcement of the majority of its provisions will commence on 2 August 2026. The law prohibits certain uses of AI tools, including those that threaten citizens' rights, such as biometric categorization, untargeted scraping of faces, and systems that try to read emotions are banned in the workplace and schools, as are social scoring systems. It also prohibits the use of predictive policing tools in some instances. The law takes a phased approach to implementing the EU's AI rulebook, meaning there are various deadlines between now and then as different legal provisions will start to apply.

The framework puts different obligations on AI developers, depending on use cases and perceived risk. The bulk of AI uses will not be regulated as they are considered low-risk, but a small number of potential AI  use cases are banned under the law. High-risk use cases, such as biometric uses of AI or AI used in law enforcement, employment, education, and critical infrastructure, are allowed under the law but developers of such apps face obligations in areas like data quality and anti-bias considerations. A third risk tier also applies some lighter transparency requirements for makers of tools like AI chatbots.

In case of failure to comply with the Act, the companies in the EU providing, distributing, importing, and using AI systems and GPAI models, are subject to fines of up to EUR 35 million or seven per cent of the total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.

Key highlights of EU AI Act Provisions

• The AI Act classifies AI according to its risk. It prohibits Unacceptable risks such as social scoring systems and manipulative AI. The regulation mostly addresses high-risk AI systems.
• Limited-risk AI systems are subject to lighter transparency obligations and according to the act, the developers and deployers must ensure that the end-users are aware that the interaction they are having is with AI such as Chatbots and Deepfakes. The AI Act allows the free use of minimal-risk AI. This includes the majority of AI applications currently available in the EU single market like AI-enabled video games, and spam filters, but with the advancement of Gen AI changes with regards to this might be done. The majority of obligations fall on providers (developers) of high-risk AI systems that intend to place on the market or put into service high-risk AI systems in the EU, regardless of whether they are based in the EU or a third country. And also, a third-country provider where the high-risk AI system’s output is used in the EU.
• Users are natural or legal persons who deploy an AI system in a professional capacity, not affected end-users. Users (deployers) of high-risk AI systems have some obligations, though less than providers (developers). This applies to users located in the EU, and third-country users where the AI system’s output is used in the EU.
• General purpose AI or GPAI model providers must provide technical documentation, and instructions for use, comply with the Copyright Directive, and publish a summary of the content used for training. Free and open license GPAI model providers only need to comply with copyright and publish the training data summary, unless they present a systemic risk. All providers of GPAI models that present a systemic risk – open or closed – must also conduct model evaluations, and adversarial testing, and track and report serious incidents and ensure cybersecurity protections.
• The Codes of Practice will account for international approaches. It will cover but not necessarily be limited to the obligations, particularly the relevant information to include in technical documentation for authorities and downstream providers, identification of the type and nature of systemic risks and their sources, and the modalities of risk management accounting for specific challenges in addressing risks due to the way they may emerge and materialize throughout the value chain. The AI Office may invite GPAI model providers, and relevant national competent authorities to participate in drawing up the codes, while civil society, industry, academia, downstream providers and independent experts may support the process.

Application & Timeline of Act

The EU AI Act will be fully applicable 24 months after entry into force, but some parts will be applicable sooner, for instance the ban on AI systems posing unacceptable risks will apply six months after the entry into force. The Codes of Practice will apply nine months after entry into force. Rules on general-purpose AI systems that need to comply with transparency requirements will apply 12 months after the entry into force. High-risk systems will have more time to comply with the requirements as the obligations concerning them will become applicable 36 months after the entry into force. The expected timeline for the same is:

• August 1st, 2024: The AI Act will enter into force.
• February 2025: Prohibition of certain AI systems - Chapters I (general provisions) & II (prohibited AI systems) will apply; Prohibition of certain AI systems.
• August 2025: Chapter III Section 4 (notifying authorities), Chapter V (general purpose AI models), Chapter VII (governance), Chapter XII (confidentiality and penalties), and Article 78 (confidentiality) will apply, except for Article 101 (fines for General Purpose AI providers); Requirements for new GPAI models. 
• August 2026: The whole AI Act applies, except for Article 6(1) & corresponding obligations (one of the categories of high-risk AI systems);
•  August 2027: Article 6(1) & corresponding obligations apply.

The AI Act sets out clear definitions for the different actors involved in AI, such as the providers, deployers, importers, distributors, and product manufacturers. This means all parties involved in the development, usage, import, distribution, or manufacturing of AI systems will be held accountable. Along with this, the AI Act also applies to providers and deployers of AI systems located outside of the EU, e.g., in Switzerland, if output produced by the system is intended to be used in the EU. The Act applies to any AI system within the EU that is on the market, in service, or in use, covering both AI providers (the companies selling AI systems) and AI deployers (the organizations using those systems).

In short, the AI Act will apply to different companies across the AI distribution chain, including providers, deployers, importers, and distributors (collectively referred to as “Operators”). The EU AI Act also has extraterritorial application and can also apply to companies not established in the EU, or providers outside the EU if they -make an AI system or GPAI model available on the EU market. Even if only the output generated by the AI system is used in the EU, the Act still applies to such providers and deployers. 

CyberPeace Outlook 

The EU AI Act, approved by EU lawmakers in 2024, is a landmark legislation designed to protect citizens' health, safety, and fundamental rights from potential harm caused by AI systems. The AI Act will apply to AI systems and GPAI models. The Act creates a tiered risk categorization system with various regulations and stiff penalties for noncompliance. The Act adopts a risk-based approach to AI governance, categorizing potential risks into four tiers: unacceptable, high, limited, and low. Violations of banned systems carry the highest fine: €35 million, or 7 percent of global annual revenue. It establishes transparency requirements for general-purpose AI systems. The regulation also provides specific rules for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models and lays down more stringent requirements for GPAI models with 'high-impact capabilities' that could pose a systemic risk and have a significant impact on the internal market. For high-risk AI systems, the AI Act addresses the issues of fundamental rights impact assessment and data protection impact assessment.

The EU AI Act aims to enhance trust in AI technologies by establishing clear regulatory standards governing AI. We encourage regulatory frameworks that strive to balance the desire to foster innovation with the critical need to prevent unethical practices that may cause user harm. The legislation can be seen as strengthening the EU's position as a global leader in AI innovation and developing regulatory frameworks for emerging technologies. It sets a global benchmark for regulating AI. The companies to which the act applies will need to make sure their practices align with the same. The act may inspire other nations to develop their own legislation contributing to global AI governance. The world of AI is complex and challenging, the implementation of regulatory checks, and compliance by the concerned companies, all pose a conundrum. However, in the end, balancing innovation with ethical considerations is paramount. 

At the same hand, the tech sector welcomes regulatory progress but warns that overly-rigid regulations could stifle innovation. Hence flexibility and adaptability are key to effective AI governance. The journey towards robust AI regulation has begun in major countries, and it is important that we find the right balance between safety and innovation and also take into consideration the industry reactions.

References: 

1. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401689
2. https://www.theverge.com/2024/7/12/24197058/eu-ai-act-regulations-bans-deadline
3. https://techcrunch.com/2024/07/12/eus-ai-act-gets-published-in-blocs-official-journal-starting-clock-on-legal-deadlines/
4. https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/eu-ai-act-to-enter-into-force-in-august.html
5. https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/tip/Is-your-business-ready-for-the-EU-AI-Act
6. https://www.simmons-simmons.com/en/publications/clyimpowh000ouxgkw1oidakk/the-eu-ai-act-a-quick-guide

‍