#FactCheck - Out-of-Context Clip of PM Modi Misused to Claim He Insulted India
Executive Summary:
A short video clip of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is going viral on social media. In the clip, he can be heard saying, “What sins did we commit in our previous life that we were born in India?” Users are sharing this video claiming that the Prime Minister insulted India and its people during a foreign visit. However, an research by the CyberPeace found that the claim is misleading. The viral clip is taken out of context from a longer speech delivered by Modi during his visit to Shanghai, China, in 2015
Claim:
A Facebook user named “Bittu Yadav” shared the reel, portraying the statement as anti-India. The caption reads:“Look at this, and you supporters—see how your ‘leader’ is praising the country.”
Post link and archive link:

Fact Check:
To verify the claim, we searched relevant keywords on Google and found the full video uploaded on May 16, 2015, on the official YouTube channel of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The video shows Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressing the Indian community in Shanghai, China.

In the 57-minute speech, at around 51 minutes 25 seconds, Modi was referring to the pessimistic atmosphere in India before 2014. He said: “Within a year… people used to say, ‘Leave it, nothing will happen now. Who knows what sins we committed in our previous life that we were born in India’… From that mindset, today the world says that if there is a country growing at the fastest pace, it is India.”
This clearly shows that Modi was citing a past sentiment to highlight how perceptions about India have changed over time, not expressing his personal view. Media reports from his May 2015 China visit also noted that he addressed around 5,000 members of the Indian community in Shanghai, where he spoke about India’s economic growth and initiatives like “Make in India.”

Conclusion:
The viral claim is false. The video has been edited and shared out of context. In reality, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was referring to a past mindset before 2014 while highlighting the change in India’s global perception.
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Introduction
Against the dynamic backdrop of Mumbai, where the intersection of age-old markets and cutting-edge innovation is a daily reality, an initiative of paramount importance has begun to take shape within the hallowed walls of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This is not just a tweak, a nudge in policy, or a subtle refinement of protocols. What we're observing is nothing short of a paradigmatic shift, a recalibration of systemic magnitude, that aims to recalibrate the way India's financial monoliths oversee, manage, and secure their informational bedrock – their treasured IT systems.
On the 7th of November, 2023, the Reserve Bank of India, that bastion of monetary oversight and national fiscal stability, unfurled a new doctrine – the 'Master Direction on Information Technology Governance, Risk, Controls, and Assurance Practices.' A document comprehensive in its reach, it presents not merely an update but a consolidation of all previously issued guidelines, instructions, and circulars relevant to IT governance, plaited into a seamless narrative that extols virtues of structured control and unimpeachable assurance practices. Moreover, it grasps the future potential of Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Management, testaments to RBI's forward-thinking vision.
This novel edict has been crafted with a target audience that spans the varied gamut of financial entities – from Scheduled Commercial Banks to Non-Banking Financial Companies, from Credit Information Companies to All India Financial Institutions. These are the juggernauts that keep the economic wheels of the nation churning, and RBI's precision-guided document is an unambiguous acknowledgment of the vital role IT holds in maintaining the heartbeat of these financial bodies. Here lies a riveting declaration that robust governance structures aren't merely preferred but essential to manage the landscape of IT-related risks that balloon in an era of ever-proliferating digital complexity.
Directive Structure
The directive's structure is a combination of informed precision and intuitive foresight. Its seven chapters are not simply a grouping of topics; they are the seven pillars upon which the temple of IT governance is to be erected. The introductory chapter does more than set the stage – it defines the very reality, the scope, and the applicability of the directive, binding the reader in an inextricable covenant of engagement and anticipation. It's followed by a deep dive into the cradle of IT governance in the second chapter, drawing back the curtain to reveal the nuanced roles and defiant responsibilities bestowed upon the Board of Directors, the IT Strategy Committee, the clairvoyant Senior Management, the IT Steering Committee, and the pivotal Head of IT Function.
As we move along to the third chapter, we encounter the nuts and bolts of IT Infrastructure & Services Management. This is not just a checklist; it is an orchestration of the management of IT services, third-party liaisons, the calculus of capacity management, and the nuances of project management. Here terms like change and patch management, cryptographic controls, and physical and environmental safeguards leap from the page – alive with earnest practicality, demanding not just attention but action.
Transparency deepens as we glide into the fourth chapter with its robust exploration of IT and Information Security Risk Management. Here, the demand for periodic dissection of IT-related perils is made clear, along with the edifice of an IT and Information Security Risk Management Framework, buttressed by the imperatives of Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing.
The fifth chapter presents a tableau of circumspection and preparedness, as it waxes eloquent on the necessity and architecture of a well-honed Business Continuity Plan and a disaster-ready DR Policy. It is a paean to the anticipatory stance financial institutions must employ in a world fraught with uncertainty.
Continuing the narrative, the sixth chapter places the spotlight on Information Systems Audit, delineating the precise role played by the Audit Committee of the Board in ushering in accountability through an exhaustive IS Audit of the institution's virtual expanse.
And as we perch on the final chapter, we're privy to the 'repeal and other provisions' of the directive, underscoring the interplay of other applicable laws and the interpretation a reader may yield from the directive's breadth.
Conclusion
To proclaim that this directive is a mere step forward in the RBI's exhaustive and assiduous efforts to propel India's financial institutions onto the digital frontier would be a grave understatement. What we are witnessing is the inception of a more adept, more secure, and more resilient financial sector. This directive is nothing less than a beacon, shepherding in an epoch of IT governance marked by impervious governance structures, proactive risk management, and an unyielding commitment to the pursuit of excellence and continuous improvement. This is no ephemeral shift - this is, indisputably, a revolutionary stride into a future where confidence and competence stand as the watchwords in navigating the digital terra incognita.
References:

Executive Summary
A video showing a man being beaten with a cricket bat is being widely shared on social media. It is being claimed that a priest had allegedly misbehaved with a girl at the same house where he had gone to perform a puja, following which the girl’s brother beat him up. However, our Research found the claim to be misleading. CyberPeace Research found that the video is around four years old. According to reports, the man was beaten after he allegedly objected to a cricket bat being kept inside a temple. Four youths were arrested by the police in connection with the incident.
Claim:
An X user shared the viral video with the caption: “The priest went to a house to perform a puja, where he first harassed a girl, and then the girl’s brother played T20. The sensible girl informed her family. The priest who predicts other people’s future could not predict his own—that his honour was also going to be at stake.”
https://x.com/vineel_ydv/status/1837299886921753054?s=20
https://ghostarchive.org/archive/b91vB

Fact Check
To verify the viral claim, we searched Google using relevant keywords. During the search, we did not find any credible media reports supporting the claim. To further verify the claim, we conducted a reverse image search of keyframes from the video. During the search, we found a report published by Dainik Bhaskar on November 5, 2020. According to the report, police arrested four youths in connection with the assault of a priest in Fatehabad, Haryana. The report stated that three days earlier, the youths had beaten the priest with a cricket bat after he objected to them keeping the bat inside the temple.
https://www.bhaskar.com/local/haryana/news/fatehabad-haryana-priest-beaten-with-cricket-bat-very-hardly-in-fatehabad-police-arrested-four-accused-127888122.html

As part of the next step in our Research, we found a report published on the News18 website with a generic caption. The viral image was also included in the report.

Conclusion
Our Research found that the video is around four years old and is unrelated to the claim being circulated on social media. The incident took place after the priest objected to the youths keeping a cricket bat inside the temple, following which he was assaulted with the bat. Police subsequently arrested four youths in connection with the incident. Therefore, the claim that the priest was beaten after allegedly harassing a girl at the house where he had gone to perform a puja is misleading.

Introduction
Military equipment used by elite special forces is supposed to be the most tightly secured hardware a country owns, the last place anyone would expect a hidden flaw in its parts supply chain to slip through undetected. Yet that is precisely where one surfaced this August, when The Telegraph, revealed that cameras fitted to the Royal Navy's K3 Scout surveillance drones, equipment used by Britain's Royal Marines and closely associated with the Special Boat Service, the United Kingdom's elite maritime special forces unit, had been secretly transmitting signals to an internet address inside China. The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence stripped the affected cameras of all internet connectivity the moment the transmissions were discovered, and has spent the days since insisting no sensitive data actually left the country. That distinction, between what was taken and what was exposed, is where this incident becomes genuinely worth examining.
What was actually found, and what was not
The K3 Scout is an 8.4 metre uncrewed surface vessel built by Kraken Technology Group, a British defence manufacturer based in Fareham, Hampshire, capable of reaching 55 knots and remaining at sea for up to 30 days. The Royal Navy purchased roughly 20 of these vessels under Project Beehive, a £12 million programme designed to fold autonomous systems into frontline maritime operations quickly, and the Royal Marines' Coastal Forces Squadron and 47 Commando have operated the fleet since March 2026.
A routine cyber vulnerability assessment, not an external tip off or an adversarial intrusion, is what caught the problem. Investigators found the electro-optical and infrared cameras mounted on the vessels sending what the industry calls heartbeat communications, routine signals a connected device sends simply to confirm it is powered on and functioning, to an IP address located in China. Kraken did not manufacture the cameras in house; the company sourced them from a third party supplier that had reportedly given assurances about their security, assurances the heartbeat traffic now calls directly into question.
Every source, including the UK Ministry of Defence itself, confirms the cameras were sending signals to an IP address in China. What remains unconfirmed is which company actually manufactured the compromised camera components. Neither The Telegraph nor the Ministry of Defence has publicly named the specific camera manufacturer, and an unverified social media claim allegedly identifying a Canadian supplier has since been disputed by that company, with no confirmation from official sources tying it to the incident as of now.
Crucially, the UK Ministry of Defence has been consistent on one point across every statement it has issued: its investigation found no evidence that classified information, government systems, or mission critical data were accessed, compromised, or transmitted outside the country. That is a meaningful distinction, and one worth taking at face value rather than dismissing as reflexive reassurance, since heartbeat signals by design carry connectivity status rather than payload content. But security researchers who reviewed the case have been equally consistent in noting that even metadata this thin has value to a watching adversary. Knowing when and where a piece of specialised military hardware is powered on and actively connected can itself function as a targeting signal, revealing patterns of deployment, operational tempo, and geographic presence without a single classified file ever leaving the device.
Why this particular fleet matters
The timing sharpens the concern considerably. A defence source cited in reporting on the story indicated the K3 Scout fleet was being considered as part of a future British contribution to securing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, where the United Kingdom has already deployed a warship amid discussions of a multinational security mission. Equipment destined for a contested, strategically sensitive waterway having any unexplained data path back to a systemic rival's territory is not a detail that stays confined to a procurement footnote. The vessels were also tested during a NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea in 2025, meaning any compromised telemetry pattern could theoretically have been observed by the very alliance partners Britain was demonstrating the technology to.
The deeper issue is structural rather than incidental. Modern military hardware, however elite the unit operating it, is rarely built end to end by a single trusted manufacturer. Cameras, sensors, chipsets, and firmware routinely pass through several tiers of suppliers before reaching a finished platform, and each tier is a potential point where the chain of custody and verification can quietly break down. Kraken's own assurances about its camera supplier illustrate exactly how that failure propagates: a manufacturer can act in good faith, rely on a vendor's word, and still end up fielding compromised hardware, because the vulnerability was never introduced at the assembly stage but several layers upstream, in components whose ultimate origin was never fully audited.
CyberPeace View | A wider principle worth naming
There is a broader ethical and legal frame worth applying here, one that extends beyond ordinary cybersecurity practice into the territory international humanitarian law occupies. The core distinction that law draws, between combatants and protected persons, between military objectives and civilian life, depends fundamentally on operators having accurate, uncompromised situational awareness. A surveillance platform is not merely a piece of hardware; it is the sensory apparatus through which decisions with real consequences for human life get made in contested environments. If the integrity of that apparatus cannot be guaranteed, the reliability of everything built on top of it, target verification, proportionality assessments, distinction between combatant and civilian, is quietly weakened at its foundation. This is not a claim that the K3 Scout breach itself caused harm; the Ministry of Defence's own findings suggest it did not. It is a reminder that supply chain integrity in military sensing equipment is not simply a procurement or cybersecurity concern sitting apart from the laws of armed conflict. It sits underneath them, because a compromised sensor is, in a very real sense, a compromised judgment further down the chain.
Where India fits into this story
India has been grappling with functionally the same problem for years, and its response offers a useful point of comparison. Reporting dating back to 2023 revealed that Indian defence officials had quietly barred domestic drone manufacturers from using components sourced from countries sharing a land border with India, an unmistakable, if unstated, reference to China, citing exactly the kind of vulnerability now playing out in Britain's fleet, compromised communication functions, cameras, and operating software capable of leaking intelligence. That policy has hardened considerably since. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi finalised a stringent framework requiring that drones procured from domestic manufacturers contain no Chinese origin components or electronics at all, and at least one major drone order was placed on hold after allegations surfaced that the supplier had used Chinese parts despite those restrictions.
The commercial consequence of that caution has been real and acknowledged openly by industry figures; sourcing components outside China raises costs, given that up to 70 percent of the global drone supply chain has historically run through Chinese manufacturing. But India appears to have concluded, well ahead of this particular British incident becoming public, that the cost of auditing and diversifying a supply chain is lower than the cost of fielding compromised sensing equipment inside sensitive military operations. Indian firms have responded by building propulsion, avionics, and camera systems in house specifically to close this gap, treating component provenance as a first order design question rather than an afterthought bolted on after a breach forces the issue. Seen from that vantage point, the K3 Scout episode reads less like a uniquely British failure and more like a case study in a risk India's own defence establishment had already priced in.
Lessons from the breach
A few conclusions follow fairly directly from how this incident unfolded. First, routine cyber vulnerability assessments work, and this case is arguably an argument for doing more of them, more often, rather than a sign that current practice failed; the breach was caught internally, before any confirmed operational harm occurred. Second, a manufacturer's own assurances about a component supplier are not a substitute for independent verification, since Kraken's good faith reliance on its camera vendor's word is precisely where this vulnerability slipped through. Third, and most durably, defence procurement increasingly needs to treat component provenance as inseparable from operational security, not as a compliance checkbox to be satisfied once at contract signing. India's multi-year pivot toward auditing and localising sensitive component supply chains, imperfect and costly as it has been, points toward the direction other defence establishments will likely be pushed in as more incidents like this one surface. The K3 Scout breach did not, on the evidence available, compromise a single mission. What it compromised was the assumption that hardware assurances alone are sufficient, and that assumption was never going to survive close scrutiny forever.
References
- LBC, "Spy cameras on Navy drones used by UK's elite special forces sending signals to China as security fears grow." https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/royal-navy-spy-drones-sending-signals-to-china-5Hjdfpm_2/
- Defence Blog, "Royal Navy naval drone cameras secretly sent data to China." https://defence-blog.com/royal-navy-naval-drone-cameras-secretly-sent-data-to-china/
- The National Interest, "The Royal Navy's Spy Drones May Have Been Spying for China, Too." https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navys-spy-drones-may-have-been-spying-for-china-too-sa-081026
- Kyiv Post, "UK Navy Drone Camera Components Were Secretly Communicating With China." https://www.kyivpost.com/post/82061
- The Defense News, "UK's Royal Navy K3 Scout Drone Cameras Found Sending Data to an IP Address in China." https://www.thedefensenews.com/UKs-Royal-Navy-K3-Scout-Drone-Cameras-Found-Sending-Data-to-an-IP-Address-in-China/
- The Jerusalem Post, "UK drones sent data to China, raising US, European fears on Chinese components." https://www.jpost.com/international/article-905191
- Firstpost, "UK military drones fitted with Chinese cameras found sending data to Beijing: Report." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-military-drones-fitted-with-chinese-cameras-found-sending-data-to-beijing-report-14037075.html
- Firstpost, "UK deploys warship to West Asia amid plans for multinational Hormuz security mission." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-deploys-warship-to-west-asia-amid-plans-for-multinational-hormuz-security-mission-ws-e-14009471.html
- Reuters via Inquirer.net, "India bars makers of military drones from using Chinese parts." https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1813810/india-bars-makers-of-military-drones-from-using-chinese-parts
- The Print, "Amid concerns about use of Chinese parts in drones, Army general urges industry to be transparent." https://theprint.in/defence/amid-concerns-about-use-of-chinese-parts-in-drones-army-general-urges-industry-to-be-transparent/2305866/
- idrw.org, "India Unveils Drone Security Framework to Eliminate Chinese Components and Strengthen UAV Cyber Defences." https://idrw.org/india-unveils-drone-security-framework-to-eliminate-chinese-components-and-strengthen-uav-cyber-defences/
- The Week, "The hidden weakness in India's military drones: Zen Technologies says it has fixed the Chinese problem." https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2026/07/09/the-hidden-weakness-in-indias-military-drones-zen-technologies-says-it-has-fixed-the-chinese-problem.html