#FactCheck -Misleading Social Media Claim Targets University Over Viral Video
Executive Summary
A video circulating on social media shows a woman using abusive language in front of a camera. Users sharing the clip claim that the woman is a professor at Galgotias University and that the video exposes her alleged reality. However, an research by CyberPeace found the claim to be misleading. The probe revealed that the woman seen in the viral video has no connection with Galgotias University and is not a professor there.Fact-checking further showed that the video is not recent but around seven years old. The woman featured in the clip was identified as Shubhrastha, who is a political strategist by profession.
Claim:
A user on X (formerly Twitter) shared the viral video on February 18, 2026, claiming: “A ‘class in abuse studies’ at Galgotias University? An obscene video of a professor teaching ethics has gone viral. Another shameful chapter has been added to the list of controversies surrounding Galgotias University.” The post further alleged that after falsely claiming a Chinese robot as its own, the university’s “Culture and Ethics” faculty member was seen publicly using abusive language in the viral clip. The post link and its archived version are provided below:
Fact Check:
To verify the authenticity of the viral claim, we extracted key frames from the video and conducted a reverse image search using Google Lens. During the research , we found the same video uploaded on the Indian Spectator’s YouTube channel on June 9, 2018
The video was also found on another YouTube channel, where it had been uploaded on June 12, 2018.
Conclusion
The research clearly establishes that the woman seen in the viral video has no association with Galgotias University and is not a professor there. The clip is also not recent but approximately seven years old. The woman in the video was identified as Shubhrastha, a political strategist.
Related Blogs
Executive Summary
A video of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is being shared on social media with the claim that he disrespected the national anthem by continuing to walk while it was being played. The CyberPeace Research Wing’s investigation found that the claim is false. The audio heard in the viral clip has been added separately to the original footage, creating a misleading impression about what was happening in the video.
Claim
An X user shared the video claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi continued walking during the national anthem, thereby disrespecting it.
https://x.com/sudhirkummar123/status/2089044275665535414?s=20
Fact Check
To verify the claim, the Desk conducted a reverse image search using keyframes from the viral video. The search led us to a longer version of the footage uploaded on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official YouTube channel on June 21, 2025. We reviewed the longer video and found that the audio in the viral clip does not match the original footage. The original video does not feature the national anthem being played. Instead, a female announcer on the stage can be heard asking the gathering to welcome Prime Minister Modi upon his arrival in Siwan, Bihar. The description accompanying the original video also states that people gave Prime Minister Modi a warm welcome upon his arrival in Siwan.
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/YhBryZZwlIk
The investigation also found several media reports published on June 20, 2025, which reported that Modi had visited Siwan ahead of the Bihar Assembly elections and inaugurated or laid the foundation stones for development projects worth around Rs 5,900 crore. News18 report on PM Modi’s Siwan visit
The original footage therefore establishes that the scene was related to Modi’s welcome in Siwan and not to the playing of the national anthem.
Conclusion
The claim that Prime Minister Narendra Modi disrespected the national anthem by walking during its rendition is false. The original footage does not contain the national anthem. The audio heard in the viral clip has been added separately to the video, creating a false impression about the incident.
Introduction
Military equipment used by elite special forces is supposed to be the most tightly secured hardware a country owns, the last place anyone would expect a hidden flaw in its parts supply chain to slip through undetected. Yet that is precisely where one surfaced this August, when The Telegraph, revealed that cameras fitted to the Royal Navy's K3 Scout surveillance drones, equipment used by Britain's Royal Marines and closely associated with the Special Boat Service, the United Kingdom's elite maritime special forces unit, had been secretly transmitting signals to an internet address inside China. The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence stripped the affected cameras of all internet connectivity the moment the transmissions were discovered, and has spent the days since insisting no sensitive data actually left the country. That distinction, between what was taken and what was exposed, is where this incident becomes genuinely worth examining.
What was actually found, and what was not
The K3 Scout is an 8.4 metre uncrewed surface vessel built by Kraken Technology Group, a British defence manufacturer based in Fareham, Hampshire, capable of reaching 55 knots and remaining at sea for up to 30 days. The Royal Navy purchased roughly 20 of these vessels under Project Beehive, a £12 million programme designed to fold autonomous systems into frontline maritime operations quickly, and the Royal Marines' Coastal Forces Squadron and 47 Commando have operated the fleet since March 2026.
A routine cyber vulnerability assessment, not an external tip off or an adversarial intrusion, is what caught the problem. Investigators found the electro-optical and infrared cameras mounted on the vessels sending what the industry calls heartbeat communications, routine signals a connected device sends simply to confirm it is powered on and functioning, to an IP address located in China. Kraken did not manufacture the cameras in house; the company sourced them from a third party supplier that had reportedly given assurances about their security, assurances the heartbeat traffic now calls directly into question.
Every source, including the UK Ministry of Defence itself, confirms the cameras were sending signals to an IP address in China. What remains unconfirmed is which company actually manufactured the compromised camera components. Neither The Telegraph nor the Ministry of Defence has publicly named the specific camera manufacturer, and an unverified social media claim allegedly identifying a Canadian supplier has since been disputed by that company, with no confirmation from official sources tying it to the incident as of now.
Crucially, the UK Ministry of Defence has been consistent on one point across every statement it has issued: its investigation found no evidence that classified information, government systems, or mission critical data were accessed, compromised, or transmitted outside the country. That is a meaningful distinction, and one worth taking at face value rather than dismissing as reflexive reassurance, since heartbeat signals by design carry connectivity status rather than payload content. But security researchers who reviewed the case have been equally consistent in noting that even metadata this thin has value to a watching adversary. Knowing when and where a piece of specialised military hardware is powered on and actively connected can itself function as a targeting signal, revealing patterns of deployment, operational tempo, and geographic presence without a single classified file ever leaving the device.
Why this particular fleet matters
The timing sharpens the concern considerably. A defence source cited in reporting on the story indicated the K3 Scout fleet was being considered as part of a future British contribution to securing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, where the United Kingdom has already deployed a warship amid discussions of a multinational security mission. Equipment destined for a contested, strategically sensitive waterway having any unexplained data path back to a systemic rival's territory is not a detail that stays confined to a procurement footnote. The vessels were also tested during a NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea in 2025, meaning any compromised telemetry pattern could theoretically have been observed by the very alliance partners Britain was demonstrating the technology to.
The deeper issue is structural rather than incidental. Modern military hardware, however elite the unit operating it, is rarely built end to end by a single trusted manufacturer. Cameras, sensors, chipsets, and firmware routinely pass through several tiers of suppliers before reaching a finished platform, and each tier is a potential point where the chain of custody and verification can quietly break down. Kraken's own assurances about its camera supplier illustrate exactly how that failure propagates: a manufacturer can act in good faith, rely on a vendor's word, and still end up fielding compromised hardware, because the vulnerability was never introduced at the assembly stage but several layers upstream, in components whose ultimate origin was never fully audited.
CyberPeace View | A wider principle worth naming
There is a broader ethical and legal frame worth applying here, one that extends beyond ordinary cybersecurity practice into the territory international humanitarian law occupies. The core distinction that law draws, between combatants and protected persons, between military objectives and civilian life, depends fundamentally on operators having accurate, uncompromised situational awareness. A surveillance platform is not merely a piece of hardware; it is the sensory apparatus through which decisions with real consequences for human life get made in contested environments. If the integrity of that apparatus cannot be guaranteed, the reliability of everything built on top of it, target verification, proportionality assessments, distinction between combatant and civilian, is quietly weakened at its foundation. This is not a claim that the K3 Scout breach itself caused harm; the Ministry of Defence's own findings suggest it did not. It is a reminder that supply chain integrity in military sensing equipment is not simply a procurement or cybersecurity concern sitting apart from the laws of armed conflict. It sits underneath them, because a compromised sensor is, in a very real sense, a compromised judgment further down the chain.
Where India fits into this story
India has been grappling with functionally the same problem for years, and its response offers a useful point of comparison. Reporting dating back to 2023 revealed that Indian defence officials had quietly barred domestic drone manufacturers from using components sourced from countries sharing a land border with India, an unmistakable, if unstated, reference to China, citing exactly the kind of vulnerability now playing out in Britain's fleet, compromised communication functions, cameras, and operating software capable of leaking intelligence. That policy has hardened considerably since. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi finalised a stringent framework requiring that drones procured from domestic manufacturers contain no Chinese origin components or electronics at all, and at least one major drone order was placed on hold after allegations surfaced that the supplier had used Chinese parts despite those restrictions.
The commercial consequence of that caution has been real and acknowledged openly by industry figures; sourcing components outside China raises costs, given that up to 70 percent of the global drone supply chain has historically run through Chinese manufacturing. But India appears to have concluded, well ahead of this particular British incident becoming public, that the cost of auditing and diversifying a supply chain is lower than the cost of fielding compromised sensing equipment inside sensitive military operations. Indian firms have responded by building propulsion, avionics, and camera systems in house specifically to close this gap, treating component provenance as a first order design question rather than an afterthought bolted on after a breach forces the issue. Seen from that vantage point, the K3 Scout episode reads less like a uniquely British failure and more like a case study in a risk India's own defence establishment had already priced in.
Lessons from the breach
A few conclusions follow fairly directly from how this incident unfolded. First, routine cyber vulnerability assessments work, and this case is arguably an argument for doing more of them, more often, rather than a sign that current practice failed; the breach was caught internally, before any confirmed operational harm occurred. Second, a manufacturer's own assurances about a component supplier are not a substitute for independent verification, since Kraken's good faith reliance on its camera vendor's word is precisely where this vulnerability slipped through. Third, and most durably, defence procurement increasingly needs to treat component provenance as inseparable from operational security, not as a compliance checkbox to be satisfied once at contract signing. India's multi-year pivot toward auditing and localising sensitive component supply chains, imperfect and costly as it has been, points toward the direction other defence establishments will likely be pushed in as more incidents like this one surface. The K3 Scout breach did not, on the evidence available, compromise a single mission. What it compromised was the assumption that hardware assurances alone are sufficient, and that assumption was never going to survive close scrutiny forever.
References
- LBC, "Spy cameras on Navy drones used by UK's elite special forces sending signals to China as security fears grow." https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/royal-navy-spy-drones-sending-signals-to-china-5Hjdfpm_2/
- Defence Blog, "Royal Navy naval drone cameras secretly sent data to China." https://defence-blog.com/royal-navy-naval-drone-cameras-secretly-sent-data-to-china/
- The National Interest, "The Royal Navy's Spy Drones May Have Been Spying for China, Too." https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navys-spy-drones-may-have-been-spying-for-china-too-sa-081026
- Kyiv Post, "UK Navy Drone Camera Components Were Secretly Communicating With China." https://www.kyivpost.com/post/82061
- The Defense News, "UK's Royal Navy K3 Scout Drone Cameras Found Sending Data to an IP Address in China." https://www.thedefensenews.com/UKs-Royal-Navy-K3-Scout-Drone-Cameras-Found-Sending-Data-to-an-IP-Address-in-China/
- The Jerusalem Post, "UK drones sent data to China, raising US, European fears on Chinese components." https://www.jpost.com/international/article-905191
- Firstpost, "UK military drones fitted with Chinese cameras found sending data to Beijing: Report." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-military-drones-fitted-with-chinese-cameras-found-sending-data-to-beijing-report-14037075.html
- Firstpost, "UK deploys warship to West Asia amid plans for multinational Hormuz security mission." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-deploys-warship-to-west-asia-amid-plans-for-multinational-hormuz-security-mission-ws-e-14009471.html
- Reuters via Inquirer.net, "India bars makers of military drones from using Chinese parts." https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1813810/india-bars-makers-of-military-drones-from-using-chinese-parts
- The Print, "Amid concerns about use of Chinese parts in drones, Army general urges industry to be transparent." https://theprint.in/defence/amid-concerns-about-use-of-chinese-parts-in-drones-army-general-urges-industry-to-be-transparent/2305866/
- idrw.org, "India Unveils Drone Security Framework to Eliminate Chinese Components and Strengthen UAV Cyber Defences." https://idrw.org/india-unveils-drone-security-framework-to-eliminate-chinese-components-and-strengthen-uav-cyber-defences/
- The Week, "The hidden weakness in India's military drones: Zen Technologies says it has fixed the Chinese problem." https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2026/07/09/the-hidden-weakness-in-indias-military-drones-zen-technologies-says-it-has-fixed-the-chinese-problem.html
Introduction
Criminal justice in India is majorly governed by three laws which are – Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Evidence Act. The centre, on 11th August 2023’ Friday, proposes a new bill in parliament Friday, which is replacing the country’s major criminal laws, i.e. Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Evidence Act.
The following three bills are being proposed to replace major criminal laws in the country:
- The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill, 2023 to replace Indian Penal Code 1860.
- The Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita Bill, 2023, to replace The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- The Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023, to replace The Indian Evidence Act 1872.
Cyber law-oriented view of the new shift in criminal lawNotable changes:Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill, 2023 Indian Penal Code 1860.
Way ahead for digitalisation
The new laws aim to enhance the utilisation of digital services in court systems, it facilitates online registration of FIR, Online filing of the charge sheet, serving summons in electronic mode, trial and proceedings in electronic mode etc. The new bills also allow the virtual appearance of witnesses, accused, experts, and victims in some instances. This shift will lead to the adoption of technology in courts and all courts to be computerised in the upcoming time.
Enhanced recognition of electronic records
With the change in lifestyle in terms of the digital sphere, significance is given to recognising electronic records as equal to paper records.
Conclusion
The criminal laws of the country play a significant role in establishing law & order and providing justice. The criminal laws of India were the old laws existing under British rule. There have been several amendments to criminal laws to deal with the growing crimes and new aspects. However, there was a need for well-established criminal laws which are in accordance with the present era. The step of the legislature by centralising all criminal laws in their new form and introducing three bills is a good approach which will ultimately strengthen the criminal justice system in India, and it will also facilitate the use of technology in the court system.
