#FactCheck - Old Japanese Earthquake Footage Falsely Linked to Tibet
Executive Summary:
A viral post on X (formerly Twitter) gained much attention, creating a false narrative of recent damage caused by the earthquake in Tibet. Our findings confirmed that the clip was not filmed in Tibet, instead it came from an earthquake that occurred in Japan in the past. The origin of the claim is traced in this report. More to this, analysis and verified findings regarding the evidence have been put in place for further clarification of the misinformation around the video.
Claim:
The viral video shows collapsed infrastructure and significant destruction, with the caption or claims suggesting it is evidence of a recent earthquake in Tibet. Similar claims can be found here and here
Fact Check:
The widely circulated clip, initially claimed to depict the aftermath of the most recent earthquake in Tibet, has been rigorously analyzed and proven to be misattributed. A reverse image search based on the Keyframes of the claimed video revealed that the footage originated from a devastating earthquake in Japan in the past. According to an article published by a Japanese news website, the incident occurred in February 2024. The video was authenticated by news agencies, as it accurately depicted the scenes of destruction reported during that event.
Moreover, the same video was already uploaded on a YouTube channel, which proves that the video was not recent. The architecture, the signboards written in Japanese script, and the vehicles appearing in the video also prove that the footage belongs to Japan, not Tibet. The video shows news from Japan that occurred in the past, proving the video was shared with different context to spread false information.
The video was uploaded on February 2nd, 2024.
Snap from viral video
Snap from Youtube video
Conclusion:
The video viral about the earthquake recently experienced by Tibet is, therefore, wrong as it appears to be old footage from Japan, a previous earthquake experienced by this nation. Thus, the need for information verification, such that doing this helps the spreading of true information to avoid giving false data.
- Claim: A viral video claims to show recent earthquake destruction in Tibet.
- Claimed On: X (Formerly Known As Twitter)
- Fact Check: False and Misleading
Related Blogs
Executive Summary
A video of Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath is being widely circulated on social media with the claim that he supported the Bihar police and justified the encounter of Bharat Bhushan Tiwari in Bhojpur district’s Bilouti village on June 17, 2026. CyberPeace Research Wing research found the claim to be misleading. The viral video is not related to the Bihar encounter case. It is an old video from February 2026, in which the Chief Minister was speaking in the context of law and order and police action in Uttar Pradesh.
Claim:
A Facebook user shared the video claiming it shows CM Yogi Adityanath’s reaction supporting the Bihar encounter of Bharat Tiwari. https://www.facebook.com/reel/1712174420025092 ,https://archive.ph/wip/yUsou
Fact Check:
A keyword search led to the same video being found on the ‘ET Now Swadesh’ YouTube channel in the form of a short video, uploaded on February 4, 2026, indicating that it predates the Bihar incident. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dj7ySFsnkqk
Further verification led to a Dainik Jagran report published on February 3, 2026, which carried visuals from the same statement. The report confirmed that the remarks were made in the context of Uttar Pradesh’s law and order situation and police response. https://www.jagran.com/uttar-pradesh/lucknow-city-cm-yogi-on-up-crime-zero-tolerance-and-police-action-justified-40129630.html
The report quoted CM Yogi Adityanath saying that if police do not act, criminals would dominate the situation, and that police are empowered to respond in the language criminals understand. He also emphasized that police training is designed to ensure effective response to crime. An Aaj Tak report on the Bihar encounter case stated that 28-year-old Bharat Tiwari was killed in an encounter on June 17, 2026, in Bhojpur district. Following the incident, an FIR was registered against police personnel, and the victim’s mother demanded strict action and justice.
Conclusion:
The research confirms that the viral video of CM Yogi Adityanath is old and unrelated to the Bihar encounter case. It is from February 2026 and pertains to a law-and-order statement in Uttar Pradesh. The video is being falsely shared by linking it to the Bihar encounter incident.
%20(1).webp)
Digitisation in Agriculture
The traditional way of doing agriculture has undergone massive digitization in recent years, whereby several agricultural processes have been linked to the Internet. This globally prevalent transformation, driven by smart technology, encompasses the use of sensors, IoT devices, and data analytics to optimize and automate labour-intensive farming practices. Smart farmers in the country and abroad now leverage real-time data to monitor soil conditions, weather patterns, and crop health, enabling precise resource management and improved yields. The integration of smart technology in agriculture not only enhances productivity but also promotes sustainable practices by reducing waste and conserving resources. As a result, the agricultural sector is becoming more efficient, resilient, and capable of meeting the growing global demand for food.
Digitisation of Food Supply Chains
There has also been an increase in the digitisation of food supply chains across the globe since it enables both suppliers and consumers to keep track of the stage of food processing from farm to table and ensures the authenticity of the food product. The latest generation of agricultural robots is being tested to minimise human intervention. It is thought that AI-run processes can mitigate labour shortage, improve warehousing and storage and make transportation more efficient by running continuous evaluations and adjusting the conditions real-time while increasing yield. The company Muddy Machines is currently trialling an autonomous asparagus-harvesting robot called Sprout that not only addresses labour shortages but also selectively harvests green asparagus, which traditionally requires careful picking. However, Chris Chavasse, co-founder of Muddy Machines, highlights that hackers and malicious actors could potentially hack into the robot's servers and prevent it from operating by driving it into a ditch or a hedge, thereby impending core crop activities like seeding and harvesting. Hacking agricultural pieces of machinery also implies damaging a farmer’s produce and in turn profitability for the season.
Case Study: Muddy Machines and Cybersecurity Risks
A cyber attack on digitised agricultural processes has a cascading impact on online food supply chains. Risks are non-exhaustive and spill over to poor protection of cargo in transit, increased manufacturing of counterfeit products, manipulation of data, poor warehousing facilities and product-specific fraud, amongst others. Additional impacts on suppliers are also seen, whereby suppliers have supplied the food products but fail to receive their payments. These cyber-threats may include malware(primarily ransomware) that accounts for 38% of attacks, Internet of Things (IoT) attacks that comprise 29%, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, SQL Injections, phishing attacks etc.
Prominent Cyber Attacks and Their Impacts
Ransomware attacks are the most popular form of cyber threats to food supply chains and may include malicious contaminations, deliberate damage and destruction of tangible assets (like infrastructure) or intangible assets (like reputation and brand). In 2017, NotPetya malware disrupted the world’s largest logistics giant Maersk and destroyed all end-user devices in more than 60 countries. Interestingly, NotPetya was also linked to the malfunction of freezers connected to control systems. The attack led to these control systems being compromised, resulting in freezer failures and potential spoilage of food, highlighting the vulnerability of industrial control systems to cyber threats.
Further Case Studies
NotPetya also impacted Mondelez, the maker of Oreos but disrupting its email systems, file access and logistics for weeks. Mondelez’s insurance claim was also denied since NotPetya malware was described as a “war-like” action, falling outside the purview of the insurance coverage. In April 2021, over the Easter weekend, Bakker Logistiek, a logistics company based in the Netherlands that offers air-conditioned warehousing and food transportation for Dutch supermarkets, experienced a ransomware attack. This incident disrupted their supply chain for several days, resulting in empty shelves at Albert Heijn supermarkets, particularly for products such as packed and grated cheese. Despite the severity of the attack, the company successfully restored their operations within a week by utilizing backups. JBS, one of the world’s biggest meat processing companies, also had to pay $11 million in ransom via Bitcoin to resolve a cyber attack in the same year, whereby computer networks at JBS were hacked, temporarily shutting down their operations and endangering consumer data. The disruption threatened food supplies and risked higher food prices for consumers. Additional cascading impacts also include low food security and hindrances in processing payments at retail stores.
Credible Threat Agents and Their Targets
Any cyber-attack is usually carried out by credible threat agents that can be classified as either internal or external threat agents. Internal threat agents may include contractors, visitors to business sites, former/current employees, and individuals who work for suppliers. External threat agents may include activists, cyber-criminals, terror cells etc. These threat agents target large organisations owing to their larger ransom-paying capacity, but may also target small companies due to their vulnerability and low experience, especially when such companies are migrating from analogous methods to digitised processes.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation warns that the food and agricultural systems are most vulnerable to cyber-security threats during critical planting and harvesting seasons. It noted an increase in cyber-attacks against six agricultural co-operatives in 2021, with ancillary core functions such as food supply and distribution being impacted. Resultantly, cyber-attacks may lead to a mass shortage of food not only meant for human consumption but also for animals.
Policy Recommendations
To safeguard against digital food supply chains, Food defence emerges as one of the top countermeasures to prevent and mitigate the effects of intentional incidents and threats to the food chain. While earlier, food defence vulnerability assessments focused on product adulteration and food fraud, including vulnerability assessments of agriculture technology now be more relevant.
Food supply organisations must prioritise regular backups of data using air-gapped and password-protected offline copies, and ensure critical data copies are not modifiable or deletable from the main system. For this, blockchain-based food supply chain solutions may be deployed, which are not only resilient to hacking, but also allow suppliers and even consumers to track produce. Companies like Ripe.io, Walmart Global Tech, Nestle and Wholechain deploy blockchain for food supply management since it provides overall process transparency, improves trust issues in the transactions, enables traceable and tamper-resistant records and allows accessibility and visibility of data provenance. Extensive recovery plans with multiple copies of essential data and servers in secure, physically separated locations, such as hard drives, storage devices, cloud or distributed ledgers should be adopted in addition to deploying operations plans for critical functions in case of system outages. For core processes which are not labour-intensive, including manual operation methods may be used to reduce digital dependence. Network segmentation, updates or patches for operating systems, software, and firmware are additional steps which can be taken to secure smart agricultural technologies.
References
- Muddy Machines website, Accessed 26 July 2024. https://www.muddymachines.com/
- “Meat giant JBS pays $11m in ransom to resolve cyber-attack”, BBC, 10 June 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57423008
- Marshall, Claire & Prior, Malcolm, “Cyber security: Global food supply chain at risk from malicious hackers.”, BBC, 20 May 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-61336659
- “Ransomware Attacks on Agricultural Cooperatives Potentially Timed to Critical Seasons.”, Private Industry Notification, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 20 April https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220420-2.pdf.
- Manning, Louise & Kowalska, Aleksandra. (2023). “The threat of ransomware in the food supply chain: a challenge for food defence”, Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-023-09516-y
- “NotPetya: the cyberattack that shook the world”, Economic Times, 5 March 2022. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/newsletters/ettech-unwrapped/notpetya-the-cyberattack-that-shook-the-world/articleshow/89997076.cms?from=mdr
- Abrams, Lawrence, “Dutch supermarkets run out of cheese after ransomware attack.”, Bleeping Computer, 12 April 2021. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dutch-supermarkets-run-out-of-cheese-after-ransomware-attack/
- Pandey, Shipra; Gunasekaran, Angappa; Kumar Singh, Rajesh & Kaushik, Anjali, “Cyber security risks in globalised supply chains: conceptual framework”, Journal of Global Operations and Strategic Sourcing, January 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shipra-Pandey/publication/338668641_Cyber_security_risks_in_globalized_supply_chains_conceptual_framework/links/5e2678ae92851c89c9b5ac66/Cyber-security-risks-in-globalized-supply-chains-conceptual-framework.pdf
- Daley, Sam, “Blockchain for Food: 10 examples to know”, Builin, 22 March 2023 https://builtin.com/blockchain/food-safety-supply-chain
Introduction
The digital realm is evolving at a rapid pace, revolutionising cyberspace at a breakneck speed. However, this dynamic growth has left several operational and regulatory lacunae in the fabric of cyberspace, which are exploited by cybercriminals for their ulterior motives. One of the threats that emerged rapidly in 2024 is proxyjacking, in which vulnerable systems are exploited by cyber criminals to sell their bandwidth to third-party proxy servers. This cyber threat poses a significant threat to organisations and individual servers.
Proxyjacking is a kind of cyber attack that leverages legit bandwidth sharing services such as Peer2Profit and HoneyGain. These are legitimate platforms but proxyjacking occurs when such services are exploited without user consent. These services provide the opportunity to monetize their surplus internet bandwidth by sharing with other users. The model itself is harmless but provides an avenue for numerous cyber hostilities. The participants install net-sharing software and add the participating system to the proxy network, enabling users to route their traffic through the system. This setup intends to enhance privacy and provide access to geo-locked content.
The Modus Operandi
These systems are hijacked by cybercriminals, who sell the bandwidth of infected devices. This is achieved by establishing Secure Shell (SSH) connections to vulnerable servers. While hackers rarely use honeypots to render elaborate scams, the technical possibility of them doing so cannot be discounted. Cowrie Honeypots, for instance, are engineered to emulate UNIX systems. Attackers can use similar tactics to gain unauthorized access to poorly secured systems. Once inside the system, attackers utilise legit tools such as public docker images to take over proxy monetization services. These tools are undetectable to anti-malware software due to being genuine software in and of themselves. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools also struggle with the same threats.
The Major Challenges
Limitation Of Current Safeguards – current malware detection software is unable to distinguish between malicious and genuine use of bandwidth services, as the nature of the attack is not inherently malicious.
Bigger Threat Than Crypto-Jacking – Proxyjacking poses a bigger threat than cryptojacking, where systems are compromised to mine crypto-currency. Proxyjacking uses minimal system resources rendering it more challenging to identify. As such, proxyjacking offers perpetrators a higher degree of stealth because it is a resource-light technique, whereas cryptojacking can leave CPU and GPU usage footprints.
Role of Technology in the Fight Against Proxyjacking
Advanced Safety Measures- Implementing advanced safety measures is crucial in combating proxyjacking. Network monitoring tools can help detect unusual traffic patterns indicative of proxyjacking. Key-based authentication for SSH can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access, ensuring that only trusted devices can establish connections. Intrusion Detection Systems and Intrusion Prevention Systems can go a long way towards monitoring unusual outbound traffic.
Robust Verification Processes- sharing services must adopt robust verification processes to ensure that only legitimate users are sharing bandwidth. This could include stricter identity verification methods and continuous monitoring of user activities to identify and block suspicious behaviour.
Policy Recommendations
Verification for Bandwidth Sharing Services – Mandatory verification standards should be enforced for bandwidth-sharing services, including stringent Know Your Customer (KYC) protocols to verify the identity of users. A strong regulatory body would ensure proper compliance with verification standards and impose penalties. The transparency reports must document the user base, verification processes and incidents.
Robust SSH Security Protocols – Key-based authentication for SSH across organisations should be mandated, to neutralize the risk of brute force attacks. Mandatory security audits of SSH configuration within organisations to ensure best practices are complied with and vulnerabilities are identified will help. Detailed logging of SSH attempts will streamline the process of identification and investigation of suspicious behaviour.
Effective Anomaly Detection System – Design a standard anomaly detection system to monitor networks. The industry-wide detection system should focus on detecting inconsistencies in traffic patterns indicating proxy-jacking. Establishing mandatory protocols for incident reporting to centralised authority should be implemented. The system should incorporate machine learning in order to stay abreast with evolving attack methodologies.
Framework for Incident Response – A national framework should include guidelines for investigation, response and remediation to be followed by organisations. A centralized database can be used for logging and tracking all proxy hacking incidents, allowing for information sharing on a real-time basis. This mechanism will aid in identifying emerging trends and common attack vectors.
Whistleblower Incentives – Enacting whistleblower protection laws will ensure the proper safety of individuals reporting proxyjacking activities. Monetary rewards provide extra incentives and motivate individuals to join whistleblowing programs. To provide further protection to whistleblowers, secure communication channels can be established which will ensure full anonymity to individuals.
Conclusion
Proxyjacking represents an insidious and complicated threat in cyberspace. By exploiting legitimate bandwidth-sharing services, cybercriminals can profit while remaining entirely anonymous. Addressing this issue requires a multifaceted approach, including advanced anomaly detection systems, effective verification systems, and comprehensive incident response frameworks. These measures of strong cyber awareness among netizens will ensure a healthy and robust cyberspace.
References
- https://gridinsoft.com/blogs/what-is-proxyjacking/
- https://www.darkreading.com/cyber-risk/ssh-servers-hit-in-proxyjacking-cyberattacks
- https://therecord.media/hackers-use-log4j-in-proxyjacking-scheme
