#FactCheck - Viral Video of Sachin Tendulkar Commenting on Joe Root Is AI-Generated

Introduction

India’s telecommunications infrastructure is one of the world’s largest and most complex, serving over a billion users across urban and rural landscapes. With rampant digitisation and mobile penetration, the vulnerability of telecom networks to cyber threats has grown exponentially. On April 24, 2025, the Ministry of Communications (MOC) released a draft of the “Telecommunications (Telecom Cyber Security) Amendment Rules, 2025,” to update the prior Telecommunications (Telecom Cyber Security) Rules, 2024, to improve cybersecurity in India's telecom industry and fortify network security. Public comments and recommendations regarding these draft rules can be sent to the department by July 24, 2025, after they have been made available for public comment. These rules are enacted under the Telecommunications Act, 2023, to enhance national cybersecurity in the telecom domain. These rules aim to prevent misuse of telecom networks and reinforce data and infrastructure protection mechanisms across service providers. 

‍

Safeguarding the Spectrum: Unpacking the 2025 Cybersecurity Revisions

‍

The menace of fraudulent SIM cards deals the issue of cyber threats a fresh hand. The rising number of digital scams can also be attributed to unverified or fake mobile numbers. Fraudulent SIM cards have often been linked to various cybercrimes such as phishing, vishing, SIM swapping and identity theft. The situation has worsened in the face of easy availability of pre-activated SIM cards and weak KYC enforcement. In a recent example, as per reports of June 28, 2025, the Special Task Force (STF) found that the accused was operating a criminal nexus where he utilised fake documents and the Aadhaar credentials of law-abiding locals to activate numerous SIM cards. Following activation, the SIMs were either transferred to other telecom carriers for additional exploitation or sold illegally. This poses a serious concern for the data protection of vulnerable individuals, especially those in rural areas, whose credentials have been compromised. 

Given the adverse state of cybersecurity in the telecom industry, the Telecommunications (Telecom Cyber Security) Rules, 2024, were passed on 22nd November, 2024, which put various telecom entities under an obligation to actively prevent cybersecurity threats by adopting such policies that mitigate cybersecurity risks and notify the same to the Central Government. The 2024 Telecom Cybersecurity Rules were a significant step in fortifying India’s telecom infrastructure against cyber threats, but they primarily focused on licensed telecom service providers, leaving behind a large segment of digital platforms operating outside the traditional telecom framework largely unregulated. 

‍

Expanding the Net: Key Revisions Under the 2025 Cybersecurity Amendment Rules

‍

The amended rules of 2025 adequately address the regulatory blind spot that is created by the rapid expansion of online services, fintech apps, OTT platforms and social media networks, as these platforms often rely on telecom identifiers such as mobile numbers for user onboarding and service delivery. This regulatory blind spot was exploited for fraud, impersonation and other cybercrimes, especially in the absence of standardised identity verification mechanisms. The proposed regulations would give the government the authority to require private companies’ clients to provide identification if they use a mobile number. For a fee, businesses can also undertake this kind of verification on their own. “ The draft rules introduce a new category called “Telecommunication Identifier User Entities’ (TIUEs), extending cybersecurity compliance obligations to a broad category that now captures any entity using telecom identifiers to deliver digital services. It also creates a unified, government-backed verification framework, enabling better interoperability and uniform user identification norms across sectors. 

‍

While strengthening national digital security is the goal of the Telecom Cybersecurity (Amendment) Rules, 2025, the proposed rules create a great deal of uncertainty and compliance difficulties, especially for private digital platforms. A broad definition of Telecommunication Identifier User businesses (TIUEs) may include a variety of businesses, including e-commerce services, fintech apps and OTT platforms, under the purview of required mobile number verification. Given that many platforms already have advanced internal processes in place to verify users, this scope uncertainty creates significant concerns regarding operational clarity. 

‍

Conclusion

The Telecommunications (Telecom Cyber Security) Amendment Rules, 2025, represent a necessary evolution in India’s quest to secure its telecom ecosystem amid growing cyber threats. The draft regulations recognise the evolving landscape of digital services by broadening the legal scope to encompass Telecommunication Identifier User Entities (TIUEs). Though the goal of creating a strong, transparent and accountable framework is admirable, more clarification and stakeholder involvement are required due to the scope’s vagueness and the possible compliance burden on digital platforms. A truly durable telecom cybersecurity regime will require striking the correct balance between security, viability and privacy. 

‍

References 

‍

• https://www.cyberpeace.org/resources/blogs/the-government-enforces-key-sections-of-the-telecommunication-act-2023
• https://www.cyberpeace.org/resources/blogs/govt-notifies-the-telecommunications-telecom-cyber-security-rules-2024 
• https://the420.in/uttarakhand-stf-busts-fake-sim-racket-linked-to-cyber-crimes-and-nepal-network/ 
• https://www.thehindu.com/business/dot-puts-out-draft-rules-to-enable-mobile-user-validation/article69741367.ece ‍
• https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/06/28/dot-telecom-cyber-security-draft-policy-update/

Introduction

Misinformation is a major issue in the AI age, exacerbated by the broad adoption of AI technologies. The misuse of deepfakes, bots, and content-generating algorithms have made it simpler for bad actors to propagate misinformation on a large scale. These technologies are capable of creating manipulative audio/video content, propagate political propaganda, defame individuals, or incite societal unrest. AI-powered bots may flood internet platforms with false information, swaying public opinion in subtle ways. The spread of misinformation endangers democracy, public health, and social order. It has the potential to affect voter sentiments, erode faith in the election process, and even spark violence. Addressing misinformation includes expanding digital literacy, strengthening platform detection capabilities, incorporating regulatory checks, and removing incorrect information.

AI's Role in Misinformation Creation

AI's growth in its capabilities to generate content have grown exponentially in recent years. Legitimate uses or purposes of AI many-a-times take a backseat and result in the exploitation of content that already exists on the internet. One of the main examples of misinformation flooding the internet is when AI-powered bots flood social media platforms with fake news at a scale and speed that makes it impossible for humans to track and figure out whether the same is true or false.

The netizens in India are greatly influenced by viral content on social media. AI-generated misinformation can have particularly negative consequences. Being literate in the traditional sense of the word does not automatically guarantee one the ability to parse through the nuances of social media content authenticity and impact. Literacy, be it social media literacy or internet literacy, is under attack and one of the main contributors to this is the rampant rise of AI-generated misinformation. Some of the most common examples of misinformation that can be found are related to elections, public health, and communal issues. These issues have one common factor that connects them, which is that they evoke strong emotions in people and as such can go viral very quickly and influence social behaviour, to the extent that they may lead to social unrest, political instability and even violence. Such developments lead to public mistrust in the authorities and institutions, which is dangerous in any economy, but even more so in a country like India which is home to a very large population comprising a diverse range of identity groups. 

Misinformation and Gen AI

Generative AI (GAI) is a powerful tool that allows individuals to create massive amounts of realistic-seeming content, including imitating real people's voices and creating photos and videos that are indistinguishable from reality. Advanced deepfake technology blurs the line between authentic and fake. However, when used smartly, GAI is also capable of providing a greater number of content consumers with trustworthy information, counteracting misinformation. 

Generative AI (GAI) is a technology that has entered the realm of autonomous content production and language creation, which is linked to the issue of misinformation. It is often difficult to determine if content originates from humans or machines and if we can trust what we read, see, or hear. This has led to media users becoming more confused about their relationship with media platforms and content and highlighted the need for a change in traditional journalistic principles.

We have seen a number of different examples of GAI in action in recent times, from fully AI-generated fake news websites to fake Joe Biden robocalls telling the Democrats in the U.S. not to vote. The consequences of such content and the impact it could have on life as we know it are almost too vast to even comprehend at present. If our ability to identify reality is quickly fading, how will we make critical decisions or navigate the digital landscape safely? As such, the safe and ethical use and applications of this technology needs to be a top global priority. 

Challenges for Policymakers

AI's ability to generate anonymous content makes it difficult to hold perpetrators accountable due to the massive amount of data generated. The decentralised nature of the internet further complicates regulation efforts, as misinformation can spread across multiple platforms and jurisdictions. Balancing the need to protect the freedom of speech and expression with the need to combat misinformation is a challenge. Over-regulation could stifle legitimate discourse, while under-regulation could allow misinformation to propagate unchecked. India's multilingual population adds more layers to already-complex issue, as AI-generated misinformation is tailored to different languages and cultural contexts, making it harder to detect and counter. Therefore, developing strategies catering to the multilingual population is necessary.

Potential Solutions

To effectively combat AI-generated misinformation in India, an approach that is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional is essential. Some potential solutions are as follows:

• Developing a framework that is specific in its application to address AI-generated content. It should include stricter penalties for the originator and spreader and dissemination of fake content in proportionality to its consequences. The framework should establish clear and concise guidelines for social media platforms to ensure that proactive measures are taken to detect and remove AI-generated misinformation.
• Investing in tools that are driven by AI for customised detection and flagging of misinformation in real time. This can help in identifying deepfakes, manipulated images, and other forms of AI-generated content. 

• The primary aim should be to encourage different collaborations between tech companies, cyber security orgnisations, academic institutions and government agencies to develop solutions for combating misinformation. 
• Digital literacy programs will empower individuals by training them to evaluate online content. Educational programs in schools and communities teach critical thinking and media literacy skills, enabling individuals to better discern between real and fake content.

Conclusion

AI-generated misinformation presents a significant threat to India, and it is safe to say that the risks posed are at scale with the rapid rate at which the nation is developing technologically. As the country moves towards greater digital literacy and unprecedented mobile technology adoption, one must be cognizant of the fact that even a single piece of misinformation can quickly and deeply reach and influence a large portion of the population. Indian policymakers need to rise to the challenge of AI-generated misinformation and counteract it by developing comprehensive strategies that not only focus on regulation and technological innovation but also encourage public education. AI technologies are misused by bad actors to create hyper-realistic fake content including deepfakes and fabricated news stories, which can be extremely hard to distinguish from the truth. The battle against misinformation is complex and ongoing, but by developing and deploying the right policies, tools, digital defense frameworks and other mechanisms, we can navigate these challenges and safeguard the online information landscape.

References:

• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/how-to/how-ai-powered-tools-deepfakes-pose-a-misinformation-challenge-for-internet-users/articleshow/98770592.cms?from=mdr 
• https://www.dw.com/en/india-ai-driven-political-messaging-raises-ethical-dilemma/a-69172400 
• https://pure.rug.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/975865684/proceedings.pdf#page=62 

‍

Introduction

For two decades, cybercrime enforcement was built around a simple assumption: criminals hide behind screens, but they still operate mostly within reachable borders. That assumption has collapsed. Today's fraud economy runs through industrial-scale scam compounds in Myanmar and Cambodia, laundering networks spanning a dozen jurisdictions, and trafficked labour forced to defraud victims thousands of miles away. INTERPOL's own trend reporting has tracked victims from more than 60 countries pulled into scam operations that now stretch well beyond Southeast Asia into Africa, the Gulf, and Latin America. Global losses from this activity are estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars annually, and the networks rebuild faster than any single government can dismantle them.

A Threat That Outran the Old Playbook

The mismatch is the real story behind a wave of policy moves in 2025 and 2026. The August 12, 2026 U.S. National Security Presidential Memorandum authorising vetted private companies to conduct government-supervised offensive cyber operations against transnational criminal organisations is one data point in that wave, not the whole story. Washington's move sits alongside a broader, still-unfinished experiment: can the international system build cooperative machinery fast enough to match a threat that treats borders as an inconvenience rather than a barrier?

Three Tracks of International Response

Three distinct but overlapping tracks have emerged.

The treaty: The most consequential recent development is the UN Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by the General Assembly in December 2024 and opened for signature in Hanoi in October 2025, where 71 states and the EU signed on. It is the first comprehensive global treaty addressing cybercrime and cross-border evidence sharing, building on the older Budapest Convention framework that has anchored cooperation since 2004. The Hanoi Convention needs 40 ratifications to enter into force; as of mid-2026, only three states (Qatar, Azerbaijan, and Vietnam) had ratified it, and human rights groups continue to warn that its broad scope could be used by authoritarian governments to justify surveillance and cross-border data requests dressed up as cybercrime cooperation. The treaty's fate will hinge on a Conference of States Parties process now being negotiated, where democracies are pushing for genuine multi-stakeholder oversight rather than a rubber stamp.

The operational track: While treaty diplomacy moves slowly, police-to-police cooperation has scaled up dramatically. INTERPOL's Operation First Light, now an annual standing initiative, illustrates the trajectory: its 2026 iteration spanned January to April, generated over 5,800 arrests and roughly $293 million in intercepted funds, and made heavy use of the Global Rapid Intervention of Payments mechanism to freeze illicit transfers before they disappeared into crypto wallets. A parallel operation led by Dubai Police with the FBI and Chinese authorities dismantled nine pig-butchering compounds across Myanmar, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand, seizing more than $701 million. In Europe, Europol's EMPACT framework has entered a new 2026–2029 cycle, deepening ties with Frontex, Eurojust, and regional partners like Ameripol and the EL PACTTO programme in Latin America, effectively building a lattice of standing coordination bodies rather than one-off task forces. These operations demonstrate real capacity, but they also expose the "whack-a-mole" problem: raided compounds in Myanmar's Myawaddy region simply relocated, reconnected via satellite internet, and resumed operations within weeks, according to regional reporting.

The public-private track: This is where the U.S. memorandum fits into a genuinely global pattern rather than standing alone. The United Kingdom's 2026–2029 Fraud Strategy centres on a £31 million Online Crime Centre, opening in 2026, that fuses data from the National Crime Agency, the intelligence community, and private partners across banking, telecoms, and technology into a single coordination hub building on existing arrangements like Stop Scams UK, where telecom operators and banks already share suspicious SIM and account data in near real time. In the U.S., a June 2026 joint action involving the Justice Department, Meta, Microsoft, Google, Apple, and Coinbase froze $3.8 billion in cryptocurrency and disrupted 1.4 million fraud-linked accounts, showing that platform cooperation can move faster than formal treaty processes. Singapore has positioned itself as a hub for this model too, anchoring the Global Anti-Scam Alliance, which now includes ASEAN's own foundation as a member, bringing governments, banks, and tech platforms into shared intelligence loops. What distinguishes the U.S. memorandum is that it goes a step further than data-sharing: it authorises companies to take disruptive technical action, not just contribute intelligence, under a legal theory that folds them into the government's own authority under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's law-enforcement exception.

Where the System Still Breaks Down

Despite this activity, structural gaps, like jurisdiction, are the deepest ones. Scam compounds deliberately locate in special economic zones and border regions precisely because territorial control there is contested or weak, leaving no single government with clean authority to act. ASEAN's own policy work acknowledges that nearly every stage of the regional scam value chain crosses at least one border, which is why the bloc has shifted toward standing coordination bodies like its Working Group on Anti-Online Scams rather than relying on bilateral requests.

Attribution and accountability lag behind operational tempo. Financial intelligence and blockchain analytics have improved enforcement precision, but identifying the human traffickers and financiers sitting above front-line scam operators remains slow, uneven, and dependent on political will in host countries.

Governance of the newer public-private authorities is also unsettled. Human rights advocates flag that expanding both the Hanoi Convention's surveillance-adjacent powers and unilateral hack-back authorities like the U.S. memorandum could, without careful oversight, blur the line between fighting organised fraud and enabling broader digital overreach. The U.S. memorandum's own guardrails, which are a ban on operations causing serious injury or rising to a use of force, mandatory federal sign-off, and a $1 million forfeitable bond, reflect an awareness of that risk, but its implementing procedures remain classified, and comparable transparency gaps exist in several other national programs.

The Emerging Consensus

What's notable is not any single instrument but the convergence: nearly every serious national or regional response now combines the same three ingredients deeper platform and financial-sector data sharing, standing multilateral operational coordination, and a cautious expansion of what non-state actors are permitted to do. The countries and blocs making the fastest progress, from the UK's Online Crime Centre to INTERPOL's payment-interdiction tools to ASEAN's regional information-sharing arrangement, are the ones treating cyber-enabled transnational crime as a persistent infrastructure problem rather than a series of discrete crimes to be prosecuted after the fact. Whether that convergence produces durable results or simply better-coordinated whack-a-mole will depend on the unglamorous work still ahead: ratifying treaties, writing classified rulebooks, and building the cross-border trust that lets financial and technical data move as fast as the criminals do.

Conclusion 

Transnational cybercrime has outgrown fragmented national enforcement. The emerging combination of international treaties, operational cooperation, and public-private partnerships offers a stronger response, but serious gaps in jurisdiction, accountability, and oversight remain. Ultimately, success will depend on whether states can build cooperation and safeguards capable of matching criminals’ speed, adaptability, and global reach.

Sources

• Presidential Memorandum: Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime — The White House
• United Nations Convention against Cybercrime — UNODC
• The Promise and Peril of the U.N. Convention Against Cybercrime — Just Security
• Moving Forward with the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime — ICCLR
• Growing threat of transnational scam centres highlighted at INTERPOL General Assembly
• Over 5,800 arrests, USD 293 million intercepted in global fraud bust — INTERPOL
• Operation First Light 2026: 276 Arrested, $701M Seized — Breached.Company

‍