#FactCheck: Viral Video of Chandra Arya Speaking Kannada Unrelated to Canadian PM Nomination

Introduction

For two decades, cybercrime enforcement was built around a simple assumption: criminals hide behind screens, but they still operate mostly within reachable borders. That assumption has collapsed. Today's fraud economy runs through industrial-scale scam compounds in Myanmar and Cambodia, laundering networks spanning a dozen jurisdictions, and trafficked labour forced to defraud victims thousands of miles away. INTERPOL's own trend reporting has tracked victims from more than 60 countries pulled into scam operations that now stretch well beyond Southeast Asia into Africa, the Gulf, and Latin America. Global losses from this activity are estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars annually, and the networks rebuild faster than any single government can dismantle them.

A Threat That Outran the Old Playbook

The mismatch is the real story behind a wave of policy moves in 2025 and 2026. The August 12, 2026 U.S. National Security Presidential Memorandum authorising vetted private companies to conduct government-supervised offensive cyber operations against transnational criminal organisations is one data point in that wave, not the whole story. Washington's move sits alongside a broader, still-unfinished experiment: can the international system build cooperative machinery fast enough to match a threat that treats borders as an inconvenience rather than a barrier?

Three Tracks of International Response

Three distinct but overlapping tracks have emerged.

The treaty: The most consequential recent development is the UN Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by the General Assembly in December 2024 and opened for signature in Hanoi in October 2025, where 71 states and the EU signed on. It is the first comprehensive global treaty addressing cybercrime and cross-border evidence sharing, building on the older Budapest Convention framework that has anchored cooperation since 2004. The Hanoi Convention needs 40 ratifications to enter into force; as of mid-2026, only three states (Qatar, Azerbaijan, and Vietnam) had ratified it, and human rights groups continue to warn that its broad scope could be used by authoritarian governments to justify surveillance and cross-border data requests dressed up as cybercrime cooperation. The treaty's fate will hinge on a Conference of States Parties process now being negotiated, where democracies are pushing for genuine multi-stakeholder oversight rather than a rubber stamp.

The operational track: While treaty diplomacy moves slowly, police-to-police cooperation has scaled up dramatically. INTERPOL's Operation First Light, now an annual standing initiative, illustrates the trajectory: its 2026 iteration spanned January to April, generated over 5,800 arrests and roughly $293 million in intercepted funds, and made heavy use of the Global Rapid Intervention of Payments mechanism to freeze illicit transfers before they disappeared into crypto wallets. A parallel operation led by Dubai Police with the FBI and Chinese authorities dismantled nine pig-butchering compounds across Myanmar, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand, seizing more than $701 million. In Europe, Europol's EMPACT framework has entered a new 2026–2029 cycle, deepening ties with Frontex, Eurojust, and regional partners like Ameripol and the EL PACTTO programme in Latin America, effectively building a lattice of standing coordination bodies rather than one-off task forces. These operations demonstrate real capacity, but they also expose the "whack-a-mole" problem: raided compounds in Myanmar's Myawaddy region simply relocated, reconnected via satellite internet, and resumed operations within weeks, according to regional reporting.

The public-private track: This is where the U.S. memorandum fits into a genuinely global pattern rather than standing alone. The United Kingdom's 2026–2029 Fraud Strategy centres on a £31 million Online Crime Centre, opening in 2026, that fuses data from the National Crime Agency, the intelligence community, and private partners across banking, telecoms, and technology into a single coordination hub building on existing arrangements like Stop Scams UK, where telecom operators and banks already share suspicious SIM and account data in near real time. In the U.S., a June 2026 joint action involving the Justice Department, Meta, Microsoft, Google, Apple, and Coinbase froze $3.8 billion in cryptocurrency and disrupted 1.4 million fraud-linked accounts, showing that platform cooperation can move faster than formal treaty processes. Singapore has positioned itself as a hub for this model too, anchoring the Global Anti-Scam Alliance, which now includes ASEAN's own foundation as a member, bringing governments, banks, and tech platforms into shared intelligence loops. What distinguishes the U.S. memorandum is that it goes a step further than data-sharing: it authorises companies to take disruptive technical action, not just contribute intelligence, under a legal theory that folds them into the government's own authority under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's law-enforcement exception.

Where the System Still Breaks Down

Despite this activity, structural gaps, like jurisdiction, are the deepest ones. Scam compounds deliberately locate in special economic zones and border regions precisely because territorial control there is contested or weak, leaving no single government with clean authority to act. ASEAN's own policy work acknowledges that nearly every stage of the regional scam value chain crosses at least one border, which is why the bloc has shifted toward standing coordination bodies like its Working Group on Anti-Online Scams rather than relying on bilateral requests.

Attribution and accountability lag behind operational tempo. Financial intelligence and blockchain analytics have improved enforcement precision, but identifying the human traffickers and financiers sitting above front-line scam operators remains slow, uneven, and dependent on political will in host countries.

Governance of the newer public-private authorities is also unsettled. Human rights advocates flag that expanding both the Hanoi Convention's surveillance-adjacent powers and unilateral hack-back authorities like the U.S. memorandum could, without careful oversight, blur the line between fighting organised fraud and enabling broader digital overreach. The U.S. memorandum's own guardrails, which are a ban on operations causing serious injury or rising to a use of force, mandatory federal sign-off, and a $1 million forfeitable bond, reflect an awareness of that risk, but its implementing procedures remain classified, and comparable transparency gaps exist in several other national programs.

The Emerging Consensus

What's notable is not any single instrument but the convergence: nearly every serious national or regional response now combines the same three ingredients deeper platform and financial-sector data sharing, standing multilateral operational coordination, and a cautious expansion of what non-state actors are permitted to do. The countries and blocs making the fastest progress, from the UK's Online Crime Centre to INTERPOL's payment-interdiction tools to ASEAN's regional information-sharing arrangement, are the ones treating cyber-enabled transnational crime as a persistent infrastructure problem rather than a series of discrete crimes to be prosecuted after the fact. Whether that convergence produces durable results or simply better-coordinated whack-a-mole will depend on the unglamorous work still ahead: ratifying treaties, writing classified rulebooks, and building the cross-border trust that lets financial and technical data move as fast as the criminals do.

Conclusion 

Transnational cybercrime has outgrown fragmented national enforcement. The emerging combination of international treaties, operational cooperation, and public-private partnerships offers a stronger response, but serious gaps in jurisdiction, accountability, and oversight remain. Ultimately, success will depend on whether states can build cooperation and safeguards capable of matching criminals’ speed, adaptability, and global reach.

Sources

• Presidential Memorandum: Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime — The White House
• United Nations Convention against Cybercrime — UNODC
• The Promise and Peril of the U.N. Convention Against Cybercrime — Just Security
• Moving Forward with the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime — ICCLR
• Growing threat of transnational scam centres highlighted at INTERPOL General Assembly
• Over 5,800 arrests, USD 293 million intercepted in global fraud bust — INTERPOL
• Operation First Light 2026: 276 Arrested, $701M Seized — Breached.Company

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Introduction

Have you ever wondered how the internet works? Yes, there are screens and wires, but what’s going on beneath the surface? Every time you open a website, send an email, chat on messaging apps, or stream movies, you’re relying on something you probably don’t think about: the TCP/IP protocol suite. Without it, the internet as we know it wouldn’t exist. Let’s take a look at why this unassuming set of rules allows us to connect to anyone anywhere in the world. 

The Problem: Networks That Couldn't Talk to Each Other

The internet is widely called a network of networks. A network is a group of devices that are connected and can share data with each other. 

Researchers and governments began building early computer networks in the 1960s and 70s. But as the Cold War intensified, the U.S. military felt the need to establish a robust data-sharing infrastructure through interconnected networks that could withstand attacks. At the time, each network had different standards and protocols, which meant getting networks to communicate wasn’t easy or efficient. One network would have to be subsumed into another. This would lead to major problems in the reliability of data relay, flexibility of including more nodes, scalability of the interconnected network, and innovation.

The Breakthrough: Open Architecture Networking

This changed in the 1970s, when Bob Kahn proposed the concept of open architecture networking. It was a simple but revolutionary idea. He envisioned a system where all networks could talk to each other as equals. In this conceptualisation, all networks, even though unique in design and interface, could connect as peers to facilitate end-to-end communication. End-to-end communication helps deliver data between the source and destination without relying on intermediate nodes to control or modify it. This helps to make data relay more reliable and less prone to errors. 

Along with Vint Cerf, he developed a network protocol, the TCP/IP suite, that would go on to enable different networks across satellite, wired, and non-wired domains to communicate with one another.  

What Is TCP/IP?

TCP/IP stands for Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol. It’s a set of communication rules that allow computers and devices to exchange information across different networks. 

It’s powerful because: 

• Layered and open architecture: Each function (like data delivery or routing) is handled by a specific layer. This modular design makes it easy to build new technologies like the World Wide Web or streaming services on top of it.
• Decentralisation: There's no single point of control. Any device can connect to another across the internet, making it scalable and resilient.
• Standardisation: TCP/IP works across all kinds of hardware and operating systems, making it truly universal. 

The Core Components

• TCP (Transmission Control Protocol): Ensures that data is delivered accurately and in order. If any piece is lost or duplicated, TCP handles it.
• IP (Internet Protocol): Handles addressing and routing. It decides where each packet of data should go and how it gets there.
• UDP (User Datagram Protocol): A lightweight version of TCP, used when speed is more important than accuracy, such as for video calls or online gaming.

Why It Matters

The TCP/IP protocol suite introduced a set of standardised guidelines that enable networks to communicate, thereby laying the foundation of the Internet. It has made the Internet global, open, reliable, interoperable, scalable, and resilient, — features because of which the Internet has come to become the backbone of modern communication systems. So the next time you open a browser or send a message, remember: it’s TCP/IP quietly making it all possible.

References

• https://www.techtarget.com/searchnetworking/definition/ARPANET
• https://www.internetsociety.org/internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet/ 
• https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/tcp-ip-model/ 
• https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/tcpip-network-administration/0596002971/ch01.html 

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Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven autonomous weapons are reshaping military strategy, acting as force multipliers that can independently assess threats, adapt to dynamic combat environments, and execute missions with minimal human intervention, pushing the boundaries of modern warfare tactics. AI has become a critical component of modern technology-driven warfare and has simultaneously impacted many spheres in a technology-driven world. Nations often prioritise defence for significant investments, supporting its growth and modernisation. AI has become a prime area of investment and development for technological superiority in defence forces. India’s focus on defence modernisation is evident through initiatives like the Defence AI Council and the Task Force on Strategic Implementation of AI for National Security.

The main requirement that Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) require is the “autonomy” to perform their functions when direction or input from a human actor is absent. AI is not a prerequisite for the functioning of AWSs, but, when incorporated, AI could further enable such systems. While militaries seek to apply increasingly sophisticated AI and automation to weapons technologies, several questions arise. Ethical concerns have been raised for AWS as the more prominent issue by many states, international organisations, civil society groups and even many distinguished figures.

Ethical Concerns Surrounding Autonomous Weapons

The delegation of life-and-death decisions to machines is the ethical dilemma that surrounds AWS. A major concern is the lack of human oversight, raising questions about accountability. What if AWS malfunctions or violates international laws, potentially committing war crimes? This ambiguity fuels debate over the dangers of entrusting lethal force to non-human actors. Additionally, AWS poses humanitarian risks, particularly to civilians, as flawed algorithms could make disastrous decisions. The dehumanisation of warfare and the violation of human dignity are critical concerns when AWS is in question, as targets become reduced to mere data points. The impact on operators’ moral judgment and empathy is also troubling, alongside the risk of algorithmic bias leading to unjust or disproportionate targeting. These ethical challenges are deeply concerning.

Balancing Ethical Considerations and Innovations

It is immaterial how advanced a computer becomes in simulating human emotions like compassion, empathy, altruism, or other emotions as the machine will only be imitating them, not experiencing them as a human would. A potential solution to this ethical predicament is using a 'human-in-the-loop' or 'human-on-the-loop' semi-autonomous system. This would act as a compromise between autonomy and accountability.

A “human-on-the-loop” system is designed to provide human operators with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements before unacceptable levels of damage occur. For example, defensive weapon systems could autonomously select and engage targets based on their programming, during which a human operator retains full supervision and can override the system within a limited period if necessary.

In contrast, a ‘human-in-the-loop” system is intended to engage individual targets or specific target groups pre-selected by a human operator. Examples would include homing munitions that, once launched to a particular target location, search for and attack preprogrammed categories of targets within the area.

International Debate and Regulatory Frameworks

The regulation of autonomous weapons that employ AI, in particular, is a pressing global issue due to the ethical, legal, and security concerns it contains. There are many ongoing efforts at the international level which are in discussion to regulate such weapons. One such example is the initiative under the United Nations Convention on CertainConventional Weapons (CCW), where member states, India being an active participant, debate the limits of AI in warfare. However, existing international laws, such as the Geneva Conventions, offer legal protection by prohibiting indiscriminate attacks and mandating the distinction between combatants and civilians. The key challenge lies in achieving global consensus, as different nations have varied interests and levels of technological advancement. Some countries advocate for a preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons, while others prioritise military innovation. The complexity of defining human control and accountability further complicates efforts to establish binding regulations, making global cooperation both essential and challenging.

The Future of AI in Defence and the Need for Stronger Regulations

The evolution of autonomous weapons poses complex ethical and security challenges. As AI-driven systems become more advanced, a growing risk of its misuse in warfare is also advancing, where lethal decisions could be made without human oversight. Proactive regulation is crucial to prevent unethical use of AI, such as indiscriminate attacks or violations of international law. Setting clear boundaries on autonomous weapons now can help avoid future humanitarian crises. India’s defence policy already recognises the importance of regulating the use of AI and AWS, as evidenced by the formation of bodies like the Defence AI Project Agency (DAIPA) for enabling AI-based processes in defence Organisations. Global cooperation is essential for creating robust regulations that balance technological innovation with ethical considerations. Such collaboration would ensure that autonomous weapons are used responsibly, protecting civilians and combatants, while encouraging innovation within a framework prioritising human dignity and international security.

Conclusion

AWS and AI in warfare present significant ethical, legal, and security challenges. While these technologies promise enhanced military capabilities, they raise concerns about accountability, human oversight, and humanitarian risks. Balancing innovation with ethical responsibility is crucial, and semi-autonomous systems offer a potential compromise. India’s efforts to regulate AI in defence highlight the importance of proactive governance. Global cooperation is essential in establishing robust regulations that ensure AWS is used responsibly, prioritising human dignity and adherence to international law, while fostering technological advancement.

References

●     https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/reaim-summit-ai-war-weapons-9556525/

●     https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2024/04/25/the-road-less-travelled-ethics-in-the-international-regulatory-debate-on-autonomous-weapon-systems/

●     https://disarmament.unoda.org/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/

●     https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/5FD01B5A96116766C3B1273490B24897/S0892679423000357a.pdf/banning-autonomous-weapons-a-legal-and-ethical-mandate.pdf

●     https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1846937