#FactCheck-AI-Generated Video Falsely Shared as Venezuela Earthquake Footage
Executive Summary
Two powerful earthquakes measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude struck Venezuela on June 24, 2026, within a span of one minute, causing widespread destruction. Hundreds of buildings were reportedly reduced to rubble. Against this backdrop, a video is being widely shared on social media showing two high-rise buildings colliding with each other before collapsing. Several users have claimed that the footage shows the aftermath of the recent earthquake in Venezuela. CyberPeace Research Wing team conducted a detailed research and found that the viral video is not authentic. The footage was generated using artificial intelligence and is being falsely shared as real visuals from the Venezuela earthquake.
Claim
A Facebook user, “Rana Yashwant,” shared the video on June 26, 2026, with the caption: "Venezuela: The high-rise buildings fell as if they were fast-moving train coaches. How long could they withstand such a powerful earthquake? Both collapsed face-first. What happened to the people? Who knows." https://www.facebook.com/reel/1036186612182534 ,https://perma.cc/98PE-DFKB
Fact Check
We first extracted several keyframes from the viral video and conducted reverse image searches using Google Lens. However, we found no credible news reports or evidence linking the footage to the recent earthquakes in Venezuela. A closer examination of the video revealed several anomalies. Despite the intense shaking and collision of the buildings, the windows and structural features remained unchanged throughout the footage. No visible deformation or damage appeared in the buildings before they collapsed, which is highly unrealistic and raised suspicions that the video had been generated using AI. To verify this, we analyzed the video using the AI detection tool detectvideo.ai. The results indicated a 73 percent probability that the footage was AI-generated.
Similarly, analysis conducted using Sightengine found a 99 percent probability that the video had been created using artificial intelligence.
Conclusion
Our research found the viral claim to be false. The video showing two buildings colliding and collapsing is not related to the recent earthquakes in Venezuela. The footage was generated using artificial intelligence and is being misleadingly shared as real disaster footage.
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Introduction
Insurance companies hold a huge amount of sensitive data. Medical history, bank account numbers, identity proofs, years of claims records — all of it sits on insurer servers, waiting. That makes the sector an easy target. India saw close to 370 million malware attacks in a single recent year. Banking, financial services and insurance firms bore the brunt of it. That got the attention of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI). On 6 April 2026, it released a new set of Information and Cyber Security Guidelines. These replace the old 2023 rules and ask insurers to take much stronger responsibility for protecting their systems, and their customers' data.
Who Must Follow These New Rules
The updated guidelines are not limited to large insurance companies alone. They apply to life, general and health insurers. They also apply to foreign reinsurance branches operating in India, and to intermediaries such as brokers, corporate agents, web aggregators and third-party administrators. Insurance repositories and the Insurance Information Bureau of India fall within scope too. Individual insurance agents, point-of-sale persons and surveyors are not covered directly. But insurers must still make sure these people follow a basic security framework approved by their board. Foreign reinsurance branches get a little more room — they can depart from a specific rule, but only if they can justify it properly to the regulator. Why cast such a wide net in the first place? Because breaches rarely start at the big insurer with the well-staffed Information Technology (IT) team. They start with the small broker or corporate agent who never got around to updating a password policy.
A Stronger Role for the Boardroom
An Independent CISO (Chief Information Security Officer)
The clearest change sits right at the top. A Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) can no longer report to the Head of Information Technology (IT). Nor can the CISO (Chief Information Security Officer) be handed sales targets or any other business goal. Why does this matter so much? Picture a CISO (Chief Information Security Officer) who answers to the same person pushing hard for a product launch next week. Flagging a serious vulnerability suddenly becomes an awkward, career-risking conversation. The IRDAI (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India) has simply removed that awkwardness by rule.
More Frequent Oversight
The Information Security Risk Management Committee used to meet only twice a year. Now it must meet at least once every quarter. A new Information Technology (IT) Steering Committee has also been set up to handle day-to-day technology decisions. This frees the risk committee to focus purely on oversight. There's also a new seat at the table: at least one outside cybersecurity expert must now join the Risk Management Committee. Someone with no stake in internal politics, no department to protect, just technical judgement.
Faster Action When Something Goes Wrong
A Six-Hour Reporting Deadline
No system is completely safe from attack. So the guidelines also focus heavily on how insurers respond once something goes wrong. Every cybersecurity incident now has to reach the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team within six hours of being spotted, with the IRDAI (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India) and other regulators looped in at the same time. Six hours is a tight deadline. It means insurers need detection and escalation systems that work round the clock, not just during office hours.
Testing and Exceptions
Business continuity and disaster recovery plans must be tested at least once a year, and not through some comfortable, pre-planned shutdown either — the test has to feel like a real disaster. Exceptions to security policy are also handled with far more discipline now. A short exception of up to three months can be approved by the CISO (Chief Information Security Officer) alone. One lasting between three months and a year needs sign-off from the risk committee. Anything longer needs approval from the board itself. Gaps found during audits must be closed within twelve months, with the board tracking progress at every stage.
Looking Ahead to Tomorrow's Risks
The guidelines do not stop at today's threats. More insurers are moving their operations to the cloud. So the rules now demand stronger contracts with cloud vendors, and a clear plan for what happens to customer data once a vendor relationship ends. Third-party risk gets close attention too. Many security breaches in the financial sector start with a vendor, not with the insurer's own systems. Before hiring any vendor, insurers must now check their security properly. Every contract must include audit rights and a clause requiring the vendor to report incidents. One of the most forward-looking additions is early preparation for a post-quantum world. Insurers must keep a clear list of their cryptographic assets. In simple terms, this is a map of where and how encryption is used across their systems. It helps them get ready once stronger encryption standards become necessary. Quantum computers capable of breaking today's encryption are still some years away, by most estimates. Mapping out those cryptographic assets now is a lot cheaper than scrambling to do it after the threat has already landed.
Conclusion
Where does all this leave things? Cybersecurity in Indian insurance isn't a server-room problem anymore — it sits squarely in the boardroom now. Directors now own this risk, not just Information Technology (IT) managers tucked away in a basement office. Policyholders benefit too, since their data now sits behind stronger locks, watched more closely and reported on far more often than before. Insurers who treat this as a paperwork exercise will struggle to keep up. Those who actually build these habits into daily operations will likely spend less time firefighting breaches five years from now, and more time competing on service and price instead.
References
3. Medianama, 'IRDAI Updates Cybersecurity Rules, Mandates DPDP Compliance', April 2026.
4. DSCI, brief on IRDAI's Information and Cyber Security Guidelines, 2026, April 2026.
7. Deloitte India, 'IRDAI Tightens Cyber Net: Wake-up Call for Insurers'.
Executive Summary
A video of an Indian Army officer leaving a meeting alongside a police official is being widely circulated on social media. Some users are sharing the clip with the claim that the officer walked out of a meeting after the government refused to provide funding for security preparations related to Pakistan and China. CyberPeace Research Wing’s research found the viral claim to be false. Our research revealed that the video is not related to any dispute over defence funding. It actually shows a press conference held in Patiala in March 2025 regarding an attack on an Indian Army Colonel. During the press conference, the Army officer demanded a transparent, time-bound, fair and impartial research, while the police official provided details about the action taken in the case.
Claim
Facebook user ‘Salman Pathan’ shared the video on July 15, 2026, with the claim: “After the government refused funding for security arrangements/preparations related to Pakistan and China, an Indian Army officer left the meeting.” The post further questioned the government over alleged priorities in spending public money.
https://www.facebook.com/reel/3995874277215044
https://perma.cc/JL7A-2A6B?type=standard
Fact Check
To verify the claim, we extracted keyframes from the viral video and conducted a reverse image search using Google Lens. During the research, we found that the same video was uploaded on March 25, 2025, by X user ‘Man Aman Singh Chhina’. The post stated:
“Chief of Staff of Western Command Lieutenant General Mohit Wadhwa left along with senior officers after reading a statement on the Patiala Colonel case without answering any questions. The DGP also read his statement and left, but at least he answered media questions.”
https://x.com/manaman_chhina/status/1904492655720988850?s=20
Further research revealed that the Government of Punjab’s official YouTube channel had uploaded the video of the same press conference on March 25, 2025. At the end of the press conference, when the Army and police officials leave the venue, the same question from journalists that appears in the viral clip can be heard.
https://www.youtube.com/live/7i3Nxc6vTpU
According to a report published by Amar Ujala on July 16, 2025, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, dissatisfied with the research conducted by the Chandigarh Police SIT, transferred the case to the Central Bureau of research (CBI).
Conclusion
Our research found that an old and unrelated video from March 2025 is being falsely circulated with the claim that an Army officer left a meeting after the government refused funding for security preparations related to Pakistan and China. The viral video actually relates to a press conference regarding the attack on Colonel Pushpinder Singh Bath in Patiala and has no connection with any defence funding issue. The viral claim is therefore false and misleading.
Introduction
In recent years, India has seen tremendous growth in its space industry. The satellite infrastructure of India now provides key services to a variety of sectors, including communication, navigation, broadcasting, disaster management and national security operations. Satellite communications globally will connect remote communities, aid in the delivery of Digital Governance and support India's strategic military capabilities. Given the expanding space ecosystem in India with the involvement of the public sector, private sector and research institutions, the security of satellite communications is becoming increasingly important.
At the same time, as satellite communication technologies become more pervasive, the risk of cyber threats targeting space systems increases. Cyberattacks against satellites, ground terminals or communication networks may critically impact, disrupt, damage, and/or destroy essential services, and expose sensitive information. To mitigate these risks, CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team), in collaboration with the SatCom Industry Association of India released a Cyber Security Framework and Guidelines for Space Platforms/Systems, including Satellite Communication, in 2026. This framework aims to establish and enhance cybersecurity measures throughout India's space ecosystem, while guiding how to better prepare for and respond to the growing volume of cyber threat activity targeting Space Systems.
Overview of the CERT-In Space Cybersecurity Framework
CERT-In introduced a dedicated cybersecurity framework for space systems in February 2026. Developed in collaboration with industry stakeholders, the framework provides guidelines to strengthen the security of satellite communication infrastructure across India. Although the guidelines are advisory in nature, they are designed to promote best practices and encourage organisations to adopt robust cybersecurity measures.
The framework targets a wide range of stakeholders involved in satellite communication operations. These include government agencies, satellite operators, ground station operators, equipment manufacturers, technology vendors, and emerging space startups. By outlining cybersecurity principles, technical controls, and governance mechanisms, the framework aims to create a coordinated approach to protecting space assets.
Another key objective of the guidelines is to foster collaboration between the public and private sectors. As India’s space industry expands and private participation increases, maintaining a secure and resilient ecosystem becomes essential. The framework, therefore, emphasises risk management, incident reporting, and continuous monitoring to strengthen the overall cybersecurity posture of the space sector.
Key Components of Satellite Communication Systems
Satellite communication systems are made up of multiple interconnected devices that can be used to deliver communication services. The cybersecurity framework groups these elements into three categories: the space segment, the ground segment, and the user segment.
The space segment is everything related to the satellite itself, including the satellite's onboard systems. This includes the satellite's communication payload, telemetry systems, antennas, power systems, and software that controls its operation. Because satellites operate in remote parts of space with very little opportunity for maintenance, securing these systems is critical in order to guard against unauthorized access to or control of these systems.
The ground segment comprises the terrestrial infrastructure responsible for controlling the satellite's operations. It consists of satellite mission control centres, ground stations, network gateways and data processing facilities. The ground stations send commands to the satellites and receive telemetry data from the satellites, which makes the ground station a very important physical interface point between the satellite asset located in outer space and a terrestrial network.
The user segment contains any device terminal being used by either an individual or an organisation that is accessing a satellite service. Examples of user devices are satellite phones, VSAT terminals, modems, and IoT devices connected to satellite networks. Since these devices connect directly to the communication networks, vulnerabilities in user equipment could also represent a significant threat to the cybersecurity of satellite communications.
Major Cyber Threats to Space Infrastructure
The space systems that support the delivery of satellite communications are being increasingly targeted with multiple types of cyber threats. A major category includes cyber-attacks on communication links between satellites and ground stations. Cyber criminals can attempt to jam the satellite’s communication link, intercept communication signals, or re-transmit previously sent communication signals in order to disrupt the operation of the affected satellites.
Attacks on the systems that control the satellite are serious threats to satellite operations. Cybercriminals and hostile actors can perform command injection attacks where commands are sent to a satellite, and the satellite responds through some undesired action. If cybercriminals are able to gain access to the telemetry or command channels, they can potentially disrupt the operation of the satellite or alter the telemetry data being received from the satellite.
The ground infrastructure that supports satellite communications is still a major target for cybercriminals. Mission control networks and data centres are susceptible to malware, ransomware, phishing, and insider threats. Attackers will frequently target ground stations because they provide a connection point to terrestrial networks and can exploit vulnerabilities from the ground station’s IT systems into the satellite control systems. The combination of these threats illustrates the need for an overall security strategy that encompasses all parts of the satellite communications ecosystem.
Key Security Principles and Measures
A comprehensive overview of multiple principles designed to increase the security of satellite communications is provided in the CERT-In Framework on Cybersecurity for Satellite Communications. The first of these principles, security by design, refers to ensuring that all cybersecurity controls associated with a system are implemented at the time of the system's initial design and development, not afterwards; therefore, security controls should be incorporated throughout the entire lifecycle of a satellite system.
The second principle, which is known as Defense-in-Depth, consists of implementing many different layers or tiers of security controls to protect a system against cyber threats or attacks. An example of the different categories of security controls includes physical security, network security, and access control, among others. By combining security controls across multiple categories, an organisation may be able to reduce the chance that one single vulnerability will result in the loss of the entire system.
The third principle in the Framework, Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): Users and/or devices located within a network should not be able to rely on implicit trust. Therefore, every request for access to the network will be verified and continuously monitored for potential threats.
The previous two principles stated that secure satellite communications should be conducted using strong encryption and authentication methods, as well as secure communications methods, and that an enterprise monitoring system would be put into place to help detect anomalies or suspicious behaviour.
Conclusion
India is taking an important step toward protecting its expanding space ecosystem by creating a cybersecurity framework to safeguard cyberspace systems from cyber threats. The CERT-In guidelines offer a structured means of reducing the likelihood of cyber threats impacting satellite communication infrastructure through secure system design, continuous monitoring of systems and creating consistent partnerships among organisations. As well as providing evidence that both government and private sector organisations share a collective responsibility for the protection of space assets, both sectors participate in a collaborative effort.
India will need to implement rigorous cybersecurity measures as it expands its space infrastructure in order to ensure the continued availability of critical space infrastructure and ultimately develop its existing commercial satellite business operations with the highest level of safety and security.
References
- https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=GUIDLNVIEW02&refcode=CISG-2026-01
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233122®=3&lang=1
