#FactCheck - AI-Generated Video Falsely Linked to Protests in Iran

Introduction

In an era when misinformation spreads like wildfire across the digital landscape, the need for effective strategies to counteract these challenges has grown exponentially in a very short period. Prebunking and Debunking are two approaches for countering the growing spread of misinformation online. Prebunking empowers individuals by teaching them to discern between true and false information and acts as a protective layer that comes into play even before people encounter malicious content. Debunking is the correction of false or misleading claims after exposure, aiming to undo or reverse the effects of a particular piece of misinformation. Debunking includes methods such as fact-checking, algorithmic correction on a platform, social correction by an individual or group of online peers, or fact-checking reports by expert organisations or journalists. An integrated approach which involves both strategies can be effective in countering the rapid spread of misinformation online.

Brief Analysis of Prebunking 

Prebunking is a proactive practice that seeks to rebut erroneous information before it spreads. The goal is to train people to critically analyse information and develop ‘cognitive immunity’ so that they are less likely to be misled when they do encounter misinformation. 

The Prebunking approach, grounded in Inoculation theory, teaches people to recognise, analyse and avoid manipulation and misleading content so that they build resilience against the same. Inoculation theory, a social psychology framework, suggests that pre-emptively conferring psychological resistance against malicious persuasion attempts can reduce susceptibility to misinformation across cultures. As the term suggests, the MO is to help the mind in the present develop resistance to influence that it may encounter in the future. Just as medical vaccines or inoculations help the body build resistance to future infections by administering weakened doses of the harm agent, inoculation theory seeks to teach people fact from fiction through exposure to examples of weak, dichotomous arguments, manipulation tactics like emotionally charged language, case studies that draw parallels between truths and distortions, and so on. In showing people the difference, inoculation theory teaches them to be on the lookout for misinformation and manipulation even, or especially, when they least expect it. 

The core difference between Prebunking and Debunking is that while the former is preventative and seeks to provide a broad-spectrum cover against misinformation, the latter is reactive and focuses on specific instances of misinformation. While Debunking is closely tied to fact-checking, Prebunking is tied to a wider range of specific interventions, some of which increase motivation to be vigilant against misinformation and others increase the ability to engage in vigilance with success.

There is much to be said in favour of the Prebunking approach because these interventions build the capacity to identify misinformation and recognise red flags However, their success in practice may vary. It might be difficult to scale up Prebunking efforts and ensure their reach to a larger audience. Sustainability is critical in ensuring that Prebunking measures maintain their impact over time. Continuous reinforcement and reminders may be required to ensure that individuals retain the skills and information they gained from the Prebunking training activities. Misinformation tactics and strategies are always evolving, so it is critical that Prebunking interventions are also flexible and agile and respond promptly to developing challenges. This may be easier said than done, but with new misinformation and cyber threats developing frequently, it is a challenge that has to be addressed for Prebunking to be a successful long-term solution. 

Encouraging people to be actively cautious while interacting with information, acquire critical thinking abilities, and reject the effect of misinformation requires a significant behavioural change over a relatively short period of time. Overcoming ingrained habits and prejudices, and countering a natural reluctance to change is no mean feat. Developing a widespread culture of information literacy requires years of social conditioning and unlearning and may pose a significant challenge to the effectiveness of Prebunking interventions. 

Brief Analysis of Debunking 

Debunking is a technique for identifying and informing people that certain news items or information are incorrect or misleading. It seeks to lessen the impact of misinformation that has already spread. The most popular kind of Debunking occurs through collaboration between fact-checking organisations and social media businesses. Journalists or other fact-checkers discover inaccurate or misleading material, and social media platforms flag or label it. Debunking is an important strategy for curtailing the spread of misinformation and promoting accuracy in the digital information ecosystem. 

Debunking interventions are crucial in combating misinformation. However, there are certain challenges associated with the same. Debunking misinformation entails critically verifying facts and promoting corrected information. However, this is difficult owing to the rising complexity of modern tools used to generate narratives that combine truth and untruth, views and facts. These advanced approaches, which include emotional spectrum elements, deepfakes, audiovisual material, and pervasive trolling, necessitate a sophisticated reaction at all levels: technological, organisational, and cultural.

Furthermore, It is impossible to debunk all misinformation at any given time, which effectively means that it is impossible to protect everyone at all times, which means that at least some innocent netizens will fall victim to manipulation despite our best efforts.  Debunking is inherently reactive in nature, addressing misinformation after it has grown extensively. This reactionary method may be less successful than proactive strategies such as Prebunking from the perspective of total harm done. Misinformation producers operate swiftly and unexpectedly, making it difficult for fact-checkers to keep up with the rapid dissemination of erroneous or misleading information. Debunking may need continuous exposure to fact-check to prevent erroneous beliefs from forming, implying that a single Debunking may not be enough to rectify misinformation.  Debunking requires time and resources, and it is not possible to disprove every piece of misinformation that circulates at any particular moment. This constraint may cause certain misinformation to go unchecked, perhaps leading to unexpected effects. The misinformation on social media can be quickly spread and may become viral faster than Debunking pieces or articles. This leads to a situation in which misinformation spreads like a virus, while the antidote to debunked facts struggles to catch up.

Prebunking vs Debunking: Comparative Analysis

Prebunking interventions seek to educate people to recognise and reject misinformation before they are exposed to actual manipulation. Prebunking offers tactics for critical examination, lessening the individuals' susceptibility to misinformation in a variety of contexts. On the other hand, Debunking interventions involve correcting specific false claims after they have been circulated. While Debunking can address individual instances of misinformation, its impact on reducing overall reliance on misinformation may be limited by the reactive nature of the approach.

CyberPeace Policy Recommendations for Tech/Social Media Platforms

With the rising threat of online misinformation, tech/social media platforms can adopt an integrated strategy that includes both Prebunking and Debunking initiatives to be deployed and supported on all platforms to empower users to recognise the manipulative messaging through Prebunking and be aware of the accuracy of misinformation through Debunking interventions. 

1. Gamified Inoculation: Tech/social media companies can encourage gamified inoculation campaigns, which is a competence-oriented approach to Prebunking misinformation. This can be effective in helping people immunise the receiver against subsequent exposures. It can empower people to build competencies to detect misinformation through gamified interventions. 
2. Promotion of Prebunking and Debunking Campaigns through Algorithm Mechanisms: Tech/social media platforms may promote and guarantee that algorithms prioritise the distribution of Prebunking materials to users, boosting educational content that strengthens resistance to misinformation. Platform operators should incorporate algorithms that prioritise the visibility of Debunking content in order to combat the spread of erroneous information and deliver proper corrections; this can eventually address and aid in Prebunking and Debunking methods to reach a bigger or targeted audience.
3. User Empowerment to Counter Misinformation: Tech/social media platforms can design user-friendly interfaces that allow people to access Prebunking materials, quizzes, and instructional information to help them improve their critical thinking abilities. Furthermore, they can incorporate simple reporting tools for flagging misinformation, as well as links to fact-checking resources and corrections.
4. Partnership with Fact-Checking/Expert Organizations: Tech/social media platforms can facilitate Prebunking and Debunking initiatives/campaigns by collaborating with fact-checking/expert organisations and promoting such initiatives at a larger scale and ultimately fighting misinformation with joint hands initiatives.

Conclusion

The threat of online misinformation is only growing with every passing day and so, deploying effective countermeasures is essential.  Prebunking and Debunking are the two such interventions. To sum up: Prebunking interventions try to increase resilience to misinformation, proactively lowering susceptibility to erroneous or misleading information and addressing broader patterns of misinformation consumption, while Debunking is effective in correcting a particular piece of misinformation and having a targeted impact on belief in individual false claims. An integrated approach involving both the methods and joint initiatives by tech/social media platforms and expert organizations can ultimately help in fighting the rising tide of online misinformation and establishing a resilient online information landscape. 

References

1. https://mark-hurlstone.github.io/THKE.22.BJP.pdf
2. https://futurefreespeech.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Empowering-Audiences-Through-%E2%80%98Prebunking-Michael-Bang-Petersen-Background-Report_formatted.pdf
3. https://newsreel.pte.hu/news/unprecedented_challenges_Debunking_disinformation
4. https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/global-vaccination-badnews/

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Introduction

In September 2024, the Australian government announced the  Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024 ( CLA Bill 2024 hereon), to provide new powers to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), the statutory regulatory body for Australia's communications and media infrastructure, to combat online misinformation and disinformation. It proposed allowing the ACMA to hold digital platforms accountable for the “seriously harmful mis- and disinformation” being spread on their platforms and their response to it, while also balancing freedom of expression. However, the Bill was subsequently withdrawn, primarily over concerns regarding the possibility of censorship by the government. This development is reflective of the global contention on the balance between misinformation regulation and freedom of speech. 

Background and Key Features of the Bill

According to the BBC’s Global Minds Survey of 2023, nearly 73% of Australians struggled to identify fake news and AI-generated misinformation. There has been a substantial rise in misinformation on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok since the COVID-19 pandemic, especially during major events like the bushfires of 2020 and the 2022 federal elections. The government’s campaign against misinformation was launched against this background, with the launch of The Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation in 2021. The main provisions of the CLA Bill, 2024 were: 

1. Core Transparency Obligations of Digital Media Platforms: Publishing current media literacy plans,  risk assessment reports, and policies or information on their approach to addressing mis- and disinformation. The ACMA would also be allowed to make additional rules regarding complaints and dispute-handling processes.
2. Information Gathering and Record-Keeping Powers: The ACMA would form rules allowing it to gather consistent information across platforms and publish it. However, it would not have been empowered to gather and publish user information except in limited circumstances.
3. Approving Codes and Making Standards: The ACMA would have powers to approve codes developed by the industry and make standards regarding reporting tools, links to authoritative information, support for fact-checking, and demonetisation of disinformation. This would make compliance mandatory for relevant sections of the industry. 
4. Parliamentary Oversight: The transparency obligations, codes approved and standards set by ACMA under the Bill would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and disallowance. ACMA would be required to report to the Parliament annually. 
5. Freedom of Speech Protections: End-users would not be required to produce information for ACMA unless they are a person providing services to the platform, such as its employees or fact-checkers. Further,  it would not be allowed to call for removing content from platforms unless it involved inauthentic behavior such as bots. 
6. Penalties for Non-Compliance: ACMA would be required to employ a “graduated, proportionate and risk-based approach” to non-compliance and enforcement in the form of formal warnings, remedial directions, injunctions, or significant civil penalties as decided by the courts, subject to review by the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART). No criminal penalties would be imposed.

Key Concerns

• Inadequacy of Freedom of Speech Protections: The biggest contention on this Bill has been regarding the issue of possible censorship, particularly of alternative opinions that are crucial to the health of a democratic system. To protect the freedom of speech, the Bill defined mis- and disinformation, what constitutes “serious harm” (election interference, harming public health, etc.), and what would be excluded from its scope. However, reservations among the Opposition persisted due to the lack of a clear mechanism to protect divergent opinions from the purview of this Bill. 
• Efficacy of Regulatory Measures: Many argue that by allowing the digital platform industry to make its codes, this law lets it self-police. Big Tech companies have no incentive to curb misinformation effectively since their business models allow them to reap financial benefits from the rampant spread of misinformation. Unless there are financial non- or dis- incentives to curb misinformation, Big Tech is not likely to address the situation at war footing.  Thus, this law would run the risk of being toothless. Secondly, the Bill did not require platforms to report on the “prevalence of” false content which, along with other metrics,  is crucial for researchers and legislators to track the efficacy of the current misinformation-curbing practices employed by platforms.  
• Threat of Government Overreach:  The Bill sought to expand the ACMA’s compliance and enforcement powers concerning misinformation and disinformation on online communication platforms by giving it powers to form rules on information gathering, code registration, standard-making powers, and core transparency obligations. However, even though the ACMA as a regulatory authority is answerable to the Parliament, the Bill was unclear in defining limits to these powers. This raised concerns from civil society about potential government overreach in a domain filled with contextual ambiguities regarding information.

Conclusion

While the Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill sought to equip the ACMA with tools to hold digital platforms accountable and mitigate the harm caused by false information, its critique highlights the complexities of regulating such content without infringing on freedom of speech. Legislations and proposals regarding the matter all over the world are having to contend with this challenge. Globally, legislation and proposals addressing this issue face similar challenges, emphasizing the need for a continuous discourse at the intersection of platform accountability, regulatory restraint, and the protection of diverse viewpoints.

To regulate Big Tech effectively, governments can benefit from adopting a consultative, incremental, and cooperative approach, as exemplified by the European Union’s Digital Services Act 2023. Such a framework provides for a balanced response, fostering accountability while safeguarding democratic freedoms.

Resources

• https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/factsheet-misinformation-disinformation-bill.pdf 
• https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say/new-acma-powers-combat-misinformation-and-disinformation 
• https://www.mi-3.com.au/07-02-2024/over-80-australians-feel-they-may-have-fallen-fake-news-says-bbc 
• https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/misinformation-inquiry 
• https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/legal/submission/combatting-misinformation-and-disinformation-bill-2024 
• https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/what-is-the-misinformation-bill-and-why-has-it-triggered-worries-about-freedom-of-speech/4n3ijebde 
• https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/06/14/no-internet-means-no-work-no-pay-no-food/internet-shutdowns-deny-access-basic#:~:text=The%20Telegraph%20Act%20allows%20authorities,preventing%20incitement%20to%20the%20commission 
• https://www.hrlc.org.au/submissions/2024/11/8/submission-combatting-misinformation?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Media%20Release%20Senate%20Committee%20to%20hear%20evidence%20calling%20for%20Albanese%20Government%20to%20regulate%20and%20hold%20big%20tech%20accountable%20for%20misinformation&utm_content=Media%20Release%20Senate%20Committee%20to%20hear%20evidence%20calling%20for%20Albanese%20Government%20to%20regulate%20and%20hold%20big%20tech%20accountable%20for%20misinformation+Preview+CID_31c6d7200ed9bd2f7f6f596ba2a8b1fb&utm_source=Email%20campaign&utm_term=Read%20the%20Human%20Rights%20Law%20Centres%20submission%20to%20the%20inquiry

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Executive Summary

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Amid the ongoing geopolitical tensions involving the US, Israel, and Iran, and reports of disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz affecting cargo ship movement and global crude oil prices, several posts on social media have made a viral claim. The posts allege that Indian cargo vessels are being allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz after payments to Iran were made in Chinese currency, the yuan. The claim has been widely circulated from certain social media accounts, suggesting a shift in India’s trade and payment arrangements. However, a fact-check by CyberPeace Research Wing has found the claim to be false.

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Claim

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A social media user “MEHF voice 2.0” shared a viral post (archived link), claiming that an Indian oil tanker secured passage through the Strait of Hormuz by making payments in Chinese yuan. The post further suggested that India had formed a new alignment with China, bypassing the US dollar system.

• https://www.facebook.com/reel/1574051580342874
• https://perma.cc/RH92-FM6G 

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Fact Check

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Due to US sanctions, Iran is excluded from the international banking network SWIFT, which prevents direct trade settlements in US dollars or euros. As a result, India and Iran conduct trade through a specially designed rupee–rial payment mechanism. According to a Ministry of Commerce and Industry release (based on a written reply in Parliament), India and Iran established this arrangement to facilitate bilateral trade using local currencies instead of the US dollar.

• https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=83947&reg=3&lang=2 

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Further, information from the Indian Embassy in Tehran notes that rupee-based payments are processed through UCO Bank and Iranian banks with vostro accounts, enabling trade settlement outside sanctioned banking channels. IDBI Bank has also been part of efforts to expand rupee-based transactions with Iran.

• https://www.indianembassytehran.gov.in/index.php/eoithr_listarchview/Mzk2 

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The Ministry of External Affairs’ official fact-check handle has also debunked this claim, confirming that it is false.

• https://x.com/MEAFactCheck/status/2035975651803775483?s=20 

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Conclusion
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The viral claim that Indian oil tankers are paying in Chinese yuan to pass through the Strait of Hormuz is false. India and Iran conduct trade settlements through a rupee–rial payment mechanism, not through the Chinese currency.

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