#Factcheck-False Claims of Houthi Attack on Israel’s Ashkelon Power Plant
Executive Summary:
A post on X (formerly Twitter) has gained widespread attention, featuring an image inaccurately asserting that Houthi rebels attacked a power plant in Ashkelon, Israel. This misleading content has circulated widely amid escalating geopolitical tensions. However, investigation shows that the footage actually originates from a prior incident in Saudi Arabia. This situation underscores the significant dangers posed by misinformation during conflicts and highlights the importance of verifying sources before sharing information.

Claims:
The viral video claims to show Houthi rebels attacking Israel's Ashkelon power plant as part of recent escalations in the Middle East conflict.

Fact Check:
Upon receiving the viral posts, we conducted a Google Lens search on the keyframes of the video. The search reveals that the video circulating online does not refer to an attack on the Ashkelon power plant in Israel. Instead, it depicts a 2022 drone strike on a Saudi Aramco facility in Abqaiq. There are no credible reports of Houthi rebels targeting Ashkelon, as their activities are largely confined to Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

This incident highlights the risks associated with misinformation during sensitive geopolitical events. Before sharing viral posts, take a brief moment to verify the facts. Misinformation spreads quickly and it’s far better to rely on trusted fact-checking sources.
Conclusion:
The assertion that Houthi rebels targeted the Ashkelon power plant in Israel is incorrect. The viral video in question has been misrepresented and actually shows a 2022 incident in Saudi Arabia. This underscores the importance of being cautious when sharing unverified media. Before sharing viral posts, take a moment to verify the facts. Misinformation spreads quickly, and it is far better to rely on trusted fact-checking sources.
- Claim: The video shows massive fire at Israel's Ashkelon power plant
- Claimed On:Instagram and X (Formerly Known As Twitter)
- Fact Check: False and Misleading
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Introduction
When we think of cyber security we always think of hacking, viruses and exploits. However, not all cyber-attacks require advanced technical knowledge. Sometimes all that is required is to trick someone. Social engineering is when cyber criminals will attempt to trick people into giving away confidential information, sending money or giving access to their accounts. They often use our feelings to trick us including; fear, trust, curiosity and urgency. With our increasing reliance on digital services we are seeing increasingly sophisticated social engineering attacks. From fake calls from our bank to digital arrests criminals are finding new ways to trick us. With the increasing misuse of AI we are also seeing more fraudulent communication which can be very hard to spot.
Social Engineering Attacks
Social engineering attacks work by manipulating people into giving away sensitive information or carrying out activities that put them at risk. They work by exploiting human behaviour rather than technical aspects. The attack will frequently begin with an elaborate story. The fraudster could be posing as a member of your bank, IT support or government official. Once they have gained your trust, they will try and gain information from you or get you to do something. This can be very dangerous as it can get past even the strongest security systems. An organisation with high level cyber security could still leave themselves open to risk if an employee falls for the scam and gives away their login details or approves an unauthorised request.
Common types of Social Engineering Attacks:
- Phishing – Criminals will send false emails/messages pretending to be from legitimate sources. They are often filled with malicious links or asking for your personal information.
- Spear Phishing – This is a targeted phishing attack where personal/professional information is used so it appears to be genuine.
- Vishing – Voice phishing is where criminals will call you pretending to be bank employees, customer services or government.
- Smishing – Criminals will send you misleading texts trying to trick you into clicking on suspicious links or giving away your OTP and financial information.
- Pretexting – Attackers will create fake identities or situations to gain your trust. This could be a fraudster pretending to be a member of staff within IT asking for your login details
- All of these are trying to trick individuals into making decisions which could put them at risk.
Digital Arrest Scams
A worrying example of social engineering is the digital arrest scam. This scam uses fear, and a lot of manipulation of authority.Fraudsters will contact individuals and pretend to be from the police force, investigating agency or government officials. They may sometimes ask you to stay on the video call and not to contact your family.The term Digital Arrest is misleading as there is no process in Indian law that allows someone to be arrested via video call.These scams show how criminals can use peoples fear of legal repercussions. If you believe you are speaking to law enforcers you may do what they ask.
Why digital arrest scams work
There are a number of factors that make this scam successful;The criminals will pose as a government authority this causes a sense of fear. They threaten legal consequences. They will also make the victim feel isolated as they won’t tell them to seek assistance.This means they are more likely to pay money, give personal information and follow instructions.This shows that some cyber crimes can be carried out with no technical hacking. If they can create a convincing story then it can cause serious financial and emotional issues.
Legal Consequences Under Indian Cyber Laws:
There are many legal provisions that can be enforced against Social Engineering Attacks in India.
- Section 66C of the Information Technology Act, 2000: Covers the offense of identity theft and misusing another individual’s password, electronic signature or unique identifier.
- Section 66D: Covers the offense of cheating by impersonating through the use of computer resources or communication devices. This is very relevant in cases where fraudsters are impersonating officials.
- Sections 318 & 319 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Covers the offense of cheating and cheating by impersonating.
These crimes can be difficult to investigate as criminals often will be using fake identities and on an international scale. They also frequently switch communication methods making it hard to know who they are and recover any stolen money. Collaboration from Law Enforcement Agencies, Financial Institutions, Technology and Cyber Security is required to combat these crimes.
How Social Engineering Attacks are being impacted by Artificial Intelligence.
There are new issues that have come into play in terms of cyber security with artificial intelligence. Whilst there are many benefits to using AI, criminals can use AI to create more realistic social engineering attacks.
AI generated Phishing:Phishing emails used to be easy to spot due to grammar, spelling and language errors. However, using generative AI criminals can now create highly realistic and personal phishing emails within seconds.Using open source data, criminals can create messages tailored to the individual making it harder to detect fraud.
Deepfake & Voice Cloning:Criminals can use AI tools to clone voices and create realistic videos This can cause issues as criminals can impersonate family members, company executives and public officials. For example receiving a phone call from someone that sounds like a family member asking for money urgently.In Digital Arrests criminals can use AI voices and edited videos to create more realistic fake law enforcement officials. However not all digital arrests will be created using AI.
Mass Creation:AI can be used to help criminals create masses of fraudulent messages. They can be targeted to more people due to less preparation required.The main issue of using AI is it makes deception easier.
Conclusion
Social engineering is still an issue when it comes to cyber security. As it targets peoples decision making rather than exploiting technology. Whether it be phishing emails, fraudulent phone calls or digital arrests criminals will look to exploit your trust, fear and urgency.
Using AI can cause further risks. Creating messages using AI, voice cloning and deep fake videos can all help criminals to impersonate people in a more realistic way. By using automation criminals can target a larger audience with fraudulent messages. The Digital Arrests show how much damage can be done by psychologically manipulating people. Using AI can create more advanced deceptions.
References
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Phishing Guidance: Stopping the Attack Cycle at Phase One (2023), Official CISA Report
- Matthew Kosinski, 'What Is Spear Phishing?' (IBM Think), Official IBM Article
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Phishing: General Security Postcard, Official CISA Guide
- Matthew Kosinski, 'What Is Smishing (SMS Phishing)?' (IBM Think), Official IBM Article

Introduction
The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITy) released the Draft Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Second Amendment Rules, 2026 on March 30, 2026, inviting public comments with a response window closing on April 14. This is a limited 15-day period for public input on proposed rules that will have major constitutional impacts. The brevity and timing of this opportunity demonstrate debatable commitment to stakeholder engagement and meaningful consultation by the drafting agency.
While MEITY describes the proposed amendments as "clarificatory and procedural nature," an analysis shows they will have substantive effects. Collectively, the amended language changes significantly how online speech will be regulated in India by providing the executive with more concentrated regulatory authority, limiting the required transparency of content enforcement, mandating greater retention of data without proportionality-based safeguards, and placing excessive compliance burden on intermediaries. Each of these changes has consequences beyond just changes in process and together, these changes collectively raise substantial concerns regarding compliance with Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India.
The Constitutional Baseline: Shreya Singhal and the Limits of Intermediary Liability
India’s Supreme Court decision in Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 provides the foundation for intermediary liability, wherein the Court read down Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000, holding that intermediaries are required to act upon receiving actual knowledge only through a court order or a valid notification by the appropriate government authority. The Supreme Court’s decision intended to provide a constitutional protection to intermediaries from being subjected to informal, unverified executive pressure to take down content by requiring that any such order be subject to some level of legal objective credibility or threshold.
Rule 3(4) of the proposed amendments places that balance under significant strain. By requiring intermediaries to comply with advisories, directions, standard operating procedures, codes of practice, and guidelines issued by the Ministry — and tying non-compliance to the loss of safe harbour — the draft effectively lowers the constitutional threshold that Shreya Singhal was designed to maintain. Compliance obligations now potentially arise from instruments that carry no judicial sanction and no mandatory public disclosure.
Rule 3(4): Delegated Legislation or Executive Overreach
The rule-making power conferred on the Central Government under Section 87 of the IT Act is limited to carrying out the provisions of the Act. It does not authorise the creation of new substantive obligations. This principle has been consistently affirmed in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 and Confederation of Ex-Servicemen Associations v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 399, where the Court held that delegated legislation must remain within the four corners of the parent statute.
Rule 3(4) tests those limits. It converts executive advisories into binding compliance instruments without a clear statutory foundation in either Section 79 or Section 87. Although the proposed rule requires that such instruments specify their legal basis, there is no requirement that they be published or made publicly accessible. This creates a framework in which legality risks becoming circular — instruments claimed to be lawful solely by reference to a provision that does not clearly authorise them, shielded from scrutiny by their own opacity. Justice Chandurkar’s judgment in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India identified precisely this defect in the Fact Check Unit amendment. Rule 3(4) replicates the structural problem in a broader form.
Compliance Pressure and the Logic of Over-Censorship
The practical consequence of Rule 3(4) lies not only in its legality but in how it reshapes incentive structures for platforms. An intermediary facing the permanent threat of safe harbour loss will not wait to assess the legal merit of each advisory. The rational calculation is to comply early, broadly, and without friction. Lawful content — particularly satire, political commentary, and journalism — becomes vulnerable not because it is unlawful, but because it presents regulatory risk.
This dynamic was visible on 18 March 2026, when stand-up comedian Pulkit Mani (@hunnywhoisfunny) found his satirical Instagram reel being restricted across India. The video had accumulated over 16.5 million views. Users encountered a notice citing Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act. No reasons were publicly provided. No prior hearing was offered. The same night, several political parody and satire accounts were withheld on X.
Data Retention, Privacy, and the Proportionality Test
The amendments to Rules 3(1)(g) and 3(1)(h) extend data retention obligations by making them additional to requirements under any other law. The existing 180-day floor for retained user data — covering removed content, registration information, and associated records — becomes a minimum rather than a ceiling. No maximum is specified, and no proportionality requirement accompanies the extension.
This raises direct concerns under Article 21 as interpreted in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, which held that any state intrusion into privacy must satisfy the triple test of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Undefined retention periods, with no statutory ceiling and no requirement of purpose limitation, risk failing all three. The longer user data is held, including metadata, device information, and records of removed content, the greater the exposure to surveillance, unauthorised access, and use beyond the original justification.
Circumventing Judicial Scrutiny Through Procedural Redesign
The Bombay High Court, in its August 2021 order, stayed provisions of the IT Rules’ oversight mechanism as prima facie violative of Article 19(1)(a). The Madras High Court in T.M. Krishna v. Union of India affirmed that stay, cautioning that government-controlled media oversight risked undermining press independence. Both matters remain pending before the Delhi High Court.
The amendments to Rules 8(1) and 14 restructure the same oversight machinery through a modified procedural design. By extending the Inter-Departmental Committee’s jurisdiction to cover “matters” referred by the Ministry with no requirement of a complainant, no defined subject matter, and no guaranteed prior hearing, the proposed rules effectively reconstitute what courts found constitutionally suspect. Individual users posting news and current affairs content are now brought within reach of blocking mechanisms originally designed for institutional publishers.
Conclusion
As seen above, the Draft IT Rules 2026 are unable to meet the constitutional and judicial requirements to regulate free speech. What the proposed amendments construct is a durable system in which platforms self-censor under liability pressure, data is retained without proportionate justification, and content oversight expands through procedural adjustment rather than parliamentary legislation. Regulation of the digital public sphere is both legitimate and necessary. But it must be anchored in law, not in the quiet authority of executive advisories. The law must ultimately remain anchored in constitutional values, guided by the enduring principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
The comment period closes on 14 April 2026.
Submissions may be sent to itrules.consultation@meity.gov.in.
References
- https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/30591fc6e322dcbcc9dae84a0f02e9e7.pdf
- https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/a71a21d35c107f2e528363d3eb17646a.pdf
- https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/02/550681ab908f8afb135b0ad42816a1c9.pdf
- https://neopolitico.com/india/government-blocks-viral-satirical-reel-impersonating-pm-modi-raising-fresh-questions-on-free-speech-and-digital-regulation/
- https://internetfreedom.in/sound-the-alarm-iffs-first-read-on-meitys-draft-it-rules-second-amendment-2026/

Introduction
In recent years, India has seen tremendous growth in its space industry. The satellite infrastructure of India now provides key services to a variety of sectors, including communication, navigation, broadcasting, disaster management and national security operations. Satellite communications globally will connect remote communities, aid in the delivery of Digital Governance and support India's strategic military capabilities. Given the expanding space ecosystem in India with the involvement of the public sector, private sector and research institutions, the security of satellite communications is becoming increasingly important.
At the same time, as satellite communication technologies become more pervasive, the risk of cyber threats targeting space systems increases. Cyberattacks against satellites, ground terminals or communication networks may critically impact, disrupt, damage, and/or destroy essential services, and expose sensitive information. To mitigate these risks, CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team), in collaboration with the SatCom Industry Association of India released a Cyber Security Framework and Guidelines for Space Platforms/Systems, including Satellite Communication, in 2026. This framework aims to establish and enhance cybersecurity measures throughout India's space ecosystem, while guiding how to better prepare for and respond to the growing volume of cyber threat activity targeting Space Systems.
Overview of the CERT-In Space Cybersecurity Framework
CERT-In introduced a dedicated cybersecurity framework for space systems in February 2026. Developed in collaboration with industry stakeholders, the framework provides guidelines to strengthen the security of satellite communication infrastructure across India. Although the guidelines are advisory in nature, they are designed to promote best practices and encourage organisations to adopt robust cybersecurity measures.
The framework targets a wide range of stakeholders involved in satellite communication operations. These include government agencies, satellite operators, ground station operators, equipment manufacturers, technology vendors, and emerging space startups. By outlining cybersecurity principles, technical controls, and governance mechanisms, the framework aims to create a coordinated approach to protecting space assets.
Another key objective of the guidelines is to foster collaboration between the public and private sectors. As India’s space industry expands and private participation increases, maintaining a secure and resilient ecosystem becomes essential. The framework, therefore, emphasises risk management, incident reporting, and continuous monitoring to strengthen the overall cybersecurity posture of the space sector.
Key Components of Satellite Communication Systems
Satellite communication systems are made up of multiple interconnected devices that can be used to deliver communication services. The cybersecurity framework groups these elements into three categories: the space segment, the ground segment, and the user segment.
The space segment is everything related to the satellite itself, including the satellite's onboard systems. This includes the satellite's communication payload, telemetry systems, antennas, power systems, and software that controls its operation. Because satellites operate in remote parts of space with very little opportunity for maintenance, securing these systems is critical in order to guard against unauthorized access to or control of these systems.
The ground segment comprises the terrestrial infrastructure responsible for controlling the satellite's operations. It consists of satellite mission control centres, ground stations, network gateways and data processing facilities. The ground stations send commands to the satellites and receive telemetry data from the satellites, which makes the ground station a very important physical interface point between the satellite asset located in outer space and a terrestrial network.
The user segment contains any device terminal being used by either an individual or an organisation that is accessing a satellite service. Examples of user devices are satellite phones, VSAT terminals, modems, and IoT devices connected to satellite networks. Since these devices connect directly to the communication networks, vulnerabilities in user equipment could also represent a significant threat to the cybersecurity of satellite communications.
Major Cyber Threats to Space Infrastructure
The space systems that support the delivery of satellite communications are being increasingly targeted with multiple types of cyber threats. A major category includes cyber-attacks on communication links between satellites and ground stations. Cyber criminals can attempt to jam the satellite’s communication link, intercept communication signals, or re-transmit previously sent communication signals in order to disrupt the operation of the affected satellites.
Attacks on the systems that control the satellite are serious threats to satellite operations. Cybercriminals and hostile actors can perform command injection attacks where commands are sent to a satellite, and the satellite responds through some undesired action. If cybercriminals are able to gain access to the telemetry or command channels, they can potentially disrupt the operation of the satellite or alter the telemetry data being received from the satellite.
The ground infrastructure that supports satellite communications is still a major target for cybercriminals. Mission control networks and data centres are susceptible to malware, ransomware, phishing, and insider threats. Attackers will frequently target ground stations because they provide a connection point to terrestrial networks and can exploit vulnerabilities from the ground station’s IT systems into the satellite control systems. The combination of these threats illustrates the need for an overall security strategy that encompasses all parts of the satellite communications ecosystem.
Key Security Principles and Measures
A comprehensive overview of multiple principles designed to increase the security of satellite communications is provided in the CERT-In Framework on Cybersecurity for Satellite Communications. The first of these principles, security by design, refers to ensuring that all cybersecurity controls associated with a system are implemented at the time of the system's initial design and development, not afterwards; therefore, security controls should be incorporated throughout the entire lifecycle of a satellite system.
The second principle, which is known as Defense-in-Depth, consists of implementing many different layers or tiers of security controls to protect a system against cyber threats or attacks. An example of the different categories of security controls includes physical security, network security, and access control, among others. By combining security controls across multiple categories, an organisation may be able to reduce the chance that one single vulnerability will result in the loss of the entire system.
The third principle in the Framework, Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): Users and/or devices located within a network should not be able to rely on implicit trust. Therefore, every request for access to the network will be verified and continuously monitored for potential threats.
The previous two principles stated that secure satellite communications should be conducted using strong encryption and authentication methods, as well as secure communications methods, and that an enterprise monitoring system would be put into place to help detect anomalies or suspicious behaviour.
Conclusion
India is taking an important step toward protecting its expanding space ecosystem by creating a cybersecurity framework to safeguard cyberspace systems from cyber threats. The CERT-In guidelines offer a structured means of reducing the likelihood of cyber threats impacting satellite communication infrastructure through secure system design, continuous monitoring of systems and creating consistent partnerships among organisations. As well as providing evidence that both government and private sector organisations share a collective responsibility for the protection of space assets, both sectors participate in a collaborative effort.
India will need to implement rigorous cybersecurity measures as it expands its space infrastructure in order to ensure the continued availability of critical space infrastructure and ultimately develop its existing commercial satellite business operations with the highest level of safety and security.
References
- https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=GUIDLNVIEW02&refcode=CISG-2026-01
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233122®=3&lang=1