#FactCheck: Beware of Fake Emails Distributing Fraudulent e-PAN Cards
Executive Summary:
We have identified a post addressing a scam email that falsely claims to offer a download link for an e-PAN Card. This deceptive email is designed to mislead recipients into disclosing sensitive financial information by impersonating official communication from Income Tax Department authorities. Our report aims to raise awareness about this fraudulent scheme and emphasize the importance of safeguarding personal data against such cyber threats.
Claim:
Scammers are sending fake emails, asking people to download their e-PAN cards. These emails pretend to be from government authorities like the Income Tax Department and contain harmful links that can steal personal information or infect devices with malware.
Fact Check:
Through our research, we have found that scammers are sending fake emails, posing as the Income Tax Department, to trick users into downloading e-PAN cards from unofficial links. These emails contain malicious links that can lead to phishing attacks or malware infections. Genuine e-PAN services are only available through official platforms such as the Income Tax Department's website (www.incometaxindia.gov.in) and the NSDL/UTIITSL portals. Despite repeated warnings, many individuals still fall victim to such scams. To combat this, the Income Tax Department has a dedicated page for reporting phishing attempts: Report Phishing - Income Tax India. It is crucial for users to stay cautious, verify email authenticity, and avoid clicking on suspicious links to protect their personal information.
Conclusion:
The emails currently in circulation claiming to provide e-PAN card downloads are fraudulent and should not be trusted. These deceptive messages often impersonate government authorities and contain malicious links that can result in identity theft or financial fraud. Clicking on such links may compromise sensitive personal information, putting individuals at serious risk. To ensure security, users are strongly advised to verify any such communication directly through official government websites and avoid engaging with unverified sources. Additionally, any phishing attempts should be reported to the Income Tax Department and also to the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal to help prevent the spread of such scams. Staying vigilant and exercising caution when handling unsolicited emails is crucial in safeguarding personal and financial data.
- Claim: Fake emails claim to offer e-PAN card downloads.
- Claimed On: Social Media
- Fact Check: False and Misleading
Related Blogs
Executive Summary
A video showing a building engulfed in flames is going viral on social media, with users claiming it depicts an attack by Hezbollah on Israel’s military headquarters. The clip is being shared with assertions that several Israeli soldiers were killed and many remain trapped inside the burning structure. However, a research by the CyberPeace Research Wing found that the claim is false. The viral video is not from Israel but from New York City in the Manhattan area, where a residential building caught fire.
Claim
A Facebook user, ‘Nazim Khan Tirwadiya’, shared the video on April 15, 2026, claiming that Hezbollah had targeted an Israeli military headquarters, resulting in heavy casualties and ongoing fire.
Fact Check
To verify the claim, we extracted keyframes from the viral video and conducted a reverse image search. This led us to a longer version of the same clip uploaded on the YouTube channel “FDNY Response Videos” on April 12, 2026. The video description identified the location as Manhattan, New York City.
Further keyword searches led us to a report published by ABC7NY on April 12, 2026. According to the report, a massive fire broke out in a six-storey apartment building in Manhattan’s Midtown area around 6 a.m. Firefighters worked extensively to control the blaze, and two firefighters sustained minor injuries. No fatalities were reported.
Conclusion
The viral claim is false. The video does not show an attack on Israel by Hezbollah. Instead, it captures a fire incident in a residential building in Manhattan, New York City. The clip has been shared with a misleading narrative unrelated to the actual event.
Introduction: Reasons Why These Amendments Have Been Suggested.
The suggested changes in the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, are the much-needed regulatory reaction to the blistering emergence of synthetic information and deepfakes. These reforms are due to the pressing necessity to govern risks within the digital ecosystem as opposed to regular reformation.
The Emergence of the Digital Menace
Generative AI tools have also facilitated the generation of very realistic images, videos, audio, and text in recent years. Such artificial media have been abused to portray people in situations they are not in or in statements they have never said. The market size is expected to have a compound annual growth rate(CAGR) from 2025 to 2031 of 37.57%, resulting in a market volume of US$400.00 bn by 2031. Therefore, tight regulatory controls are necessary to curb a high prevalence of harm in the Indian digital world.
The Gap in Law and Institution
None of the IT Rules, 2021, clearly addressed synthetic content. Although the Information Technology Act, 2000 dealt with identity theft, impersonation and violation of privacy, the intermediaries were not explicitly obligated on artificial media. This left a loophole in enforcement, particularly since AI-generated content might get around the old system of moderation. These amendments bring India closer to the international standards, including the EU AI Act, which requires transparency and labelling of AI-driven content. India addresses such requirements and adapts to local constitutional and digital ecosystem needs.
II. Explanation of the Amendments
The amendments of 2025 present five alternative changes in the current IT Rules framework, which address various areas of synthetic media regulation.
A. Definitional Clarification: Synthetic Generation of Information Introduction.
Rule 2(1)(wa) Amendment:
The amendments provide an all-inclusive definition of what is meant by “synthetically generated information” as information, which is created, or produced, changed or distorted with the use of a computer resource, in a way that such information can reasonably be perceived to be genuine. This definition is intentionally broad and is not limited to deepfakes in the strict sense but to any artificial media that has gone through algorithmic manipulation in order to have a semblance of authenticity.
Expansion of Legal Scope:
Rule 2(1A) also makes it clear that any mention of information in the context of unlawful acts, namely, including categories listed in Rule 3(1)(b), Rule 3(1)(d), Rule 4(2), and Rule 4(4), should be understood to mean synthetically generated information. This is a pivotal interpretative protection that does not allow intermediaries to purport that synthetic versions of illegal material are not under the control of the regulation since they are algorithmic creations and not descriptions of what actually occurred.
B. Safe Harbour Protection and Content Removal Requirements
Amendment, rule 3(1)(b)- Safe Harbour Clarification:
The amendments add a certain proviso to the Rule (3) (1)(b) that explains a deletion or facilitation of access of synthetically produced information (or any information falling within specified categories) which the intermediaries have made in good faith as part of reasonable endeavours or at the receipt of a complaint shall not be considered a breach of the Section 79(2) (a) or (b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. This coverage is relevant especially since it insures the intermediaries against liability in situations where they censor the synthetic contents in advance of a court ruling or governmental warnings.
C. Labelling and Metadata Requirements that are mandatory on Intermediaries that enable the creation of synthetic content
The amendments establish a new framework of due diligence in Rule 3(3) on the case of intermediaries that offer tools to generate, modify, or alter the synthetically generated information. Two fundamental requirements are laid down.
- The generated information must be prominently labelled or embedded with a permanent, unique metadata or identifier. The label or metadata must be:
- Visibly displayed or made audible in a prominent manner on or within that synthetically generated information.
- It should cover at least 10% of the surface of the visual display or, in the case of audio content, during the initial 10% of its duration.
- It can be used to immediately identify that such information is synthetically generated information which has been created, generated, modified, or altered using the computer resource of the intermediary.
- The intermediary in clause (a) shall not enable modification, suppression or removal of such label, permanent unique metadata or identifier, by whatever name called.
D. Important Social Media Intermediaries- Pre-Publication Checking Responsibilities
The amendments present a three-step verification mechanism, under Rule 4(1A), to Significant Social Media Intermediaries (SSMIs), which enables displaying, uploading or publishing on its computer resource before such display, uploading, or publication has to follow three steps.
Step 1- User Declaration: It should compel the users to indicate whether the materials they are posting are synthetically created. This puts the first burden on users.
Step 2-Technical Verification: To ensure that the user is truly valid, the SSMIs need to provide reasonable technical means, such as automated tools or other applications. This duty is contextual and would be based on the nature, format and source of content. It does not allow intermediaries to escape when it is known that not every type of content can be verified using the same standards.
Step 3- Prominent Labelling: In case the synthetic origin is verified by user declaration or technical verification, SSMIs should have a notice or label that is prominently displayed to be seen by users before publication.
The amendments provide a better system of accountability and set that intermediaries will be found to have failed due diligence in a case where it is established that they either knowingly permitted, encouraged or otherwise failed to act on synthetically produced information in contravention of these requirements. This brings in an aspect of knowledge, and intermediaries cannot use accidental errors as an excuse for non-compliance.
An explanation clause makes it clear that SSMIs should also make reasonable and proportionate technical measures to check user declarations and keep no synthetic content published without adequate declaration or labelling. This eliminates confusion on the role of the intermediaries with respect to making declarations.
III. Attributes of The Amendment Framework
- Precision in Balancing Innovation and Accountability.
The amendments have commendably balanced two extreme regulatory postures by neither prohibiting nor allowing the synthetic media to run out of control. It has recognised the legitimate use of synthetic media creation in entertainment, education, research and artistic expression by adopting a transparent and traceable mandate that preserves innovation while ensuring accountability.
- Overt Acceptance of the Intermediary Liability and Reverse Onus of Knowledge
Rule 4(1A) gives a highly significant deeming rule; in cases where the intermediary permits or refrains from acting with respect to the synthetic content knowing that the rules are violated, it will be considered as having failed to comply with the due diligence provisions. This description closes any loopholes in unscrupulous supervision where intermediaries can be able to argue that they did so. Standard of scienter promotes material investment in the detection devices and censor mechanisms that have been in place to offer security to the platforms that have sound systems, albeit the fact that the tools fail to capture violations at times.
- Clarity Through Definition and Interpretive Guidance
The cautious definition of the term “synthetically generated information” and the guidance that is provided in Rule 2(1A) is an admirable attempt to solve confusion in the previous regulatory framework. Instead of having to go through conflicting case law or regulatory direction, the amendments give specific definitional limits. The purposefully broad formulation (artificially or algorithmically created, generated, modified or altered) makes sure that the framework is not avoided by semantic games over what is considered to be a real synthetic content versus a slight algorithmic alteration.
- Insurance of non-accountability but encourages preventative moderation
The safe harbour clarification of the Rule 3(1)(b) amendment clearly safeguards the intermediaries who voluntarily dismiss the synthetic content without a court order or government notification. It is an important incentive scheme that prompts platforms to implement sound self-regulation measures. In the absence of such protection, platforms may also make rational decisions to stay in a passive stance of compliance, only deleting content under the pressure of an external authority, thus making them more effective in keeping users safe against dangerous synthetic media.
IV. Conclusion
The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2025 suggest a structured, transparent, and accountable execution of curbing the rising predicaments of synthetic media and deepfakes. The amendments deal with the regulatory and interpretative gaps that have always existed in determining what should be considered as synthetically generated information, the intermediary liabilities and the mandatory labelling and metadata requirement. Safe-harbour protection will encourage the moderation proactively, and a scienter-based liability rule will not permit the intermediaries to escape liability when they are aware of the non-compliance but tolerate such non-compliance. The idea to introduce pre-publication verification of Significant Social Media Intermediaries adds the responsibility to users and due diligence to the platform. Overall, the amendments provide a reasonable balance between innovation and regulation, make the process more open with its proper definitions, promote responsible conduct on the platform and transform India and the new standards in the sphere of synthetic media regulation. They collaborate to enhance the verisimilitude, defence of the users, and visibility of the systems of the digital ecosystem of India.
V. References
2. https://www.statista.com/outlook/tmo/artificial-intelligence/generative-ai/worldwide
Executive Summary
As India concluded its 77th Republic Day celebrations on January 26, 2026, with grandeur and patriotic enthusiasm along the iconic Kartavya Path, a video began circulating on social media claiming to show Indian security personnel failing to perform motorcycle stunts during the ceremonial parade. The short clip allegedly depicts soldiers attempting high-risk, synchronised motorcycle manoeuvres, only to lose balance and fall off their bikes. The visuals were widely shared online with mocking captions, suggesting incompetence during a nationally televised event. However, an research by the CyberPeace found that the video is not authentic and was digitally generated using artificial intelligence.
Claim
A Pakistan-based X user, Sadaf Baloch (@sadafzbaloch), shared the video on January 27, claiming it showed Indian security personnel failing to execute motorcycle stunts during the Republic Day parade held on January 26, 2026. While sharing the clip, the user wrote:“Every time the Indian Army tries a tactical stunt, it looks less like combat training and more like a low-budget circus trailer filmed in one take.”The post was widely circulated with similar narratives questioning the professionalism of Indian forces.
Here is the link and archive link to the post, along with a screenshot.
To verify the authenticity of the viral video, the Desk conducted a detailed frame-by-frame analysis. During the examination, a watermark linked to ‘Sora’—an AI text-to-video generation model was detected at the 00:05 timestamp. The presence of this watermark strongly indicated that the video was artificially generated and not recorded during a real-world event.
Fact Check:
Further visual scrutiny revealed several inconsistencies commonly associated with AI-generated content. The background appeared unnatural and lacked realistic depth, while the movements and reactions of the security personnel looked mechanically exaggerated and inconsistent with real physics. Facial expressions and body motions during the alleged falls also appeared unrealistic. To strengthen the verification, the Desk analysed the clip using Sightengine, an AI-detection tool. The results showed a 98 per cent probability that the video contained AI-generated or deepfake elements.
Below is a screenshot of the result.
As part of the research , the Desk also conducted a customised keyword search and reviewed official coverage of the Republic Day parade. A full-length video broadcast by DD News on its official YouTube channel was examined. The footage showed joint CRPF and SSB motorcycle teams performing traditional daredevil stunts without any mishap. No incident resembling the viral claim was found in the official broadcast or in any credible media reports.
Here is the video link and a screenshot.
Conclusion
The CyberPeace research confirms that the viral video purportedly showing Indian security personnel failing to perform motorcycle stunts during the 77th Republic Day parade is AI-generated. The clip has been falsely circulated online as genuine content with the intent to mislead viewers and spread misinformation.
