#FactCheck - Viral Video of Argentina Football Team Dancing to Bhojpuri Song is Misleading

Introduction

The Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has proposed a new legislation. On the 10th of November, 2023, a draft bill emerged, a parchment of governance seeking to sculpt the contours of the nation's broadcasting landscape. The Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023, is not merely a legislative doctrine; it is a harbinger of change, an attestation to the storm of technology and the diversification of media in the age of the internet.     

The bill, slated to replace the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act of 1995, acknowledges the paradigm shifts that have occurred in the media ecosystem. The emergence of Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), over-the-top (OTT) platforms and other digital broadcasting services has rendered the previous legislation a relic, ill-suited to the dynamism of the current milieu. The draft bill, therefore, stands at the precipice of the future, inviting stakeholders and the vox populi to weigh in on its provisions, to shape the edifice of regulation that will govern the airwaves and the digital streams.

Defining the certain Clauses of the bill

Clause 1 (dd) - The Programme 

In the intricate tapestry of the bill's clauses, certain threads stand out, demanding scrutiny and careful consideration. Clause 1(dd), for instance, grapples with the definition of 'Programme,' a term that, in its current breadth, could ensnare the vast expanse of audio, visual, and written content transmitted through broadcasting networks. The implications are profound: content disseminated via YouTube or any website could fall within the ambit of this regulation, a prospect that raises questions about the scope of governmental oversight in the digital realm.

Clause 2(v) - The news and current affairs 

Clause 2(v) delves into the murky waters of 'news and current affairs programmes,' a definition that, as it stands, is a maelstrom of ambiguity. The phrases 'newly-received or noteworthy audio, visual or audio-visual programmes' and 'about recent events primarily of socio-political, economic or cultural nature' are a siren's call, luring the unwary into a vortex of subjective interpretation. The threat of potential abuse looms larger, threatening the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. It is a clarion call for stakeholders to forge a definition that is objective and clear, one that is in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, which upheld the sanctity of digital expression while advocating for responsible content creation.

Clause 2(y) Over the Top Broadcasting Services 

Clause 2(y) casts its gaze upon OTT broadcasting services, entities that operate in a realm distinct from traditional broadcasting. The one-to-many paradigm of broadcast media justifies a degree of governmental control, but OTT streaming is a more intimate affair, a one-on-one engagement with content on personal devices. The draft bill's attempt to umbrella OTT services under the broadcasting moniker is a conflation that could stifle the diversity and personalised nature of these platforms. It is a conundrum that other nations, such as Australia and Singapore, have approached with nuanced regulatory frameworks that recognise the unique characteristics of OTT services.

Clause 4(4) - Requirements for Broadcasters and Network Operators 

The bill's journey through the labyrinth of regulation is fraught with other challenges. The definition of 'Person' in Clause 2(z), the registration exemptions in Clause 4(4), the prohibition on state governments and political parties from engaging in broadcasting in Clause 6, and the powers of inspection and seizure in Clauses 30(2) and 31, all present a complex puzzle. Each clause, each sub-section, is a cog in the machinery of governance that must be calibrated with precision to balance the imperatives of regulation with the freedoms of expression and innovation.

Clause 27 - Advisory Council

The Broadcast Advisory Council, envisioned in Clause 27, is yet another crucible where the principles of impartiality and independence must be tempered. The composition of this council, the public consultations that inform its establishment, and the alignment with constitutional principles are all vital to its legitimacy and efficacy.

A Way Forward 

It is up to us, as participants in the democratic process and citizens, to interact with the bill's provisions as it makes its way through the halls of public discourse and legislative examination. To guarantee that the ultimate version of the Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023, is a symbol of advancement and a charter that upholds our most valued liberties while welcoming the opportunities presented by the digital era, we must employ the instruments of study and discussion.

The draft bill is more than just a document in this turbulent time of transition; it is a story of India's dreams, a testament to its dedication to democracy, and a roadmap for its digital future. Therefore, let us take this duty with the seriousness it merits, as the choices we make today will have a lasting impact on the history of our country and the media environment for future generations.

References 

• https://scroll.in/article/1059881/why-indias-new-draft-broadcast-bill-has-raised-fears-of-censorship-and-press-suppression#:~:text=The%20bill%20extends%20the%20regulatory,regulation%20through%20content%20evaluation%20committees.
• https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1976200
• https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-broadcast-bill-may-also-cover-those-who-put-up-news-content-online-101701023054502.html

Executive Summary:

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A viral video (archived link) circulating on social media claims that Vice Admiral AN Pramod stated India would seek assistance from the United States and President Trump if Pakistan launched an attack, portraying India as dependent rather than self-reliant. Research traced the extended footage to the Press Information Bureau’s official YouTube channel, published on 11 May 2025. In the authentic video, the Vice Admiral makes no such remark and instead concludes his statement with, “That’s all.” Further analysis using the AI Detection tool confirmed that the viral clip was digitally manipulated with AI-generated audio, misrepresenting his actual words.

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Claim:

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In the viral video an X user posted with the caption

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‍”India sells itself as a regional superpower, but its Navy Chief’s own words betray that image. If Pakistan attacks, their plan is to involve Trump, not fight back. This isn’t strategic partnership; it’s dependency in uniform”. 

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In the video the Vice Admiral was heard saying  

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“We have worked out among three services, this time if Pakistan dares take any action, and Pakistan knows it, what we are going to do. We will complain against Pakistan to the United States of America and President Trump, like we did earlier in Operation Sindoor.”  

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Fact Check:

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Upon conducting a reverse image search on key frames from the video, we located the full version of the video on the official YouTube channel of the Press Information Bureau (PIB), published on 11 May 2025. In this video, at the 59:57-minute mark, the Vice Admiral can be heard saying:

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“This time if Pakistan dares take any action, and Pakistan knows it, what we are going to do. That’s all.”

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Further analysis was conducted using the Hive Moderation tool to examine the authenticity of the circulating clip. The results indicated that the video had been artificially generated, with clear signs of AI manipulation. This suggests that the content was not genuine but rather created with the intent to mislead viewers and spread misinformation.

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Conclusion:

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The viral video attributing remarks to Vice Admiral AN Pramod about India seeking U.S. and President Trump’s intervention against Pakistan is misleading. The extended speech, available on the Press Information Bureau’s official YouTube channel, contained no such statement. Instead of the alleged claim, the Vice Admiral concluded his comments by saying, “That’s all.” AI analysis using Hive Moderation further indicated that the viral clip had been artificially manipulated, with fabricated audio inserted to misrepresent his words. These findings confirm that the video is altered and does not reflect the Vice Admiral’s actual remarks.

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Claim: Fake Viral Video Claiming Vice Admiral AN Pramod saying that next time if Pakistan Attack we will complain to US and Prez Trump.

Claimed On: Social Media

Fact Check: False and Misleading

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Introduction:  The Internet’s Foundational Ideal of Openness

The Internet was built as a decentralised network to foster open communication and global collaboration. Unlike traditional media or state infrastructure, no single government, company, or institution controls the Internet. Instead, it has historically been governed by a consensus of the multiple communities, like universities, independent researchers, and engineers, who were involved in building it. This bottom-up, cooperative approach was the foundation of Internet governance and ensured that the Internet remained open, interoperable, and accessible to all. As the Internet began to influence every aspect of life, including commerce, culture, education, and politics, it required a more organised governance model.  This compelled the rise of the multi-stakeholder internet governance model in the early 2000s. 

The Rise of Multistakeholder Internet Governance

Representatives from governments, civil society, technical experts, and the private sector congregated at the United Nations World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), and adopted the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. Per this Agenda, internet governance was defined as “… the development and application by governments, the private sector, and civil society in their respective roles of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” Internet issues are cross-cutting across technical, political, economic, and social domains, and no one actor can manage them alone. Thus, stakeholders with varying interests are meant to come together to give direction to issues in the digital environment, like data privacy, child safety, cybersecurity,  freedom of expression, and more, while upholding human rights. 

Internet Governance in Practice: A History of Power Shifts

While the idea of democratizing Internet governance is a noble one, the Tunis Agenda has been criticised for reflecting geopolitical asymmetries and relegating the roles of technical communities and civil society to the sidelines.  Throughout the history of the internet, certain players have wielded more power in shaping how it is managed. Accordingly, internet governance can be said to have undergone three broad phases.

In the first phase,  the Internet was managed primarily by technical experts in universities and private companies, which contributed to building and scaling it up.  The standards and protocols set during this phase are in use today and make the Internet function the way it does. This was the time when the Internet was a transformative invention and optimistically hailed as the harbinger of a utopian society, especially in the USA, where it was invented. 

In the second phase, the ideal of multistakeholderism was promoted, in which all those who benefit from the Internet work together to create processes that will govern it democratically. This model also aims to reduce the Internet’s vulnerability to unilateral decision-making, an ideal that has been under threat because this phase has seen the growth of Big Tech. What started as platforms enabling access to information, free speech, and creativity has turned into a breeding ground for misinformation, hate speech, cybercrime, Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM), and privacy concerns. The rise of generative AI only compounds these challenges. Tech giants like Google, Meta, X (formerly Twitter), OpenAI, Microsoft, Apple, etc. have amassed vast financial capital, technological monopoly, and user datasets. This gives them unprecedented influence not only over communications but also culture, society, and technology governance. 

The anxieties surrounding Big Tech have fed into the third phase, with increasing calls for government regulation and digital nationalism. Governments worldwide are scrambling to regulate AI, data privacy, and cybersecurity, often through processes that lack transparency. An example is India’s Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, which was passed without parliamentary debate. Governments are also pressuring platforms to take down content through opaque takedown orders. Laws like the UK’s  Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, are criticised for giving the government the power to indirectly mandate encryption backdoors, compromising the strength of end-to-end encryption systems. Further, the internet itself is fragmenting into the “splinternet” amid rising geopolitical tensions, in the form of Russia’s “sovereign internet” or through China’s Great Firewall. 

Conclusion

While multistakeholderism is an ideal, Internet governance is a playground of contesting power relations in practice. As governments assert digital sovereignty and Big Tech consolidates influence, the space for meaningful participation of other stakeholders has been negligible. Consultation processes have often been symbolic. The principles of openness, inclusivity, and networked decision-making are once again at risk of being sidelined in favour of nationalism or profit. The promise of a decentralised, rights-respecting, and interoperable internet will only be fulfilled if we recommit to the spirit of Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance, not just its structure. Efficient internet governance requires that the multiple stakeholders be empowered to carry out their roles, not just talk about them. 

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References

• https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/02/05/can-the-internet-be-governed 
• https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ISOC-PolicyBrief-InternetGovernance-20151030-nb.pdf 
• https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/government-engagement-ge/multistakeholder-model-internet-governance-fact-sheet-05-09-2024-en.pdf\
• https://nrs.help/post/internet-governance-and-its-importance/
• https://daidac.thecjid.org/how-data-power-is-skewing-internet-governance-to-big-tech-companies-and-ai-tech-guys/ 

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