#FactCheck: False Claims of Fireworks in Dubai International Stadium celebrating India’s Champions Trophy Victory 2025

In Delhi there is a bank branch where a lot of money was stolen from people over the country. This bank branch is where all the money disappeared. The people who did this did not wear masks. Break in at midnight. They just used a passbook a rubber stamp and a form that nobody checked carefully. This is the truth that the people who investigate cybercrime keep finding. The way that cybercriminals get away with the money is not by using a computer it is by using a bank account. The police in Delhi who investigate cybercrime have found that a lot of accounts were opened at bank branches. These accounts were opened using identity documents that were borrowed bought or stolen. Then these accounts were rented out to groups of criminals. One bank branch keeps coming up in complaints. This is not bad luck it is a sign of a bigger problem with how banks check who is opening an account.

These fake accounts, which are called " accounts" are controlled by criminal groups, not the people whose names are on the accounts. These accounts are a part of the cybercrime problem in India. The mistakes that bank branches make which allow these accounts to be opened raise a lot of questions. These questions are about how banks check who is opening an account how they prevent money laundering and how they work with groups to stop cybercrime. The bank accounts are the way that cybercriminals in India get away with the money they steal from people. The cybercrime investigators keep finding bank accounts like the ones at the bank branch, in Delhi, where the money was stolen.

The Anatomy of a Mule Account Network

The pattern is now familiar to investigators. A fraud complaint on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal traces a victim's stolen money to a beneficiary account. When police pull the account-opening file, the person named on the KYC documents often denies ever visiting the branch or signing the forms; signature verification frequently shows a mismatch. In one recent Delhi case, a cooperative bank's deputy manager was arrested after a single account he had helped open surfaced in 159 separate cyber fraud complaints from across the country, with transactions worth nearly Rs 68 crore routed through it before detection. Similar investigations have uncovered supply gangs that procure dozens of accounts at a time using POS machines, stacks of ATM cards, and cheque books belonging to different people and rent them out to fraudsters as ready-made conduits for stolen money.

What makes a single branch or a small cluster of accounts significant is what it reveals about entry-point failure. Investigators do not describe these as sophisticated hacking operations; they describe them as verification failures as are accounts opened without the mandatory in-person checks, video KYC, or document authentication that RBI rules require. When 96, or 700, or 8.5 lakh mule accounts are traced back through a handful of branches and intermediaries, the story is not really about the fraudsters at the far end of the chain. It is about the choke point where honest oversight should have stopped the account from ever existing.

Where the KYC Framework Is Breaking Down

The RBI's Know Your Customer Master Direction requires banks to establish customer identity, verify a genuine business relationship, and apply risk-based due diligence before allowing an account to operate. In practice, investigators have repeatedly found accounts opened through complicit or negligent bank staff, business correspondents, and third-party agents who bypass these checks entirely. Analysts note that mule accounts systematically exploit gaps in customer onboarding, KYC verification, transaction monitoring, and dormant-account surveillance, with criminals using forged or stolen identity documents and layering funds across multiple accounts to escape detection. Economically vulnerable individuals who are daily-wage workers, students, the unemployed are frequently paid a small commission to hand over their documents or existing accounts, often without understanding that they could face criminal liability for transactions they never authorised.

This is compounded by a financial-inclusion paradox that regulators themselves acknowledge: India has expanded banking access faster than it has expanded financial and digital literacy, leaving a population that is easy to recruit knowingly or unknowingly  into mule networks. The result is a KYC regime that looks robust on paper but is only as strong as its weakest branch-level implementation, and weak implementation has proved trivially easy for organised networks to locate and exploit at scale.

The Regulatory and Institutional Response

RBI: From Static Compliance to Active Detection

The Reserve Bank of India has moved beyond periodic KYC audits toward technology-driven detection. It has directed banks to tighten onboarding controls, strengthen transaction monitoring, and report suspicious activity more proactively, and it has proposed additional safeguards, including limits on aggregate credits into accounts where a satisfactory business relationship has not yet been established. Its most significant intervention is MuleHunter.ai, an AI and machine-learning system built to flag suspected mule accounts from transaction-behaviour patterns rather than static KYC data alone; the platform is already operational across roughly two dozen banks and is being expanded. The RBI Innovation Hub has also begun working directly with the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) to share fraud-risk intelligence and coordinate detection in near real time.

FIU-IND and the PMLA Framework

The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) is the backbone of India's AML architecture. It mandates KYC verification, Customer Due Diligence, record maintenance, and timely reporting of suspicious transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit–India (FIU-IND). Banks are required to file Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and Cash Transaction Reports with FIU-IND, which in turn analyses financial intelligence and shares it with law enforcement and regulators. On paper, this creates a feedback loop between banks, the RBI, and enforcement agencies; in practice, the sheer volume of mule-linked transactions are hundreds of thousands of accounts flagged nationally  has strained the capacity of this reporting chain to generate timely, actionable freezes before funds are withdrawn or converted to cryptocurrency.

The IT Act, CERT-In, and Cyber Enforcement

The Information Technology Act, 2000, together with provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, provides the criminal-law basis for prosecuting mule account operators, aggregators, and the fraudsters who direct them. CERT-In's role sits slightly upstream of the banking layer: it issues advisories on phishing, fake payment gateways, and compromised digital infrastructure that fraud syndicates use to recruit mule account holders and move money. The Ministry of Home Affairs' I4C coordinates the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal and the 1930 helpline, which allow victims to report fraud and trigger a limited window for freezing beneficiary accounts. I4C has also issued direct public alerts against illegal payment gateways built on mule accounts, warning citizens not to rent or sell their bank credentials to intermediaries.

The Coordination Gap

None of these institutions is short of legal authority. The gap is operational: banks, the RBI, FIU-IND, state police cyber cells, the CBI, and I4C each hold a piece of the picture, but no single agency has a real-time, end-to-end view of an account from opening to fraud to freeze. A mule account can be flagged by one bank's internal monitoring, reported through a completely different victim's complaint in another state, and investigated by a third jurisdiction's cyber police with each step introducing delay. The Indian Banks' Association has publicly pushed for the RBI to be given clearer power to directly freeze accounts flagged as mule accounts, rather than requiring each bank to act unilaterally or wait for a police request, precisely because this fragmentation lets fraudsters withdraw or launder funds within hours of a transaction.

Policy Recommendations

1. Mandatory video-KYC and biometric re-verification for all new accounts opened through business correspondents and third-party agents, with personal liability for verifying bank officials found complicit.

2. A statutory, RBI-backed mechanism allowing banks to freeze accounts flagged by MuleHunter.ai-type systems or FIU-IND intelligence within hours, rather than only after a formal police complaint.

3. A unified, interoperable case database linking the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, FIU-IND's STR system, and state cyber cells, so that an account flagged once is visible to every agency instantly.

4. Stronger due-diligence audits of banking correspondents and cooperative banks, which recur disproportionately in mule account cases relative to their share of total accounts.

5. Public financial-literacy campaigns targeted at the economically vulnerable groups most often recruited as unwitting mule account holders, paired with clear legal guidance distinguishing victims from willing participants.

Conclusion

The branch-level mule account cases surfacing across Delhi and other cities are not isolated policing stories; they are a live audit of India's AML and KYC architecture. The RBI, FIU-IND, CERT-In, and law enforcement agencies each have credible tools and legal mandates like MuleHunter.ai, PMLA reporting, IT Act prosecutions, and I4C's coordination portal chief among them but fraud syndicates continue to outpace the system by exploiting the seams between institutions rather than any single point of failure. Closing that gap requires less new law and more operational integration: faster account freezes, verified accountability at the point of account opening, and a shared, real-time picture of mule networks across every agency involved. Until banks, regulators, and investigators can act as one system rather than several disconnected ones, every dismantled racket will simply be replaced by the next.

References

1. https://aninews.in/news/national/general-news/delhi-police-arrests-bank-deputy-manager-in-83776792-crore-mule-account-case-linked-to-159-cyber-fraud-complaints20260610130737/
2. https://the420.in/delhi-bank-manager-mule-account-cyber-fraud-case/
3. https://www.business-standard.com/finance/news/what-are-mule-accounts-cybercrime-banking-layer-india-fraud-rbi-126062400855_1.html
4. https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/centre-freezes-450-000-mule-bank-accounts-used-in-cyber-fraud-schemes-124111200320_1.html
5. https://www.medianama.com/2025/04/223-iba-rbi-cyber-fraud-measures-freeze-bank-accounts-cybercrime/
6. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Fcentre-warns-of-illegal-payment-gateways-and-mule-accounts-3252723
7. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/over-85-lakh-mule-accounts-in-700-bank-branches-used-by-cyber-criminals-cbi-3604229
8. https://website.rbi.org.in/en/web/rbi/-/notifications/master-direction-know-your-customer-kyc-direction-2016-updated-as-on-may-04-2023-lt-span-gt-11566
9. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15402/1/moneylaunderingact2002.pdf
10. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13116/1/it_act_2000_updated.pdf
11. https://www.mha.gov.in/en/division_of_mha/cyber-and-information-security-cis-division/Details-about-Indian-Cybercrime-Coordination-Centre-I4C-Scheme

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Executive Summary:

The claim of a video of  US President Joe Biden dozing off during a television interview is digitally manipulated . The original video is from a 2011 incident involving actor and singer Harry Belafonte. He seems to fall asleep during a live satellite interview with KBAK – KBFX - Eyewitness News. Upon thorough analysis of keyframes from the viral video, it reveals that US President Joe Biden’s image was altered in Harry Belafonte's video. This confirms that the viral video is manipulated and does not show an actual event involving President Biden.

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Claims:

A video shows US President Joe Biden dozing off during a television interview while the anchor tries to wake him up.

Fact Check:

Upon receiving the posts, we watched the video then divided the video into keyframes using the inVid tool, and reverse-searched one of the frames from the video.

We found another video uploaded on Oct 18, 2011 by the official channel of KBAK - KBFX - Eye Witness News. The title of the video reads, “Official Station Video: Is Harry Belafonte asleep during live TV interview?”  

The video looks similar to the recent viral one, the TV anchor could be heard saying the same thing as in the viral video. Taking a cue from this we also did some keyword searches to find any credible sources. We found a news article posted by Yahoo Entertainment of the same video uploaded by KBAK - KBFX - Eyewitness News.

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Upon thorough investigation from reverse image search and keyword search reveals that the recent viral video of US  President Joe Biden dozing off during a TV interview is digitally altered to misrepresent the context. The original video dated back to 2011, where American Singer and actor Harry Belafonte was the actual person in the TV interview but not US  President Joe Biden.

Hence, the claim made in the viral video is false and misleading.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the viral video claiming to show US President Joe Biden dozing off during a television interview is digitally manipulated and inauthentic. The video is originally from a 2011 incident involving American singer and actor Harry Belafonte. It has been altered to falsely show US President Joe Biden. It is a reminder to verify the authenticity of online content before accepting or sharing it as truth.

• Claim:  A viral video shows in a television interview US President Joe Biden dozing off  while the anchor tries to wake him up.
• Claimed on: X (Formerly known as Twitter)
• Fact Check: Fake & Misleading

Executive Summary

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A news graphic is being shared on social media claiming that Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath said,“Those who practice casteism and discrimination are the ones opposing UGC. If you do not indulge in caste-based discrimination, what is there to fear?” The CyberPeace’s research found the viral claim circulating on social media to be false. Our research  revealed that Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath never made such a statement. It was also established that the viral news graphic has been digitally edited.

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Claim

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On February 8, a user on social media platform X (formerly Twitter) shared a news graphic bearing the logo of Navbharat Times, attributing the above statement to CM Yogi Adityanath. The post and its archived version can be seen below, along with screenshots. (Links and screenshots provided)

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• https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=878765434968058&set=a.12586118025849 
• https://archive.ph/oCVbH 

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Fact Check:

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To verify the authenticity of the claim, we conducted a keyword-based search on Google. However, we did not find any credible or reliable media report supporting the viral statement. We further examined the official social media accounts of Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, including his Facebook and Instagram handles. Our review found no post, speech, or statement resembling the claim made in the viral graphic.

Continuing the research , we examined the official social media accounts of Navbharat Times. During this process, we found the original graphic published on the Navbharat Times Facebook page on January 26, 2026. The caption of the original graphic read: “On the occasion of Republic Day 2026, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath said, ‘No one is above the Constitution.’”

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This clearly differs from the claim made in the viral graphic, indicating that the latter was altered.

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• https://www.facebook.com/navbharattimes/posts/pfbid0vE6mdTyBwrr 

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Conclusion

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Our research  confirms that Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath did not make the statement being attributed to him on social media. The viral news graphic is digitally edited and misleading. The claim, therefore, is false.

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